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Foreword 
am  pleased  to  present 
Consultative  Committees  on 
electricity  networks. 
here  the  reports  by  the 
access  by  th.l rd  partIes  to 
The  creation  by  the  Commlss~on of  these  Committees,  one 
made  up  of  representatives  of  the  Member  States  and  the 
other  of  representatIves  of  the  e I ectr I cIty  companIes 
and  consumers,  Is  expl lcltly  mentioned  In  the 
Commun 1  cat 1  on  by  the  Conm Iss I on  to  Counc I I  COM( 89) 336 
which  accompanied  the  draft  directive  on  electricity 
transit,  now  adopted  by  Councl I. 
This  consultation  seemed  necessary  In  order 
beyond  the  stage  of  transit,  ways  of  making 
European  market  of  1992  a  rea I I ty  In  the 
sector,  of  strengthening  competition  and 
consumer  choice. 
to  explore, 
the  greater 
electricity 
of  widening 
The  task  of  the  CommIttees  was  to  IdentIfy  the  maIn 
techn I ca 1 ,  economIc  and  admInIstratIve  e I ements  to  be 
taken  account  of  In  the  formulation  of  a  Community 
po 1 1  cy  on  whether,  and  how,  thIrd  partIes  shou I d  have 
access  to electricity networks. 
This  task  of  analysis  and  clarification  has  been 
successfully  concluded.  would  I Ike  to  thank  alI 
CommIttee  members  for  havIng  partIcIpated  actIve  I y  In 
dIscuss 1  on,  for  sharIng  theIr  expertIse  and  for 
expressing  their  different  points  of  view  on  this 
Important  and  complex  subJect. 
The  reports  bring  an  Indispensable  contribution  to  the 
debate  on  the  IncreasIng  of  competItIon  In  the  sector 
concerned  and  constitute  a  basis  on  which  to  formulate 
the  guiding  principles  of  pol Icy  for  the  European 
electricity market . 
Ant6nlo Cardoso  e  Cunha 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The  European  Commission  in  its  Communication  COM(89)  336  final,  dated 
September  29,  1989,  decided  for  the  installation  of  two  consul tat lve 
commIt tees  In  order  to  study  the  poss I  b I I I  ty  of  provIdIng  access  to 
third  parties  to  the  electricity  networks  of  the  member  states of  the 
European  Community.  One  consultative  committee  consisted  of 
representatives of  the electricity  Industry,  I.e.  Integrated utilities, 
generators,  transmission  companies,  distributors,  large  Industrial 
users,  domestic  and  other  small  consumers  and  was  called  the 
Professional  Consultative  COmmittee  on  Electricity  (PCCE).  The  other 
committee  on  electricity consisted of  representatives of  member  states 
and  was  ca lied  Com I te  Consu 1  tat If  Etats  t.tembres  E  lectr 1  cite  CCCEME>. 
The  members  of  the  CCEME  are shown  in  Appendix  A. 
This  report  Is  dedicated  to the work  of  CCEME. 
An  effort  has  been  made  to  reflect  the  views  of  the  delegates as  they 
expressed  them,  however,  when  a  point  was  made  by  more  than  one 
representative,  In  more  than  one  occasion,  effort  has  been  made  to 
avoid  duplication. 
1.1  Mandate  of  the  CCEME 
The  Committee  was  asked  to  assist  the  Commission  In  I  dent lfylng  the 
various  elements  {technical,  economic  and  administrative)  to  be  taken 
Into  account  by  the  COmmission  In  considering  whether  and  under  what 
conditions  a  system  of  third  party  access  to  the  electricity 
transmission networks  could  be  Implemented. 
The  members  of  the  CCEME  met  several  times  to discuss and  express  their 
views  on  the most  Important  aspects of  the  following  topics: 
Effects of Third Party Access  (TPA)  on  electricity generation. 
Effects of  TPA  on  electricity transmission. 
Effects of  TPA  on  electricity distribution and  consumption. 
Modalities of  the  implementation of  TPA. 
It  was  agreed  by  all  delegates  that  any  TPA  scheme  considered  should 
not  reduce  the  Intended  level  of security of supply,  quality of service 
and  system  control. ~  t 
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2.0 TYPES  OF  IPA 
ThIrd  Party  Access  or  TPA  Is  a  term  used  throughout  thIs  report  to 
denote,  In  general,  the  abi I ity  of  third  parties  (Generators, 
independent  power  producers,  consumers,  dIstributors)  to  receIve  and 
pay  for  services  provided  to  them  by  an  electricity  transmission 
network.  Definitions  of  the  type  of  access  that  may  be  available  to 
these  parties  are  provided  In  the  Glossary  In  Appendix  B.  It  Is 
important  to  poInt  out  that  these  defInItIons  are  provided  and  used 
throughout  this report  as working  hypotheses only. 
The  terms  nopen  access•  and  "thIrd  party  access•  are  used  to  denote 
service provided on  a  "first come  - first  served"  basis versus  the  term 
•common  carrier•  which,  throughout  this  report,  Is  used  to  denote 
service provided on  a  upro  rata"  basis. 
It  became  apparent  from  the  early  stages of  the  discussion  that  there 
was  no  support  for  a  pro  rata  system.  It  was  argued  that  a  pro  rata 
system  would  Jeopardize  the  security  of  supply  of  existing  customers. 
It  was  therefore  decided  that  such  a  system  should  be  rejected  and  not 
considered any  further  In  this report. 
The  term  "open  access"  Is  used  to  denote  that  all  possible  users 
(generators,  Independent  power  producers,  distributors,  small  and  large 
consumers>  have  access  to transmission services,  versus  the  term  "third 
party accessu  that  Is used  to denote  access to  these services available 
only  to  certain  types  of  customers  (for  example,  only  large  consumers 
and  distributors). 
Throughout  this  report,  the  term  TPA  Is  used  generically  to denote  any 
form  of  access  to  transmission services,  such  as open  access,  or  third 
party  access.  Despite  the  fact  that  It  was  recognized  by  most  of  the 
delegates  that,  from  a  practical  point  of  view,  the  domestic  and  other 
small  consumers  might  not  be  able  to  benefit  directly  from  TPA,  at 
least  during  Its  Initial  phase  of  Implementation,  It  was  decided  that 
the  discussions  should  not  rule  out  any  type  of  TPA  client  at  this 
stage. - 5  -
3.0 EFFECTS  OF  TPA  ON  ELECTRICITY  GENERATION 
In  the  context  of  electricity  generation,  TPA  would  make  it  possible 
for  certain  customers  or  distribution  companies  to  select  purchasing 
electricity  from  the  generator  of  their  choice,  in  principle  anywhere 
ins I  de  or  outs I  de  the  Commun I  t y ,  depend I  ng  on  t r ansm I  ss  ion  capac I  t y 
ava i I  ab I II ty. 
It  was  noted  by  a  few  participants  that  any  effort  to  introduce  more 
open  access  to generation facilities would  require  some  form  of  formal 
or  Informal  separation  of  the  production  function  from  the 
transmission,  distribution  and/or  electricity  marketing  functions. 
This  separation  Is  also  referred  to  as  •unbundling•.  In  highly 
Integrated electricity systems,  this separation  may  vary  from  a  formal 
disintegration of  the company  (as was  the case  In  England  and  Wales)  to 
a  possible  development  of  an  arms  length  relationship  between  the 
production  department  and  the  transmission-distribution  departments  of 
the  integrated  company  (as  was  the  case  in  Scot land).  such  a  scheme 
would  offer  a  wider  choice  of  suppliers  to  electricity  consumers  and 
would  also  be  expected  to  Introduce  a  higher  degree  of  competition  at 
the  level  of electricity generation. 
Thus,  the  Introduction of  some  form  of  TPA  would  affect  the electricity 
Industry  In  different  ways,  depending  upon  the  structure  and  the 
specific circumstances  prevailing  In  each  of  the  twelve  member  states. 
TPA  would  also change  the way  generation  plant  Is  dispatched  today,  to 
the  extent  that  the  presence  of  TPA  contracts  may  interfere  with  the 
dispatch  merit  order.  In  this  context,  It  was  recognized  that  at 
present  there  Is  a  wide  variety  of  structures  of  the  electricity 
industry  among  member  states.  It was  argued  that,  In  parallel  with  the 
Introduction  of  a  more  competitive  system,  It  Is  necessary  to  achieve 
greater  convergence  of  energy  policies of  member  states,  in  particular 
with  respect  to  fuel  policies,  state  aids,  environmental  and  safety 
requirements,  as  well  as  financial  parameters  such  as  taxation, 
accounting policies,  costing and  pricing principles etc. 
Some  of  the  participants  noted  that  there  Is  hardly  any  doubt  that 
there  would  be  considerable  advantages  to  be  gained  from  an  Increased 
Integration  of  the  European  electricity  production  system.  These 
advantages  could  be  realized  by  an  Increased  cooperation  among  the 
European  electricity  producers,  as  it  Is  expected  to  occur  under  the 
Electricity Transit Directive.  In  such  a  case,  It was  further  argued, 
there would  be  hardly  any  further  advantages  by  Introducing  TPA,  which 
may  lead  to  a  reduction  of  overall  economic  efficiency  and  may  even 
hinder  the  realization  of  national  energy  policy  objectives.  Another 
delegation  argued  that,  despite  an  expected  Improvement  In  the 
efficiency  of  the  European  electricity  system  by  Introducing  more 
transit,  a  system  of electricity monopolies  would  still  be  maintained. 
Such  a  system  would  not  be  In  a  position  to  offer  the  advantages  of 
more  competition,  Including  giving  Individual  consumers  the  freedom  to 
choose  the producer  of  their choice. ··l 
i  ~ 
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Differing  views  were  expressed  about  the  effect  of  TPA  on  new 
generation  investments.  Most  delegates felt  that  TPA  might  make  future 
demand  less  certain,  thus  making  investments  in  new  generating  plants 
riskier.  It  was  submitted  that,  in  such  an  environment,  TPA  would  tend 
to  favour  Investments  with  lower  risk,  such  as  Combine  Cycle  Gas 
Turbines  CCCGT·s)  that  are  efficient  and  can  be  Installed  In  the  form 
of  smaller  units  with  shorter  lead  times.  This  would  tend  to  exclude 
Investments  In  capital  Intensive  projects with  longer  lead  times,  such 
as  nuclear  and  coal  plants.  Such  a  shift  could  be  accepted,  In  the 
view  of one  delegate,  as a  result of market  forces,  and  coincidentally, 
It  could also be  beneficial  from  an  environmental  point of  view. 
Some  delegates  expressed  concern  that  a  more  competitive  system  might 
conf llct  with  nat lonal  energy  policy  object tvea.  However,  even  In  a 
market  based  aystM,  governments  could  stIll  regulate  future  fuel 
choices,  If  they  felt  that  It  was  In  their  best  Interest  to  do  so  for 
energy  policy  reasons. 
Another  view  expressed  by  some  delegates  -was  that  a  competitive 
approach  has  to  be  structured  very  carefully  In  order  to  allow 
competition  to  work  without  adversely  affecting  security  of  supply, 
quality  of  service  and  system  control.  It  was  further  argued  that  in 
such  a  competitive  environment,  there would  be  no  reason  why  shortages 
may  develop,  particularly  when  the  producers  have  more  opportunity  to 
access  a  larger  market.  It  was  also  argued  that  In  a  TPA  regime  the 
execut ton  of  long  term  contractual  arrangements  between  electr Ietty 
suppliers  and  their  clients would  be  a  dlst I  net  possibility.  In  such 
cases,  the  Investment  uncertainty would  be  greatly mitigated. 
In  addition,  In  a  more  competitive  environment  Introduced  by  TPA,  It 
was  argued  that  spare capacity margins might  be  reduced  In  an  effort  to 
reduce  costs,  thus  compromising  security of supply.  On  the other  hand, 
It  was  also  mentioned  that  Increased  levels  of  inter-regional 
electricity  transit  and  more  open  access  might  reduce  the  total  level 
of  reserve  capacIty  needed  CommunIty-wIde.  Furthermore,  reduced 
capacity  margins  mean  more  economic  electricity  supply,  provided  that 
securIty  of  supp I  y  wou 1  d  not  be  compromIsed.  Another  way  to  ensure 
adequate  levels of  reserve  capacity  would  be  through  appropriate  price 
signals to the generators. - 7  -
~.0 EFFECTS  OF  TPA  ON  TRANSMISSION 
It  was  recognized  by  all  parties  that,  because  of  its  nature  and  its 
capital  intensity,  it  is  uneconomic  to  duplicate  a  transmission 
network.  Unnecessary  duplication  of  transmission  faci titles  would 
constitute waste  of  scarce  resources  such  as  equipment,  capital,  labor 
etc.  and  may  be  environmentally unacceptable. 
It  was  therefore  the  view  of  the Committee  that  In  practice,  under  any 
TPA  scheme,  the  transmission  system  would  maintain  Its  monopolistic 
character.  Some  delegates  felt  It  should  be  treated  as  a  function 
separate from  generation providing  transmission and  related services to 
all  part les. 
It  was  submitted  by  one  of  the delegates  that  any  TPA  scheme  should  be 
based  on  simple  principles.  Baaed  on  the  specific  UK  example,  he 
proceeded  to cite some  of  the principles that  could  be  used: 
There  should  be  access  to  the  transmission  as  well  as  the 
distribution network  on  a  non-discriminatory basis. 
The  transmission/distribution  function  (the  wires  business)  should 
be  distinguished  from  the  merchandising  function,  I.e.  the 
commercial  aspects of electricity trade. 
The  grid  should  be  given  the  responsibility  to  dispatch  generating 
units on  the basis of some  kind of a  merit  order. 
Rigorous  operational 
distribution. 
codes  relating 
An  overseeing and/or  regulatory  function. 
to  transmission  and 
Transmission  charges  should  be  transparent  and  carefully  designed 
to give  the  right economic  signals to future  investment. 
Another  delegate  submitted  that  It  Is  desirable  to  have  more 
competition  In  the  electricity sector,  however,  one  has  to  be  mindful 
of  the  problema  that  may  be  created  by  the  Introduction  of  TPA.  These 
may  concern: 
the question of who  has  the obligation to supply; 
Who  will  have  the  responsibility  to  supply  the  nnon-captlve" 
customers,  If and  when  they  decide  to return  to the system. 
Should  a  syst• be  developed  whereby  a  fee  should  be  charged  for 
opting  In  or out of  the system? 
The  difficulty of deriving standard tariffs. '  ' 
; .. 
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With  respect  to  transmission  rates,  the  same  representative  submitted 
that  It  would  be  much  easier  to  develop  the  appropriate  transmission 
rates  in  stages,  by  first  studying  as  an  example  to  allow  only 
distribution  companies  to  access  the  grid  and  "shop  around"  for  their 
e I  ect rIc I  ty  supp I I  es.  HIs  suggestion  was  to  "go  s I  ow  and  I  earn  a I  ong 
the  way":  by  first  examining,  as  an  example,  allowing  TPA  to 
distributors close to an  lntracommunity  boarder. 
In  response  to this  last  point  another  representative pointed out  that, 
If  some  TPA  scheme  was  to be  Introduced,  It would  not  be  appropriate  to 
limit  access  to  boarder  distributors.  Access  should  be  extended,  on  a 
non-discriminatory basis,  to  include other  large electricity users.  On 
this occasion,  It  was  further  argued  that  a  TPA  system  should  also  be 
expanded  to  Include  even  countries outside  the  EEC  associated  directly 
or  Indirectly with  intracommunity  electricity trade. 
In  addition,  there  was  some  concern  expressed  by  the  same  delegate 
that,  the  present  level  of  co-operation  between  European  utilities 
through  organizations such  as  UCPTE  would  be  lost  in  a  more  competitive 
TPA  environment.  This  does  not  need  to  be  the  case  if,  as  indicated 
earlier  by  another  representative,  the  "wires"  function,  i.e.  the 
operation  of  the  transmission  system,  were  separated  from  the 
commercial  aspects  of  electricity  trade.  Such  a  scheme  would  sti II 
permit  cooperation  of  operators  at  the  technical  level  of  running  the 
grids,  while  electricity merchants  might  compete  for  new  business  and 
new  markets. 
Some  member  state  delegates  submitted  that  they  have  no  experience 
with  TPA  and  that  they  could  see  no  reasons  or  benefIts  from  the 
introduction  of  an  untested  scheme,  such  as  TPA.  One  delegate  more 
particularly  argued  that  highly  integrated  systems  would  be  required 
to  review  their  structure and  all  aspects of  the electricity business. 
With  respect  to transportation,  it was  his view  that: 
the  grid  should  be  responsible  for  making  available  and  paying  for 
all  ancillary transmission services,  such  as  reserve,  back-up,  top-
up  etc. 
In  non-profit  state  owned  and/or  controlled  uti I itles,  a  profit 
scheme  would  have  to be  allowed  by  reorganizing  the system. 
If  new  transmission  lines were  necessary  and  If  these  lines  remain 
under-utilized  for  long  periods,  it  could  lead  to  lower 
profitability of  the system. 
Another  representative  submitted  that  at  the  national  level,  TPA 
regarding  transmission  does  not  appear  to  cause  any  maJor  problems  of 
technical  nature,  provided  that  appropriate  regulations were  Instituted 
and  observed.  However,  the  relevant  question  is  not  If  TPA  would  be 
technically  possible,  but  If,  from  an  overall  or  global  point  of  view, 
It  would  be  beneficial.  It  was  his  view  that  a  kind  of  TPA  that  would 
allow  Independent  producers  to  access  the  gr ld  would  be  attract lve, 
but  that  It  Is  difficult  to  see  the  community-wide  advantages  of  TPA 
permitted  to  large scale consumers. -_; 
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Another  delegate  stated  that  a  few  countries  have  already  taken  steps 
to  increase  competition,  by  removing  a  number  of  obstacles  to  imports 
and  exports of electricity and  to unbundle  production  and  distribution. 
In  one  country,  for  instance,  all  end-users  are  free  to  import 
electricity;  distribution  companies  are  free  to  buy  electricity  from 
any  Internal  production  company  and  large  consumers  have  the 
possibility  to  purchase  electric 1ty  from  any  distribution  company  they 
prefer.  In  addition,  these  possibilities  are  facilitated  by  a 
statutory transport obligation for  grid owners. 
The  same  representative  argued  that,  creating additional  incentives  to 
increase  competition,  e.g.  TPA,  could  seriously  put  at  risk  the 
necessary  levels of  security of  supply.  It  should  also  be  noted  that 
exIstIng  I  egIs I  at ion  In  some  countrIes  wou I  d  have  to  be  changed  to 
enable  Increased competition  Incentives. 
It  was  further  argued  that  In  some  member  states,  the  system  was 
designed  without  long  distance  transport  in  mind  and  with  relatively 
few  generating plants  located  near  centers of  demand.  In  such  a  case, 
the  transmission  Infrastructure has  remained  minimal  and  no  thought  has 
been  given  to  a  transmission  system  that  would  be  able  to  satisfy  TPA 
reQuirements.  TPA  would  reQuire  additional  transmission  investment  and 
some  doubt  was  expressed whether  that  Investment  could  be  recovered. - 10  -
5.0 EFFECTS  OF  TPA  ON  DISTRIBUTION  AND  CONSUMPTION 
With  respect  to  the  effects  of  TPA  on  the  security  of  supply  to  end 
users,  alI  delegates were  of  the  view  that  the  level  of  security would 
be  affected  in  a  more  competitive environment.  The  views  on  this  issue 
ranged  from  general  remarks  that  any  form  of  TPA  would  have  a  negative 
effect  on  the  level  of  security,  to  the  views  of  some  delegates  who 
submitted  that  It  would  be  possible  to  rely  on  a  market  mechanism  and 
prudent  contracting practices  In  order  to obtain  the desirable  level  of 
security,  or  that  one  could  design  a  TPA  scheme  which,  by  allowing  TPA 
on  a  case  by  case  basis  and  with  appropriate  national  legislation, 
might  ensure  an  adequate  level  of  security.  In  any  case,  most 
submissions  emphasized  the  need  to  protect  the  more  vulnerable 
customers,  I.e.  the  franchise or  captive customers. 
With  respect  to  the  need  to classify users  to  "franchlsen  versus  "non-
franchise•,  despite  the  danger  of  Introducing  some  degree  of 
discrimination between  customer  groups,  most  of  the delegates submitted 
that,  from  a  practical  point  of  view,  It  may  be  necessary  to  make  the 
distinction  In  order  to better  protect  users  that  either  are  not  large 
enough  to  exert  sIgnIfIcant  market  power,  have  no  a I  terna  t I  ve  fue I 
capability,  or  are  too  small  and  Inexperienced.  Two  delegates 
expressed  different  views  on  this  Issue  by  either  stating  that  they 
would  allow all  customers equal  TPA  rights,  knowing  full  wei I  that only 
the  larger  ones  will  be  able  to  use  these  rights,  or  that  a  •phasedn 
Introduction of  TPA  might  create market  conditions  that would  make  such 
distinction  unnecessary.  It  was  further  argued  that,  irrespective  of 
the  distinction,  a  carefully  designed  TPA  scheme  should  be  In  a 
position  to benefit  not  only  the  large  but  the  small  electricity users 
as we II. 
On  the  Issue  of  obligation  to  supply,  there  was  substantial  agreement 
that  someone  (In  most  cases  the  view  was  that  It  should  be  the  local 
distribution  company)  should  have  the  obi lgatlon  to  supply, 
particularly the captive  "franchise"  customers. 
With  respect  to  the electricity costs of  distribution companies  (where 
they  exist  as  separate  entitles),  one  delegation  expressed  the  view 
that distributors should  be  allowed  to  •shop  around"  to obtain the best 
possible  deal,  not  only  In  terms  of  price,  but  also  In  terms  of 
reliable secure supply.  Another  representative pointed out  that  In  his 
country  distributors may  be  allowed  to choose  their  supplier  only  from 
within  the same  state,  thus safeguarding national  security of  supply. 
A third  representative  suggested  that  It  might  be  possible,  even  for 
Integrated electricity systems,  to allow  their  regional  distributors to 
choose  their supplier  from  either within or outside their  country under 
certain  conditions.  He  observed  that  the  possible  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  a  TPA  system  could  strongly  depend  on  the  TPA  system 
chosen.  In  particular, a  type of  TPA  limited  to distribution companies 
could  considerably  reduce  the  risk of  cross-subsidization,  since  these 
distributors would  maintain  the  responsibility to supply  the  Industrial 
consumers  as  well  as  the  other  consumers.  In  fact,  In  cases  of  even 
temporary  production  overcapacity,  the  temptation  would  be  to  sell  at - 11  -
the spot  marginal  price,  something  that  could  tempt  flexible  Industrial 
customers  to  switch  and  could  lead  to  reactions  that  would  be 
detrimental  for  the  captive  consumers  who  would  have  to bare  the  fixed 
costs. 
On  the  issue  of  the  effect  of  TPA  on  prIces  In  genera I,  It  was 
acknowledged  by  most  delegates who  spoke  on  this  topic that  prices wil 1 
be  affected,  but  there  might  be  different  reactions,  depending  on  the 
conditions prevailing  In  each  member  state.  Delegates also pointed out 
that  lower  prices  for  some  customers  might  lead  to  cross-subsidization 
and  discr lmlnat ion  between  customer  classes,  both  ser lous  potentIa I 
problems  Induced  by  TPA. 
The  Impact  of  TPA  on  the  level  of  demand  was  expected  to be  modest  and 
difficult  to  determine,  a  view  expressed  by  most  delegates.  One 
representative  submitted  that  the  Impact  was  expected  to  be  minor,  If 
any,  because  studies  In  his  country  Indicate  that  It  would  take  a 
significant  price  change  (at  least  for  the  domestic  consumer}  before 
demand  Is  affected. 
No  maJor  concerns  were  expressed  on  the  Issue  of  end-use  1  nter-fue  1 
competition,  where  It  was  argued  that  fuel  prices  would  determine  the 
competitiveness of each  fuel,  provided  that  they  reflected costs. 
On  the  issue  of  how  TPA  may  affect  environmental  policies,  It  was 
pointed out  that  this  Is  mainly  an  issue  linked  with  the  production  of 
electricity.  The  general  view  expressed  by  most  of  the  participants 
was  that  a  more  competitive  environment  would  provide  fewer  incentives 
for  environmental  protection.  However,  this  problem  may  be  addressed 
through  the  adoption  of  minimum  environmental  standards  by  the  member 
states on  a  consistent  basis.  In  any  event,  as  It  was  pointed  out  by 
one  of  the  de I  egates.  env I  ronmenta I  poI icy  may  be  pursued  wIth  or 
without  TPA. 
With  respect  to  pricing  methodologies,  one  view  was  that  electricity 
prices  under  TPA  should  be  allowed  to  be  determined  by  market  forces, 
whereas  another  opinion  expressed  concern  that  under  TPA  It  would  be 
more  difficult  to establish prices.  A third delegate  pointed out  that 
In  his  country  prices  are  set  by  a  committee  and  before  tariffs  are 
changed,  the  Impact  on  all  sectors of  the  economy  has  to  be  assessed. 
Under  TPA  this  would  be  difficult  to  do,  furthermore  some  customers 
might  stand to benefit more  than others. 
There  was  general  consensus  among  the  delegates  In  favour  of  prIce 
transparency.  On  the  issue of  cost  transparency,  a  few  delegates  felt 
that  it  Is  usefu I  and  that  It  wou I  d  he I  p  the . creatIon  of  a  more 
competitive  environment.  Other  delegates  argued,  however,  that  once  a 
truly  competitive  environment  has  been  created,  cost  transparency 
would  not  be  consistent  with  competItion  and  therefore  would  not  be 
needed.  However,  depending  on  the  TPA  system  Introduced,  cost 
Information would  be  needed  by  the competent  authorities  In  confidence, 
to  help  establish  regulated  prices  of  monopoly  services  such  as 
transmission  and  transmission  related  services.  This  Information  In 
some  member  states  Is  already submitted  In  confidence. - 12  -
With  respect  to  the  need  for  regulation  of  tariffs,  one  delegate 
submitted  that  one  either  has  allowed  the  development  of  a  competitive 
Industry,  In  which  case  regulation  would  not  be  necessary,  or  a 
monopoly  situation  Is  maintained,  In  which  case  there  would  be  a  need 
for  regulation  and  regulated  tariffs.  Another  representative  pointed 
out  that  under  TPA  there  would  be  parts  of  the  system,  such  as 
transmission,  that  would  remain  as  monopolies  and  would  therefore  need 
some  form  of  regulation. - 13  -
6.0  MODALITIES  OF  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  TPA 
The  delegates were  asked  to make  submissions on  the  need  for  regulation 
under  TPA,  the  regulatory  arrangements  and  Instruments  needed  for  the 
implementation  of  TPA  and  the  Institutional  requirements of  regulation. 
Given  that  the  debate  on  the  possible  advantages  of  TPA  had  not  been 
conclusive,  some  delegates  were  hesitant  to  pronounce  themselves  on 
these  Issues  Indicating  It  was  "premature".  It  would  also  be 
appropriate,  according  to  a  few  delegates,  to  walt  for  the  results  of 
the  Implementation  of  the  Electricity  Transit  Directive  and  the  Price 
Transparency  Directive.  Nevertheless,  the  following  remarks  were  made: 
Various  schemes  of  regulation already exist  In  the electricity  industry 
of  the  member  states,  In  order  to set or  approve  prices charged  to  the 
final  consumers.  It  was  the  view  of  moat  delegates  that  the 
lntroduct ion  of  any  form  of  TPA  would  give  r lse  to  some  new  Issues, 
both  at  the Community  as well  as  the  national  level,  that  would  require 
some  form  of  new  regulatory  intervention.  Some  delegates  commented 
that  limiting  TPA  to  certain  customers  only,  or  1  lmltlng  client 
mobility  might  be  anticompetltive  and  possibly  even  Incompatible  with 
the Treaty of  Rome  under  certain conditions. 
One  delegate  pointed  out  that  some  new  administrative  set-up  would  be 
necessary  at  Community  level  to ensure  fairness  and  equal  treatment  of 
all  users.  He  added  that  new  regulations  should  have  common  features 
across  all  member  states  but  maximum  flexibl lity  and  freedom  to 
Implement  these  regulations should  be  given  to all  member  states.  With 
respect  to  the  form  and  degree  of  TPA  and  the  regulatory  Instruments 
needed  to  achieve  the  main  objectives of  more  competition  and  freedom 
of  choice,  one  delegate stated that  the development  of more  competition 
would  require  a  regulatory  framework.  Real  cost  transparency  would  be 
needed  to  avoid  cross-subsidization.  Flexible  regulation  would  be 
needed  to deal  with  the  issue of  generation and  transmission  capacity. 
TPA  would,  In  his  view,  be  able  to  take  care  of  other  market  needs 
through  negotiations  In  a  competitive  envlroment.  With  respect  to 
future  Investment  uncertainty  Induced  by  TPA,  he  stated that  some  rules 
would  be  needed  to  limit  mobility  of  clients  (such  as  providing  for 
several  years of  notice of  entry and/or  exit)  as well  as  conditions of 
access.  He  finally suggested  that  an  effort to resolve disputes should 
be  made  first  at  the  national  level  before  resorting  to  the  courts or 
an  arbiter at  COmmunity  level. 
Another  delegate  also  recognized  the  need  for  some  form  of  regulation 
under  any  TPA  regime  and  referred  to  the  conditions  In  his  country 
where  legislation already provides  for  some  regulation with  respect  to, 
for  example,  the obi tgatlon  to  transport electricity  for  third parties 
and  dlstr I  but ion  companies.  He  added  that  TPA  has  to  be  related  to 
energy  pol Icy  obJectives of member  states,  such  as security of  supply. 
Another  de I  egate  pointed  out  the  need  to  i nsta II  a  permanent  cost 
control  system  that  would  unbundle  the  costs  of  generation, 
transmission  and  distribution and  would  allocate costs  to  consumers  In 
a  way  to  avoid  cross-subsidization.  He  further  suggested  that 
principles of  regulation  should  be  established community-wide  and  that - 14  -
a  more  detailed  regulatory  scheme  should  be  developed  at  the  national 
level  In  a  way  to  serve  the  specific  needs  of  each  country.  He 
particularly  emphasized  the  need  for  a  flexible  national  scheme  that 
would  ensure  security  of  supply  and  fair  prices  in  all  national 
regions,  particularly  in  areas  where  economic  and  social  disparities 
exist. 
Another  delegate  mentioned  that  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  TPA 
should  be  the  production  of  electricity  at  the  lowest  possible  cost. 
In  this context  he  suggested  that  autoproducers  should  be  free  to sell 
power  to  the grid.  Even  If  the economic  Justification of  TPA  Is  based 
on  the  expectation  that  some  customers  would  be  able  to  purchase 
electricity  cheaper  than  they  do  now,  TPA  would  cause  some  cross-
subsidization  and  therefore  some  customers  would  gain  but  some  would 
also  lose.  He  made  the  general  statement  that  electricity  Is 
sufficiently  different  from  other  goods  to  Justify  a  treatment 
different  from  the  treatment  of  other  goods  In  a  competitive  market. 
He  finally  stated  that  his  country  would  be  willing  to  consider 
allowing  the next  power  plant  to be  built by  the private sector,  but  he 
expressed  some  concern  that  the  electricity market  in  his  country  was 
not  large enough  to allow many  generators to compete  effectively. 
The  next  delegate  expressed  some  concern  that  some  important  Issues 
have  not  yet  been  thought  through  sufficiently  in  order  to  allow  the 
choice  of  a  part lcular  form  of  TPA  that  may  be  appropr late  for  the 
CommunIty.  He  suggested  that  more  deta I I  ed  forms  of  TPA  shou I  d  be 
examined  more  closely  before  any  specific modalities  of  Implementation 
are examined. 
The  next  delegate to make  submissions on  the subJect  expressed  the  view 
that  the  advantages  would  not  exceed  the  disadvantages  of  TPA  and 
emphasized  continuing  scepticism  about  open  access.  It  was  also 
pointed out  that  there  Is  no  possible TPA  arrangement  that would  reduce 
regu I  at ion,  or  the  need  for  It,  and  that  any  mode  of  implementation 
would  depend  on  the objectives of  TPA.  Support  was  expressed  for  more 
competition  In  the electricity market,  but  not  necessarily  through  TPA 
only.  Emphasis  was  placed  In  the  parallel  development  of  flanking 
policies  and  other  accompanying  measures  that  would  lead  to  a  more 
harmonized  framework  In  the electricity sector. 
Another  delegate  stated  that  TPA  does  require  regulation.  However,  a 
different  degree of  regulation  Is  needed  In  areas that would  be  subject 
to  compet 1  t 1  ve  forces,  such  as  generatIon,  versus  areas  that  remaIn 
effective monopolies,  such  as  transmission.  In  areas where  competition 
could work,  he  added,  competition  law  would  be  enough,  even  though  some 
ground  rules  with  respect  to  licensing,  notice  periods  for  entry  and 
exit  etc.  would  be  needed.  With  respect  to  small  customers,  the 
situation  would  be  more  difficult  and  schemes  both  excluding  and 
Including  the  small  customers  from  TPA  could  be  considered  together 
with  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  same  delegate  suggested 
that  regulation could  be  Implemented  In  a  different  manner  in  each  one 
of  the  member  states  In  a  way  that  would  satisfy  the  specific 
conditions  prevailing  In  that  country.  He  added  that  It  would  be  very 
difficult  and  complex  to  Implement  any  form  of  detailed  regulation  at 
Community  level  and  he  stressed  the  need  for  an  adequate  transition - 15  -
period  to  allow  for  the  smooth  transition  of  existing  systems  to  any 
new  TPA  scheme.  It  was  his view  that  in  any  TPA  scheme  provision could 
be  made  for  adeQuate  security  of  supply  and  policy  priorities.  He 
f ina I I  y  proposed  a  two  stage  approach  In  Imp I  ement i ng  TPA  in  the 
Community: 
In  the first stage,  a  period  in  which  member  states would  commit  to 
removing  legislative  and  other  obstacles  and  introducing  some 
elements of  TPA  but  maintain  the discretion on  the  form  they  should 
take.  During  this stage some  guidelines might  be  needed. 
In  the second  stage,  the  right of  TPA  across  the Community  would  be 
enshrined  In  legislation  together  with  basic  principles  such  as 
unbundling  and  non-discrimination.  However,  there  would  be  no 
detailed  prescription of  the  way  TPA  would  be  provided  for  and  no 
heavy  community-wide  regulation.  This  stage  might  be  conditional 
on  a  review of  Stage One. 
A delegate expressed  some  support  for  the above  proposal  provided  that, 
he  emphasized,  a  period of evaluation was  allowed  between  the  first  and 
the  second  stage  that  would  permit,  on  the  basis  of  the  results  of 
stage one,  making  a  decision whether  to proceed  with  stage  two. - 16  -
7.0  Sl.IMMAAY 
7.1  Points of agreement 
There  was  general  agreement  among  the  delegates  that  enhancing 
competition  and  broadening  the  electricity market  would  be  beneficial, 
including  the  benefits  expected  from  the  implementation  of  the 
Electricity  Transit  Directive  and  the  Price  Transparency  Directive. 
This  would  be  consistent  with  the  objectives  of  the  Internal  Energy 
Market.  Relying  on  as  much  competition  as  possible  would  bring 
benefits,  provided  that  Important  factors,  such  as  security of  supply, 
qua II ty  of  servIce  and  system  contro I  were  not  compromised.  In  this 
regard,  a  significant  number  of  delegates  emphasized  that  the 
"traditional" electricity systems  that  exist  In  numerous  member  states 
were  not  without  merit. 
During  the  discussions  another  important  argument  made  was  that  means 
other  than  TPA  were  also  able  to  favour  the  continued  integration  of 
the  Community  electricity market.  In  parallel  to more  competition,  It 
would  be  necessary  to  obtain  more  convergence  in  different  domains 
(such  as  fiscal,  environmental,  accounting  policies,  access  to  primary 
energy  sources  etc.)  and  second,  the  elimination  of  trade  obstacles 
(such  as,  for  example,  import  and  export  monopolies). 
On  the  other  hand,  It  was  recognized  that  It  Is  at  the  level  of 
electricity  production  that  more  competition  may  be  Introduced 
(autoproductlon,  cogeneration,  Independent  power  production),  and  this 
may  be  achieved without  necessarily resorting to TPA. 
Another  important  argument  that  was  made  implicitly  during  the 
discussions  Is  that  the  Internal  electricity market  (and  the  possible 
lntroduct ion  of  TPA  whose  form  is  stIll  to  be  decided)  does  not 
necessarily  require  modification  of  the  structure  of  the  electricity 
Industry.  In  other  words,  the  existing  diversity  of  these  structures 
Is  not  in  itself an  unsurmountable  obstacle  In  the  realization of  the 
Internal  electricity market.  However,  achieving  an  Internal  market  for 
electricity  would  be  facilitated  if  proposals  having  that  as  an 
objective,  have  comparable  effects on  all  member  states. 
'It  Is  also fair  to say  that,  In  the context of TPA,  there was  agreement 
on  the  following  three aspects: 
first,  It  was  agreed  to  exclude  decisively  any  form  of  "common 
carrier"  as  It  Implies  a  danger  of  pro  rating existing contracts. 
second,  If  TPA  were  to be  Introduced  <see  below),  Its modalities of 
Implementation  should  be  based,  as  much  as  possible,  on  the 
following  Ideas:  minimum  regulation,  subsidiarity,  gradual 
approach,  and  evaluation of experience. 
finally,  the  TPA  system  that  is progressively  Introduced  In  the  UK 
represents,  with  respect  to modalities of  lmpleme~tation,  only  one 
example  of what  could  be  contemplated  In  this domain. - 17  -
7.2 Remaining  differences 
It  Is  clear  that  the  debate  brought  to  I ight  the  persistence  of 
apprec I  ab I  y  dIvergent  poInts  of  view  on  a  number  of  issues  and  more 
specifically on  the possible effects of  a  TPA  system. 
a)  Possible effects 
These  differences of opinion may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
i >  ConcernIng  the  impact  of  a  TPA  system  on  the  product I  on  of 
electricity. 
Certain  delegates  anticipate  that  TPA  would  risk  to  compromise 
new  Investments  necessary  to  respond  to  future  demand,  given 
that  the  uncertainty  of  future  prospects  resulting  from 
competition  could  dissuade  Investors.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
TPA  would  favour  generation  investments with  lower  fixed  costs, 
such  as  gas  fired  stations,  and  would  disadvantage  coal  and 
nuclear  stations  that  require  relatively  longer  amortization 
periods. 
In  contrast  to this,  It  was  argued  that  the competitive climate 
resulting  from  TPA  would  favour  the entry of  new  Investors  and 
Independent  producers,  and  would  accelerate  Investments.  In 
add it ion,  TPA  would  encourage  Investors  to  try  to  build  more 
efficient and  better performing units. 
II) Concerning  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  the  tran  ..  lsslon of electricity 
It  was  argued  that  the  commercIa I  freedom  Introduced  by  TPA 
would  not  endanger  the  quality  of  the  technical  management  of 
the  European  electricity  networks.  TPA  would  allow  the 
availabl lity of electricity originating from  cheaper  production 
sources  In  the  Community,  and  would  allow  the  development  of  a 
European  electricity  network  based  truly  on  the  opportunities 
of  commercial  trade. 
On  the  other  hand,  certain delegates anticipate  that  TPA  would 
make  the  management  of  electricity  transmission  networks 
excessively  complex,  something  that  would  have  a  negative 
effect on  the  reliability of  the  networks  and  the continuity  In 
the  supply  of  electricity.  In  addition,  TPA  would  risk  to 
dIsturb  the  exIstIng  atmosphere  of  cooper at ion  between  I  arge 
networks. 
iii)  Concerning  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  distribution and  consu.ptlon 
Certain  delegates  expect  that  TPA  would  Increase  costs  by 
endangering  the  planning  of  production  Investments,  Increasing 
transmission  losses  and  disrupting  the  •merit  order•  (the 
optimization  of  variable  costs  by  calling  to  service  stations 
on  the basis of an  economic  hierarchy).  In  addition,  TPA  would 
Introduce  ser lous  discr lmlnat lon  by  asking  capt lve  customers, ... 
b) 
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or  customers  with  I Itt le  negotiating  power,  to  pay  for  the 
benefits that would  be  obtained  by  the  large  consumers.  It  was 
argued  that  the advantages  and/or  disadvantages  I Inked  to a  TPA 
system  could  strongly  depend  on  the  system  chosen.  In 
part lcular,  a  TPA  system  I imited  to  distribution  companies 
would  reduce  considerably  the  risk  of  cross-subdldization, 
since  these  distributors  would  maintain  the  responsibility  to 
supply  the  Industrial  as well  as  the other  customers. 
On  the  other  hand  It  was  argued  that,  by  increasing  exchanges 
and  by  Increasing  the  opportunities  offered  to  lower  cost 
sources  of  production,  TPA  would  allow  the  reduction  of 
electricity  costs  In  time.  Furthermore,  TPA  would  lead  to  a 
closer  relationship  of  prices  with  costs,  would  eliminate 
cross-subsidies between  consumer  types  and  would  thus  lead  to a 
more  rational  price structure  that  would  be  more  favourable  to 
general  economic  development. 
Modal It les 
Some  delegates  were  of  the  view  that,  before  discussing  possible 
rnoda I It i es,  one  shou I  d  wait  to  see  the  resu Its  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Electricity  Transit  Directive  and  the  Price 
Transparency  Directive. 
ConcernIng  the  poss I  b I  e  moda I It I  es  of  Imp I  ement I  ng  a  TPA  scheme, 
two  Interrelated  Issues  became  the  subject  of  considerable 
difference: 
the  advantages  and  part I  cuI ar I  y  the  feas I  b II I  ty  of  unbund I I  ng 
the  various  activities of  the  electricity  sector  (generation, 
transmission,  distribution). 
cost  transparency. 
7.3 COncluding  R..arka 
The  CCEME  fulfilled  Its  mandate  practically  within  the  set  deadline, 
even  If  some  times  some  delegates  felt  they  were  under  fairly  strong 
time  pressure. 
The  debate  was  frank  and  was  conducted  In  a  positive  and  open 
atmosphere.  In  this  regard,  It  Is  important  to  underline  that,  even 
though  they  expressed  themselves  as  national  representatives,  the 
delegates  accepted  In  this  report  the  principle  of  anonymity  which 
indicates  that  the  positions  expressed  were  not  necessarily  fixed  and 
irreversible.  This  agrees  with  the  Intention  of  the  Commission,  when 
it created the consultative Committees  to deal  with  the  Issue of  TPA. 
As  It  Is  natural,  the  discussions  in  the  frame  of  CCEME  were  less 
techn 1  ca 1  than  those  of  the  profess lona I  commIt tees;  on  the  other 
hand,  concerns of energy  policy were  always  at  the  forefront  of various 
Interventions,  taking  Into  account  the  spe~lal  nature  of  the 
electricity sector  (almost  impossible  storage  and  the  necessity of  the 
supply  to  Instantly adjust  to demand  fluctuations). - 19 -
Finally,  In  terms  of  balance  of  opinions,  (and  without  preJudice  to 
what  was  said  in  the  second  paragraph  of  this section),  the sceptics of 
the  possible  advantages  and  modalities  of  implementing  TPA 
significantly  outnumbered  those  who  were  favourable.  Commission 
Services,  In  accordance  with  their  task,  remained  neutral  at  this stage 
on  all  aspects of  this problem. .. 
- 20  -
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APPENDIX  B 
GlossarY of  terms 
Right  to  the  use  of  the  transmission 
and  distribution  system  in  a  TPA 
regime. 
The  gene rat ion  of  e I  ectr I  cIty  by  an 
enterprise  for  its  own  final 
consumption,  some  of  which  may  be 
available  for  sale to other parties. 
An  Intermediary  who  buys  electricity 
from  whatever  source  for  its 
subseQuent  resale. 
Plant· designed  to produce  heat  for 
own  purposes  or  for  supply  to  local 
customers  (district  heating)  as  well 
as  to generate electricity. 
A  regime  providing  for  a  general 
obligation  on  transmission  and 
distribution  companies  to  provide 
electricity transport  services at all 
time,  with  no  distinction  between 
existing  and  new  clients  and  by 
allocating  capacity  prorata  amongst 
all  applicants. 
Process  of  charging  an  unjustifiably 
low  price  to  one  group  of  customers 
and  compensating  for  this by  charging 
hIgher  prIces  to  other  customer 
groups. 
The  transport of electricity on  lower 
voltage  local  networks  In  view  of  Its 
delivery  to final  consumers. Franchise  area 
Franchise  customer 
Grid  control 
Independent  producer 
Local  distribution company 
- LDC  -
Merit  order 
Non-franchise  customer 
Partly  integrated electricity 
company 
Production 
Production/Transmission System 
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An  area  in  which  an  electricity 
company  is  providing  services  to 
franchise  and  poss i b I  y  non-franchise 
customers. 
A  captIve  customer  In  a  franchIsed 
area. 
The  centralized  control  of  the 
operation  of  both  transmission  and 
production within a  region,  including 
I  oad  management ,  maIntenance  of 
re II ab Ill ty  and  generatIon  pI ants 
dispatch. 
A  producer  of  electricity  not 
associated  either  with  transmission 
or  distribution business. 
A local  or  regional  distribution 
company  which  Is  not  part  of  an 
Integrated electricity company. 
The  ranking  of  available  electricity 
generating  plants  with  a  view  to 
their  economic  dispatching,  usually 
on  the  basis  of  var table  generat lng 
costs. 
A customer  who  may  or  may  not  be  In  a 
franchIse  area  who  has  been  granted 
access  rights. 
A company  performing  two  of  the 
tasks of generation,  transmission and 
distribution  In  a  coordinated  way 
with  the  view  of  supplying  wholesale 
or  final  consumers. 
The  generation of electricity 
A  group 
transmission 
whole. 
of  production 
assets  operated 
and 
as  a Region 
Regional  system 
Supply 
Third  Party Access  - TPA 
Transmission 
Transport 
UCPTE 
Unbundling 
Wholly  integrated electricity 
company 
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The  geographical  area  served  by  a 
particular grid controller. 
A production/transmission system  In  a 
region. 
The  delivery  of  electricity  to  final 
consumers,  comb in lng  Its  generation 
or  pur chase ,  t r ansm I  ss  I  on  and 
distribution. 
A  reg I  me  provIdIng  for  a  qua I If I  ed 
obllgat lon  on  companies  operat lng 
electricity  transmission  grids  and 
distribution  networks  to  offer  terms 
for  the use of  their  system. 
The  transport  of  electricity  on  the 
high  voltage  Interconnected  grid  In 
view  of  Its  delivery  to  wholesale  or 
final  consumers. 
Includes  both  the  transmission  and 
distribution functions. 
(Western  European>  Union  for  the 
coordination  of  production  and 
transport of electricity. 
Disaggregation  of  charging, 
accounting  or  management  of 
particular  operations,  or  even 
ownership  of  a  wholly  Integrated or  a 
partly  Integrated company. 
A  company  performing  the 
tasks  of  generation,  transmission 
and  distribution  of  electricity  In  a 
coordinated  way  with  the  view  of 
supplying  final  consumers. COMMISSION 
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PQCE  Cgmmlttee  ProctdYrts 
(Note  by  the Chairman) 
In  arranging  these consultations  It was  our  aim  In  the  European  Commission 
to  bring  about  a  genuine  discussion  between  the  members  of  the 
Professional  Committee,  rather  than  simply  to  ascertain  their  Individual 
views  or  those  of  the  Interests  they  represented.  That  could  In  any  case 
have  been  achieved  by  correspondence  or  bilateral  meet lngs.  From  the 
beginning,  therefore,  It  was  clear  that  the Committee's  Report  should  both 
I  dent 1  fy  the  key  Issues.  as  requIred  by  the  terms  of  reference,  and 
clarifY the areas of  agreement  or  disagreement  between  the participants. 
Against  this  background  It  was  essential  that  the  text  of  the  Committee 
Report  should  be  based  on  thorough  discussion of  all  aspects of  the  Third 
Party Access  (TPA)  question.  After  a  first procedural  meeting  In  May  1990, 
therefore,  the discussions were  divided  Into  four  subject  areas: 
- Electricity Production; 
-Electricity Transmission  and  Its relation with  Production; 
-COmpetition,  Pricing and  COnsumption; 
-Modalities and  Regulation. 
For  each  of  these areas a  first  discussion was  held on  the basis of  a  non-
exclusive  agenda  sent  out  In  advance  by  the  Commission,  In  Its  role  as 
Committee  Secretariat.  The  Secretariat  then  prepared  and  circulated  to 
Members  a  draft  Chapter  for  the  Committee  Report  dealing  with  that 
subject. 
This  draft  text  was  then  discussed  In  a  second  Committee  meeting,  revised 
accordingly,  circulated  for  written  comments  and  revised  for  a  second 
time.  A few  further  changes  were  made  to these Chapters at  a  later stage, 
to take account  of  the final  phases of  the Committee's  discussions. 
Following  the  discussions  of  the  four  subject  areas,  the  Secretariat 
prepared  an  Executive  Summary  for  the  overall  Report.  In  successive 
versions,  this  text  was  discussed  twice  In  the  Committee  and  twice 
circulated for  written comments,  with  revisions at each  stage. 
To  Illustrate  the  extensive  nature  of  these  consultations,  the  effect  of 
TPA  on  Electricity  Production,  for  Instance,  was  discussed  In  both  the 
Committee's  June  and  July  1990  meetings.  Written  comments  on  successive 
draft  texts of  the  Production  Chapter  were  requested  In  August  and  again - i i  -
at  the end  of  the  year.  The  subject of  Production  was  returned  to  In  the 
two  Committee  discussions of  the  Executive  Summary  In  January  1991,  and  In 
Members'  written comments  on  that  Summary  text. 
The  Report  of  the  Profess lona I  consu I tat I  ve  CommIt tee  on  E  I  ect  r 1  cIty  Is 
therefore  a  synthesis  of  views  exchanged  In  the  Committee's  discussions 
and/or  expressed  In  written  comments.  As  such,  It  should  not  be  taken  to 
reflect  In  detail  the views  of  any  Individual  Committee  Member. 
Some  COmmittee  members,  however,  requested  that  the  published  report 
shou I  d  be  accompanIed  by  posIt I  on  statements  set  t I  ng  out  theIr  v  1  ews  or 
those  of  their  organ I  sat Ions  on  the  TPA  Issue.  These  statements  are 
annexed  to  the  PCCE  Report,  but  were  not  discussed  by  the  COmmittee  and 
should  not  be  taken  as  forming  part of  the Report. 
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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
1.  The  two  main  reasons  underlying  the  decision  to  begin  consultations 
on  th 1  rd  party  access  were  the  need  to  Integrate  the  Cornmun I  ty 's 
electricity  markets,  as  part  of  the  overall  1992  programme,  and 
growing  discussion  of  whether  It  would  be  possible  and  desirable  to 
Introduce  more  competition  and  consumer  choice  In  the  electricity 
sector. 
2.  The  work  of  the  Professional  Consultative  Committee  on  Electricity 
(PCCE >  has  successfu I 1  y  fu 1  f I I I  ed  the  Conun It tee's  remIt  of 
Identifying  the main  Implications of  Introducing a  Third  Party Access 
(TPA)  reg I  me.  But  the  consu I tat Ions  have  shown  that  c I  ear 
differences of  opinion  exist  on  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
the  present  system  and  those  of  a  TPA  regime.  An  inherent 
complication  has  been  the  need  to  compare  the  present  long-
established market  system  with  a  type  of  regime  for  which  there  has 
as yet  been  only  limited experience. 
3.  Those  arguing  for  change  have  underlined  the benefits that  TPA  should 
yield  In  terms  of  costs  and  system  efficiency  by  giving  those 
consumers  and  distribution  companies  which  were  eligible  the  freedom 
to negotiate better supply  and  price arrangements;  by  opening  the way 
for  more  trade  between  regional  and/or  national  systems;  and  by 
creating a  competitive climate at  the  level  of electricity production 
for  the existing  Industry,  new  entrants and  autoproducers. 
4.  Those  resisting  TPA  have  argued  that  It  would  create uncertainty and 
have  adverse  consequences  for  Investment  pI ann I  ng,  supp I  y  secur 1  ty 
(both  overall  and  at  the  level  of  the  Individual  consumer),  system 
control,  supply  costs  and  price  stability.  They  consider  that  the 
benefits sought  could be  achieved  by  other means,  without  sacrificing 
the  advantages  of  the  present  system.  They  have  also argued  that  TPA 
would  require  an  excessive  amount  of  regulation  going  beyond  that 
necessary  to  protect  consumers,  and  that  any  benef 1  ts  of  such  a 
regime  would  accrue  only  to  large  consumers  at  the  expense  of  other 
users of  the  system.  Lastly,  they  believe  that  It  would  not  be  right 
to  Introduce  TPA  In  a  situation where  competition would  be  distorted 
by  differences  In  national  rules  and  conditions  In  areas  such  as 
taxation,  pricing,  finance,  environmental  protection and  fuel  use. - 7-
5.  The  considerations  Identified  by  PCCE  are described  In  Chapters  2  to 
5  of  this  Report.  This  summary  Chapter  outlines  only  the  major 
Issues  which  will  need  to  be  addressed  In  deciding  whether  or  not  to 
move  towards  a  TPA  regime,  excluding  legal  questions  which  were 
outside  the  scope  of  the  Committee's  work.  Before  discussing  the 
main  Issues,  however,  It  Is  first  necessary  to  describe  briefly  the 
concept  of Third  Party Access  and  the  nature of electricity supply. 
TPA  and  ElectricitY SUpplY 
e.  The  concept  of  Third  Party  Access  Is  that  eligible  consumers, 
producers  (Including  autoproducers>  local  distribution  companies 
(LDC's)  and  other  suppliers,  should  have  the  r Jght  to  be  offered 
transmission/distribution  services.  This  would  make  It  possible, 
where  capacity  was  available,  for  supply  arrangements  to  be 
contracted  directly  between  Individual  consumers  and  suppliers 
(Including  Independent  producers)  other  than  the electricity  company 
usually  serving  their  area,  whether  those  suppliers  were  located 
within or  outside  their  own  region.  As  explained  In  the  Introduction 
to  this  Report,  It  was  decided  from  the  outset  to  rule  out  the 
'common  carrier'  approach  In  which  existing  customers  might  have  to 
give  up  transmission  capacity,  pro  rata,  to  make  room  for  new 
c I Ients. 
7.  The  TPA  concept  must  be  Interpreted  In  the  light  of  the  nature  of 
electricity  supply.  The  physical  nature  of  electricity  and 
electricity  transmission  Is  fundamentally  different  from  other 
distributed  commodities  such  as  water  or  natural  gas.  In  effect, 
demand  Is met  Instantaneously  by  tapping  Into a  balanced  system where 
electrical  potential  Is  supplied  by  a  range  of  production  units 
connected  to  the  syst•.  Production  units  will  therefore  almost 
always  supply  their electricity to the  central  transmission grid,  and 
consumers  (or  distributors)  will  In  effect  'take'  their  electricity 
from  that single source. 
8.  This  has  two  Important  consequences.  Firstly,  the  electricity 
contracted  for  under  a  TPA  arrangement  will  not  In  reality  flow  from 
the  production  unit  or  area  concerned  along  a  given  route  to  the 
TPA  customer.  What  will  happen  In  practice  Is  that  all 
production/transmission  systems  directly  Involved,  and  possibly  some 
connected  syst•s,  will  be  rebalanced  to  allow  for  the  production 
Input  and  the customer's offtake. 
Secondly,  to  ensure  the  security  of  the  system,  the  relevant 
transmission  (or  grid)  company  must  continue  to control  the  balance 
between  supply  and  d•and,  lnclydlng  the  power  to  call-up  or  shut 
down  Individual  production  units  In  Its  region,  whether  or  not  It 
owns  those  facilities,  as  well  as  the  power  to  Interrupt  supply  to 
consumers  where  production  Is  Insufficient. - 8  -
Both  these points have  Implications  for  the  TPA  concept. 
The MaIn  IIIUII 
9.  Against  this  background,  the  five  main  Issues  Identified  by  the 
COmmittee  were  the effects of  a  TPA  regime  on:-
- Production  Investments; 
- Production COsts; 
- Transmission Capacity; 
- System  Control; 
- COnsumer  Prices. 
These  are  d 1  scussed  br I  ef I  y  In  paragraphs  1 0  to  23  be I  ow.  The · 
possible  modal It lea  of  a  TPA  regime,  and  the  degree  of  regulation 
which  might  be  needed,  are discussed  In  paragraphs  24  to 31. 
PrQdYct lqn  I nyoatMnta 
10.  There  was  a  clear  disagreement  on  whether  total  production  capacity 
would  be  adequate  In  future  under  a  TPA  regime.  A majority  of  the 
electricity  Industry  representatives  argued  that  uncertainty  about 
future  sales  In  a  competitive  market  situation would  hinder  planning 
and  capital-Intensive  Investments  In  new  plants  and  that,  as  a 
result,  the high  level  of supply  security demanded  by  consumers  could 
be  jeopardlsed  In  the  longer  term.  They  accepted  that  TPA  customers 
would  often  be  wll ling  to  provide  some  Investment  certainty  by 
entering  Into  long  term  contracts,  but  argued  that  the  duration  of 
such  contracts would  be  highly unlikely to match  the expected  life of 
new  product lon  plants.  Other  COmmittee  members,  however,  believed 
that  freedom  to  negotiate  direct  sales  In  a  much  wider  market,  and 
better conditions for  Independent  producers,  including  autoproducers, 
enter lng  the  market,  would  give  more  encouragement  to  product lon 
Investments  and  harness  new  sources of  capital.  They  also argued  that 
the present market  system  did not  always  produce  an  appropriate  level 
of  Investment,  although  It  was  pointed  out  that  political  and 
planning obstacles could give rise to this type of difficulty. 
11.  A TPA  regime  might  be  expected  to  encourage  more  autoDroduct lon  by 
enabling  autoproducers  to  market  electricity  surpluses 
Internationally  to  a  wider  range  of  buyers,  rather  than  just  to  the 
local  electricity  company,  or  to  'transmit'  electricity  to  other - 9  -
sites  owned  by  the  autoproducer  or  affl llated  companies. 
Autoproducers  would  also  no  longer  have  to  rely  exclusively  on  the 
local  electricity  company  for  electricity  purchases·  at  times  of 
deficit. 
TPA  would  not  however  be  the only  way  of  encouraging  autoproductlon. 
As  noted  In  Chapter  5,  the  1988  council  Reconmendatlon  on  this 
subJect,  coupled  with  recognition  of  the  efficiency  advantages  of 
autoproductlon  (eg  In  CHP  schemes)  have  led  to  legal  or 
admlnistrat lve  changes  In  several  countr lea,  Including  obllgat Ions 
placed  on  electricity  companies  to  buy  autoproductlon  surpluses. 
~  ~  These  rules  would  clearly  need  to  be  reviewed  If  autoproducers  were 
assured  thIrd  party  access  rights.  DecIsions  on  whether  purchase 
obligations  should  be  modified  or  removed  would  no  doubt  depend  on 
the  extent  to  which  TPA  opened  up  realistic  opportunities  to  sell 
autoproductlon surpluses,  as well  as on  energy  policy considerations. 
Autoproducers  believe that  the current situation  Is  not  as favourable 
for  them  as would  be  a  more  open  market  created by  TPA. 
12.  Within  the  total  level  of  Investment,  It  was  agreed  that  the  tyee of 
capacity  could  be  affected  by  a  TPA  regime.  In  a  competitive 
environment,  there  should  be  a  greater  Incentive  to  build  efficient 
and  Innovative  plants,  Including  co-generatlon/CHP  units. 
Autoproducers,  In  particular,  would  be  likely  to  favour  CHP  schemes. 
There  were  however  dIfferences  of  opInIon  about  whether  producers 
would  be  likely  to  adopt  short-term  strategies  when  faced  with 
uncertainties  about  future  sales  levels.  To  the  extent  that  this 
happened,  companies  might  decide  to  reduce  front-end  Investment  by 
opting  for  smaller  and/or  less capital  Intensive  plants,  which  could 
In  turn reinforce the current  trend  towards  the use of natural  gas  as 
a  power  station  fuel,  and  perhaps  favour  oil  as  well,  with 
undesirable  consequences  for  the  diversification of  energy  supplies. 
Decisions  to  Invest  In  large  coal  or  nuclear  plants  would  depend  on 
companies  taking  a  longer-term strategic view  and  giving  priority  to 
achieving  lower  unit  production  costs  despite  the  higher  capital 
Investment  required.  Comparisons  with  other capital  Intensive markets 
do  not  give  any  clear  guidance  on  this  quest ion.  It  might  well  be 
that  the situation would  evolve  over  time,  with  companies  tending  to 
reduce  Investment  risks until  they  had  more  experience of  the effects 
of  TPA  on  the electricity market. 
13.  It  Is  Important  to  recognise  that  In  a  competitive  TPA  situation,  It 
would  become  much  more  difficult  for  governments  to  Influence  the 
choice  of  power  station  fuels.  Nevertheless  It  would  still  remain 
Important  for  nat lonal  and  Community  energy  policy  to  retain  a 
diversified  pattern  of  fuel  use.  Larger  companies  would  presumably 
want  to  maintain  some  fuel  diversification  to  spread  their  market 
risks;  and  dual  firing could  become  more  attractive  In  a  competitive 
situation.  But  other  means  of  exerting  an  energy  policy  Influence 
might  be  necessary.  To  avoid  unacceptable  distortions  In - 10  -
electricity  trade,  such  Interventions  would  need  either  to  be 
implemented  on  Community  level,  or  appl led  at  national  level  within a 
framework  of  agreed  Community  rules. 
Pr9ductlgn Cpsts 
14.  The  Impact  of  TPA  on  production costs would  In  part  depend  on  whether 
there  was  a  tendency  to  Invest  In  sma I I  er  and/or  I  ess  capIta I 
Intensive  plants,  or  whether  the  pressure  of  competition  dictated 
Investments  In  plants which  were  more  capital  Intensive but  likely  to 
yield  lower  and  more  stable production  costs.  Some  Investments  could 
of  course  strike a  satisfactory balance  between  both  these  alms.  In 
any  case  TPA,  provided  that  transmission  charges  were  realist lc, 
should  encourage  economic  siting  of  new  plants  Irrespective  of 
national  or  regional  boundaries,  subject  always  to any  differences  in 
local  Investment  conditions  (see paragraph  4 above). 
15.  Another  potentially  Important  question  Is  the effect of  a  TPA  regime 
on  plant  utilisation.  Normally,  within  any  particular  system,  the 
gr ld  company  wi II  call  up  Individual  power  stat Ions  In  accordance 
with  a  Merit  Order  of  variable  production  costs.  This  economic 
dispatching  procedure  should  ensure  that,  at  any  given  time,  demand 
Is  met  by  the  lowest  cost  production  units,  although  In  practice  the 
situation  Is  sometimes  distorted  by  energy  policy  Interventions  In 
favour  of  particular  fuels.  Under  a  TPA  regime,  the  utilisation of 
particular  production  sources  would  depend  only  on  contractual 
commitments,  unless  specific measures  were  adopted  to  preserve Merit 
Order  operation.  The  market  forces  Inherent  In  a  TPA  situation would 
however  tend,  over  time,  to  favour  use  of  the  most  economic 
production units.  (This  Issue  Is  returned  to  In  paragraph  20  below.) 
Tran§llsslon Capacity 
16.  It  would  be  logical  to accompany  the  Introduction of  a  TPA  regime  by 
removing  any  legal  or  administrative  barriers discriminating  against 
the  construct lon  of  transmission  I ines  by  companies  other  than  the 
present grid owners.  But,  given  the  high  costs of building new  lines, 
some  committee  Members  felt  that  this  would  not  be  an  effective 
alternative  to  granting  TPA  rights  to  sellers  or  buyers  wishing  to 
use  the existing networks. 
Because  transmission  systems  are  designed  to  allow  for  major 
emergencies  and  for  future  demand  growth,  most  systems  will  have 
capacity  to  handle  additional  transmission  demands.  Many  TPA 
arrangements  would  In  any  case  simply  rearrange  flows  within  a 
system,  without  giving  rise  to  any  additional  production  or 
consumption.  Nevertheless  many  electricity  Industry  representatives - 11  -
on  the  Committee  foresee  difficulties  arising  under  this  heading. 
They  point  to  the  difficulty of  assessing  the  availability of  spare 
capacity to meet  short-term,  longer-term or  interruptible needs. 
They  also underline  the  Integral  nature of  the productlon/transmis-
s ion  system  and  be 1 i  eve  that  TPA  wou I  d  reduce  securIty  and  make  it 
Impossible  to  optimise  system  use.  Some  other  Committee  members, 
however,  believe that  the key  to optimisation  Is  economic  dispatching 
and  that  It  would  be  possible under  TPA  to maintain  such  an  approach 
(see paragraph  20  below). 
17.  There  could,  therefore,  be  cases  where  It  was  Judged  that  new 'TPA 
contracts could  not  be  managed  without  unacceptably  Jeopardising  the 
security  of  the  system  and  of  Its  existing  customers.  Also, 
1 Imitations on  transmission capacity are  likely to be  encountered  in 
trade  between  different  systems,  where  Interconnections  are  less 
extensive.  These  problems  and  possible  regulatory  solutions  are 
discussed further  In  paragraphs  24  to 31  below. 
Systw Cgntrol 
18.  For  the  reasons  explained  In  paragraph  8  above,  central  control  of  a 
particular  transmission system  and  Its related production units would 
need  to  continue  under  any  regime.  The  committee's  discussions  have 
shown  that  In  a  TPA  situation  there  would  be  real  difficulties  In 
reconcIling  thIs  need  for  centra I  control  wl th  the  match lng  of 
production patterns to contractual  commitments. 
19.  With  sophisticated  and  costly  telecommunications  and  control 
equipment,  It  might  In  theory  be  possible  for  a  company  managing  a 
system  to  keep  the  production  of  Individual  producers  or  power 
stations at  a  level  exactly  matching  the  demand  of  their  contracted 
customers  at  any  point  In  time.  But  In  reality,  this would  not  seem 
to  be  a  practIcable  approach.  The  control  would  need  to  extend 
across  more  than  one  system,  where  TPA  contracts  existed  with 
external  suppliers,  and  unexpected  closures  of  power  stations  or 
maJor  consuming  plants  could  also  cause  difficulties.  The  maJor 
problem  however  would  be  the  number  of  contracts  to  be  handled.  To 
avoid  discrimination  It  would  probably  be  necessary  to  extend  TPA 
rights  to  a  sizeable  number  of  large  consumers  and  distributors  in 
any  part lcular  system.  The  ablll ty  to  handle  a  large  number  of 
contracts would  depend  on  developments  In  control  technologies. 
20.  Two  possible ways  of avoiding  this problem  would  be 
a)  A Clearing H9use  Mechanism 
Under  this option  the  grid  company  would  at  all  times  operate  a 
t.ter I  t  Order ,  based  on  product I  on  costs,  I  r respect I  ve  of i. 
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contractual  commitments.  There  would  however  be  a  financial 
compensation  mechanism  In  which  the  cost  savings  achieved  by  the 
Merit  Order  would  effectively  be  divided  between  the  companies 
producing  more  than  provided  for  In  their  contracts,  and  those 
producing  less. 
b)  A Pool  SYstem 
One  example  of  this approach  Is  the  mechanism  adopted  In  the  new 
UK  electricity  regime,  which  Is  designed  to  preserve  effective 
system  control  and  a~  of Merit  Order  dispatching.  Under  that 
regime  the  grid  company  operates  a  'Pool'  from  which  all 
consumers  and  distribution companies  purchase  at  the  same  price. 
Supplies  to the  Pool  are called up  by  the grid company  not  on  the 
basis  of  costs  but  according  to  prices  bid  by  the  generating 
companies  for  Individual  power  stations.  To  smooth  out  the  risks 
of  pool  price  fluctuation,  buyers  and  sellers  enter  separately 
Into contracts based  (usually) on  fixed prices. 
There  were  considerable  differences  of  view  in  the  Committee  about 
the  merits  and  relevance  of  this  second  option.  Some  electricity 
Industry  representatives  felt  that  It  was  misleading,  in  this 
context,  to  refer  specifically  to  the  new  UK  regime,  which  had  not 
been  tested over  any  extended  period of  time  and,  in  their  view,  was 
not  relevant  to  the  situation  In  other  Member  States,  which  differed 
in  both  legal  and  structural  terms.  More  particularly  It  was  also 
argued  that  the  UK  pool  system  was  not  In  reality a  TPA  regime  since 
there were  no  direct  supply  contracts determining  production  levels. 
The  prIce  bIddIng  system  used  In  the  UK  was  a I  so  crItIc  I  sed.  Other 
COmmittee  members  argued  that  the  UK  regime  was  a  real  life situation 
which  could  not  be  Ignored  by  the  Committee,  and  that  In  providing 
competition  and  consumer  choice  It  fulfilled  the  essential  alms  of  a 
TPA  regime. 
It  was  also  recognised  that  It  would  be  difficult  to apply  either of 
the  two  approaches  dIscussed  above  at  Conunun I  t y  I  eve I ,  a I  though 
trading  between  national  and  regional  systems  organised  In  this  way 
would  be  feasible. 
ConSlJMr  Prices 
21.  It  Is  clearly  not  possible  to  establish  In  advance  the  Impact  of  a 
TPA  regime  on  prices  paid  for  electricity  by  dlf.ferent  types  of 
consumer.  Much  would  depend  on  whether  the  particular  rules  for  TPA 
preserved  a  Merit  Order.  A  number  of  electricity  industry 
representatives  argued  that  overall  supply  costs  would  Increase 
because of planning  Inefficiencies and  a  tendency  to reduce  front-end 
Investment.  They  also argued  that even  (and  perhaps  particularly)  If 
large  consumers  negot lated  lower  prIces,  small  and  medium-sized 
customers  would  pay  more.  (The  Issue  of  cross-subsldlsatlon  Is 
discussed  In  paragraph  24.) I  I 
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22.  The  counter-argument  was  that  Improvements  In  system  efficiency  and 
In  product I  on  costs  result lng  from  a  compet It lve  TPA  regime  should 
benefit  all  consumers.  Distributors  eligible  for  TPA  should  in 
principle  also  be  able  to  negotiate  lower  prices,  which  would  In 
that  case  presumably  benefit  both  their  smaller  and  larger 
customers. 
23.  In  any  case,  TPA  competition  should  tend  to  ensure  that  prices  for 
those  customers  eligible  for  TPA  reflected  the  true  costs  of  supply 
(Including  transmission  costs),  provided  cross-subsldlsatlon  was 
avoided.  Distortions  In  pricing  Introduced  for  Industrial  or 
regional  policy reasons would  tend  to be  driven out  of  the system. 
yodalltlos and  Regulatlgn 
24.  The  main  new  area  of  regulation  under  a  TPA  regime  would  concern 
electricitY  transPort.  Regulation  on  matters  such  as  supply 
obligations  and  pricing  would  continue  only  for  consumers  remaining 
within  monopoly  franchises.  It  would  be  important  to  decide  whether 
this division should  be  made  on  the  basis of eligibility for  TPA,  or 
according  to whether  consumers  decided  to exercise that option. 
Some  commIt tee  members  fe It,  however,  that  the  IntroductIon  of  TPA 
would  lead  to  Increased  regulation  In  all  phases  of  electrIcity 
supply,  Including  electricity production  as  well  as  transmission  and 
distribution. 
There  were  also  differences  of  opinion  In  the  Committee  about  the 
risk  of  cross-Subsldisatlon  In  a  TPA  situation.  Many  electricity 
Industry  representatives  felt  that  this  risk  would  be  Increased 
because  Integrated companies  or  distributors might  try  to  hold  on  to 
their  larger  consumers  by  cutting  prices  to  them  and  charging 
franchise  customers  more,  and  that  this  would  be  difficult  If  not 
Impossible  to bring  under  control.  Some  others on  the  Committee  felt 
that  TPA  would  reduce  the  risk  of  cross-subsldlsatlon  through 
allowing  direct  .sales  by  electrIcity  producers,  and  through  the 
seperate  accounting  for  different  activities  (unbundling)  which  TPA 
would  In  their  view  require.  They  also  underlined  that  the  risk  of 
cross-subsldlsatlon  would  be  reduced  If  LDCs  could  exercise  market 
power  and  pass  on  the  benefits  to  smaller  consumers.  It  was  however 
common  ground  that  regulators would,  as  Is  already  the  case  In  many 
Member  States,  need  to  monItor  prIces  from  thIs  po 1  nt  of  vIew, 
a I  though  It  was  argued  that  the  allocatIon  of  costs  to  d 1  fferent 
categories of consumer  was  a  difficult  task. 
25.  Regulation  of  electricity  transport  would  In  particular  have  to 
cover: 28. 
27. 
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-the availability and  allocation of  transPort  caPacitY; 
-charges for  transportation and  related services; 
-security of syPply  arrangements  for  TPA  customers. 
The  amount  of  transport  regulation  needed  would,  In  the  first 
Instance,  depend  on  the  extent  of  TPA  rights.  Obviously  regulatIon 
would  be  more  manageable  if  only  certain  types  of  customers  were 
eligible and  fewer  TPA  arrangements  were  Involved.  It  Is  an  Important 
feature  of  tho  mechanisms  described  In  paragraph  20  that  regulation 
under  all  three  headings  In  the  previous  paragraph  would  be  avoided 
or greatly simplified.  Nevertheless,  some  Committee  members  felt  that 
In  those  circumstances  difficulties  would  stll I  arise  for  the 
operation and  development  of  tho electricity transport  network. 
If,  however,  a  mechanism  of  this  typo  was  not  adopted,  It  would  be 
necessary  to  find other  ways  of  avoiding  the  need  for  detailed case-
by-case  regulation,  which  could  roach  costly  and  unmanageable 
proportions.  One  suggested  means  of  achieving  this was  to draw  up  a 
Legal  Code  laying  down  the  main  principles  of  a  TPA  regime  (see 
Chapter  5  paragraph  5),  although  not  all  COmmittee  members  felt  that 
this would  be  a  feasible approach. 
For  _the  reasons  d lscussed  In  paragraphs  18  and  17  above ,  transport 
capacity  would  be  a  particularly  Important  but  difficult  problem  to 
be  dealt  with  under  such  a  Code.  Key  elements  In  finding  a  solution 
would  probably  be  as  much  transparency  as  possible  on  the  capacity 
situation and  separate accounting  for  transmission services,  although 
some  members  disagreed  with  these  Ideas.  It  would  also  be  essential 
to create a  situation  In  which  grid companies  wore  willing to provide 
new  transmission  capacity  If  existing capacity was  Insufficient,  and 
Indeed  to  develop  the  system  In  the  longer-term  In  a  way  which 
allowed  for  TPA  needs.  Increases  In  capacity would  not  always  Involve 
high  Investment  costs,  but  In  any  case  the  key  to  ensuring 
satisfactory  system  development  would  be  a  level  of  transmission 
charges  which  provided  an  Incentive  to market  transmission  services. 
If  this  approach  did  not  work,  however,  It  might  be  necessary  to 
place  an  obligation  on  grid  companies  to  ensure,  with  due  notice,  a 
level  of  capacity sufficient  to deal  with  TPA  demands.  This  proposal 
was  regarded  as  unacceptable  or  Illegal  by  most  of  the  electricity 
Industry  representatives on  the Committee.  In  either. case  It would  be 
Important  that  regional  or  natl"onal  authorities should  facilitate the 
construction of  new  lines. 
A further  means  of  simplifying  regulation might  be  to  include  In  the 
Code  an  arbitration  procedure  for  resolving  disputes  on  certain 
Issues without  recourse  to the  regulator. - 15 -
28.  As  an  alternative  to  drawing  up  a  Legal  Code  laying  down  the  main 
principles  of  a  TPA  regime,  the  possibility  was  raised  of  TPA 
legislation  based  on  the  prevention  of  abuse.  by  undertakings 
domlnat lng  the  market.  such  abuse  regulatIon  would  be,  from  the 
v 1  ewpo 1  nt  of  both  procedures  and  pr Inc I  pIes,  an  e I  ement  of  carte I 
law.  It  would  leave  the  conclusion  and  contents  of  transmission 
contracts  to  the  parties  Involved,  thus  providing  scope  for  varying 
solutions.  Only  In  Individual  cases  of  refusal  to  grant  access  on 
reasonable  terms,  would  the  relevant  authorities  Investigate and  take 
correct 1  ve  ac·t I  on.  They  wou I  d  do  so  on  the  bas Is  of  genera I 
predetermined  cr I  tor Ia  lndlcat lng  what  sl tuat Ions  should  be 
considered  as  abuses  of  dominant  position.  The  Committee  did  not 
discuss  In  any  detail  the arguments  for  and  against  such  an  approach, 
or  Its  legal  Implications. 
29.  The  need  to  adJust  to  a  TPA  regime,  and  some  of  the  regulatory 
problema  which  would  arise,  could  certainly be  helped  by  authorising 
transitional  arrangements  for  a  defined  period of  time. 
30.  There  was  wide  agreement  that  It  would  be  most  practicable  for  any 
TPA  regime  to  be  administered  Jointly  at  national  and  Cormnunity 
Ioyoia.  National  authorities could  draw  up  and  Implement  Legal  Codes 
based  on  agreed  principles  laid  down  In  COmmunity  legislation. 
Regulation  at  Community  level  would  be  necessary  for  cross-frontier 
TPA  trade,  as  well  as  oversight  to  ensure  harmonisation  of  national 
regimes.  COmmunity  action  would  also  be  needed  to  remove  any 
competitive distortions which  were  not  likely to be  driven out  by  TPA 
competition. 
31.  It  was  argued  by  some  Committee  members  that  the  need  for  regulation 
on  a  number  of  key  Issues,  such  as  transport  capacity  and  assistance 
In  emergencies,  arose  mainly  from  the  Integrated  structure  of  the 
Industry  In  many  Member  States  and  the  need  to  assure  consumers  and 
Independent  producers  that,  In  a  TPA  regime,  Integrated  companies 
would  not  give  preference  to  their  own  operations.  One  means  of 
alleviating  this concern  could  be  to provide  for  'unbundling'  of  the 
operational  management  and  accounting of  the  production,  transmission 
and  distribution  activities  of  Integrated  companies.  This  was 
regarded  as- Impracticable  by  some  Committee  members,  whereas  others 
believed  It  to be  an  essential  feature of any  TPA  regime. 
32.  U  It I  mate ly,  the  success  of  a  TPA  reg I  me  and  the  extent  to  whIch 
detailed  regulation  could  be  avoided  would  depend  on  the  mechanism 
selected  and  on  the  practicability  and  effectiveness  of  the 
regulatory principles which  were  adopted. 
• • • • • • I 
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CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  In  September  1989  the Commission  sent  a  Communication  to  the  Council 
on  the  subject  of  Intra-Community  electricity  trade1.  This  Included 
a  proposal  for  a  Council  Directive on  electricity transit,  which  was 
subsequently  adopted,  with  certain amendments,  by  the  Energy  Council 
on  29  October  19902. 
2.  The  Electricity Transit  Directive  applies only  to  transactions which 
Involve  cross-frontier  trade  within  the  Community,  and  which  are 
conducted  by  the  companies  responsible  for  the  Community's 
transmission  grIds.  It  does  not  therefore  assure  access  to 
transmission  grids  for  others  such  as  Independent  producers, 
autoproducers,  non-Integrated  electricity  companies  or  particular 
types  of  consumers.  Nor  does  the  transit  directive  apply  to 
transactions which  concern only one  Member  State. 
3.  In  Its  September  1989  Communication  the  Commission  announced  Its 
Intention  to  hold  a  dialogue  with  Interested parties before  deciding 
whether  or  not  to make  further  proposals on  third party  access.  This 
would  be  achieved  by  creating  two  Consultative  Committees,  one 
composed  of  Member  States'  representatives  and  the  other  of 
Interested  parties  representing  electricity companies,  autoproducers 
and  consumers. 
4.  The  second  of  these  COmmittees,  the  Professional  Consultative 
Committee  for  Electricity  CPCCE),  met  for  the  first  time  on  7  May 
1990  and  has  been  responsible  for  the preparation of  this Report. 
The  full  membership  of  PCCE  Is  set  out  on  page  ( .. ),  Including 
changes  which  have  taken  place during  the COmmittee's  work 
5.  The  terms  of  reference  agreed  by  the  Committee  at  Its  first  meeting 
were: 
'To  Identify  and  present  the  main  technical,  economic  and 
administrative  considerations  which  should  be  taken  Into 
1  COM(89)336  final  of  29  September  1989 
2  COUncil  Directive 90/547/EEC  of  29  October  1990 - 17  -
account  In  Community  policy  on  whether  and  by  what  means  third 
party  access  to  electricity  transmission  systems  should  be 
prov lded.' 
It  was  not  therefore  the  Committee's  task  to  make  specific 
recommendatIons  on  whether  or  not,  or  In  what  form,  ThIrd  Party 
Access  should  be  Introduced  In  the  Community's  electricity  system. 
This will  be  a matter  on  which  the Commission  will  make  Its proposals 
following  this Report  and  the other  consultations now  In  progress. 
6.  The  following  chapters  of  this  Report  describe  the  considerations 
which  PCCE  has  Identified  In  accordance  with  these  terms  of 
reference.  On  some  points  there were  Important  differences of opinion 
In  the  Committee,  which  are  recorded  In  the  Report.  Although  not 
directly within  the Committee's  remit,  other methods  of providing  for 
enhanced  competition  In  electricity  markets  were  raised  at  various 
stages of  the  discussions.  Some  Committee  Members  took  the  view  that 
It  would  be  right  to  compare  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
dIfferent  types  of  competItIon  rather  than  to  consIder  on I  y  thIrd 
party access. 
7.  Throughout  the Report,  reference  Is made  to the  three basic phases of 
electricity supply,  that  Is  Production  (or  generation),  high  voltage 
transmission  and  local  dlstr I  but lon.  There  are  considerable 
differences  In  the  structure  of  the  Industry  In  different  Member 
States.  In  some  countries  the  three  phases  are  carried  out  by  a 
single  company,  and  In  others  separate  companies  are  Involved.  The 
companies  concerned  are  In  some  cases  pr lyate  and  In  other  cases 
State-owned  or  owned  by  other  public or  municipal  authorities.  Mixed 
ownership  also exists  In  some  countries.  One  common  feature  however 
Is  that  the  balance  of  supply  and  demand  In  a  particular  system  at 
any  given  time  must  be  controlled centrally  by  the  company  operating 
the  transmission grid. 
8.  In  Its first  meeting  the  Committee  underlined  the  difference  between 
a  comrnon  carrier  and  a  third partY  access  regime.  The  former  concept 
would  require transport  capacity  to be  allocated pro-rata amongst  all 
applicants  at  any  given  time,  with  no  distinction  between  existing 
and  new  clients.  This  would  obviously  Jeopardise  security  of  supply 
for  ex 1st lng  customers  and  ex 1st lng  contracts.  The  common  carr ler 
approach  Is  not  therefore considered  further  In  this .Report. 
9.  It  was  also  recognised  that  a  number  of  types  of  third  party  access 
regime  were  conceivable,  depending  on  which  categor les  of  consumer 
and  whIch  categorIes  of  supp I I  ers  or  producers  were  assured  access - 18  -
r lghts.  Rather  than  limit  the  scope  of  the  consul tat Ions,  It  was 
decided  that  the  discussions  should  not  rule out  any  particular  type 
of  TPA  client  at  this  stage.  The  considerations  Identified  In  the 
Report  would  then  assist  the  Commission  to  take  a  view  on  the 
advantages  or  disadvantages  of  assuring  access  for  particular  types 
of  client,  as well  as on  the  overall  advantages  and  disadvantages of 
the third party access concept. 
10.  Lastly,  It  was  also  agreed  at  the  beginning  of  the  Committee's  work 
that,  for  effective  competition,  It  would  be  necessary  to  evaluate 
the merits of  Introducing  third party access  to both  transmission and 
local  distribution  systems.  It  would  also  be  assumed  that  both 
transactions within particular countries or  regions,  and  transactions 
across  frontiers,  would  be  covered  by  such  a  regime.  All  aspects of 
electricity supply  would  need  to be  taken  into account. 
• • • • • • Chapter  2 
EFFECTS  ON  ELECTR I  CITY  PRODUCT I  ON 
Prgductlgn capacitY 
1.  A  th  1  rd  party  access  (TPA)  reg I  me  wou I  d  make  It  poss I  b I  e,  where 
transmission  capacity  was  available,  for  ·eligible  consumers  and 
local  distribution  companies  to  negotiate  power  supply  arrangements 
directly with  producers  (Including  autoproducers>  or  suppliers other 
than  the electricity company  usually serving their area.  As  well  as 
widening  consumer  choice,  this  would  Introduce  a  new  and  wider 
element  of  competition  at  the  level  of  electricity  production.  It 
would  be  Implicit  In  such  a  sltuat lon  that  any  other  legal  or 
administrative  measures  which  could  hinder  or  significantly  distort 
competition should  be  remedied. 
2.  This  new  situation would,  Inter  alia,  over  a  period  of  time,  affect 
both  the absolute  level  of production capacity and  Its make-up. 
3.  Although  demand  forecasting  Is  always  problematical,  greater 
competItIon  wou I  d  natura II y  create  more  uncertaInty  for  I  nd I  vI dua I 
producers  about  their  sates  prospects.  The  effect  on  total  caPacity 
would  depend  on  companies'  reactions  to  that  additional 
uncertainty.  Some  might  defer  or  cancel  plans  to  construct  new 
capacity,  or  retrofitting  Investments,  because  of  the  risk of  losing 
customers  In  their  region.  Others  might  accelerate  or  expand  their 
Investment  pI ans  to  take  advantage  of  the  I  arger  Community  market 
available  to  them,  and  to  do  so  before  their  competitors.  The  entry 
of  new  companies  Into  the  market,  would  be  an  Important  factor  In 
maintaining  Investment  levels. 
4.  It  would  certainly  assist  Judgements  of  Individual  companies  on 
capacity  Investments  (or  closures>  If  good  market  Intelligence  was 
avai table  on  overall  demand  and  supply  prospects.  This  could  be 
organised  by  public  authorities  or  by  the  Industry  Itself.  such 
assessments  would  need  to cover  all  regions  and  be  concerted  for  the 
Community  as a  whole. 
5.  There  was  a  clear  disagreement  on  whether  total  Production  capacity 
would  be  adequate  In  future  under  a  TPA  regime.  Over  time,  the  price 
mechanism  If  flexible  and  sensitive  to  market  changes,  should 
provide  the right  Investment  signals,  but  the question  Is whether  TPA 
competition  would  bring  forward  enough  Investment  to maintain  at  all 
times  a  satisfactory  level  of  generation  capacity,  that  Is - 20  -
enough  capacity  to  cover  demand  and  provide  an  adeQuate  contingency 
reserve.  One  view  Is  that  the  electricity sector  Is  In  this  respect 
not  fundamentally  different  from  some  other  major  Industries,  and 
that  there  Is  therefore  no  reason  why  shortages  should  develop  In  a 
competItIve  market,  part i  cuI ar I  y  when  producers  wou I  d  have  a  much 
1  arger  market  open  to  them.  There  Is  a I  so  the  argument  that  the 
present  market  system  has  not  always  produced  the  r lght  level  of 
Investment.  The  contrary  view  Is  that,  because  of  the  high  costs, 
major  capital  risks  and  long  lead-times,  the  necessary  degree  of 
Investment  planning  can  In  the  case  of  electricity only  be  achieved 
In  a  monopolist lc  or  centrally  regulated  sl tuat I  on,  and  that,  as  a 
result,  security  of  supply  for  consumers  could  be  jeopardlsed  by  a 
TPA  regime. 
8.  The  Importance  of  this  Question  Is  accentuated  by  ·the  widely  held 
view,  based  on  consumers  past  experience,  that  anything  more  than  a 
minimal  risk  of  electricity  supply  interruption  Is  unacceptable. 
Even  In  the  new  UK  regime  the  formula  for  regulating  prices  has  been 
constructed  In  such  a  way  as  to  provide  a  strong  Incentive  for  new 
Investments  when  reserve capacity appears  likely to decline. 
7.  The  acceptability  of  supply  Interruption  will  In  reality  vary  from 
one  consumer  to  another.  Interruptible  contracts  can,  for  larger 
consumers,  already be  concluded  under  the  present  regime.  But,  third 
party  access  would  bring  about  a  new  situation  In  which  decisions 
about  supply  lnterruptlblllty  for  the  relevant  consumers  were 
arrived  at  by  negotiation  between  them  and  several  potential 
suppliers,  rather  than  decided  In  a  bilateral  relationship  with  a 
monopoly  supplier or  determined  by  government  Intervention.  Consumers 
would  have  more  scope  to  define  what  trade-off  between  price  and 
security  they  could  accept.  More  consumers  might  be  willing  to 
accept  a  greater  risk of  supply  Interruption  In  exchange  for  a  price 
reduction,  or  decide  to  provide  some  of  their  own  security  by 
Installing stand-by  generation  plant.  It  would  be  Important  for  this 
approach  that  the  customer,  and  the  political  authorities concerned, 
should  accept  In  practice  any  Interruptions  provided  for 
contractually, whatever  the economic  or  employment  Implications. 
a.  Not  all  consumers  would  see  advantages  In  that  situation.  Many,  with 
less  flex lblll ty  and  market  power,  for  Instance  householders  and 
smaller  Industrial  consumers,  might  well  prefer  to  avoid  risk  and 
remain  covered,  as  In  the  present  situation,  .by  a  regulated 
monopolistic  regime  In  which  they  benefited  from  a  supply  obligation 
and  regulated  prices.  Indeed,  a  reduction  In  the  security of  supply 
for  such  consumers  might  well  be  regarded  as  unacceptable  In  social 
and  political  terms,  particularly  where  public  utilities  were 
concerned.  This  suggests  the  possibility of  creating  two  groups  of 
consumers  - franchise  customers  covered  by  the  present  monopoly ,. 
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supply  arrangements,  and  non-franchise  customers  with  third  party 
access  rights  relying  on  contractual  arrangements  only.  Membership 
of  one  or  the  other  group  could  be  determined  legislatively  or  left 
to  the  choice  of  the  consumers  themselves,  although  In  the  latter 
case switching  back  to  the  franchise sector would  clearly have  to be 
subject  to  administrative  control.  Some  degree  of  regulation  would 
probably  be  necessary  to ensure  that  there was  no  cross-subsldlsatlon 
between  the  two  groups.  Issues  of  prIcing  and  regulat lon  In  this 
context  are discussed  further  In  chapters  ~ and  5. 
9.  To  the  extent  that electricity producers  retained  a  franchise  market 
their  Investment  security  would  be  partly  preserved.  Some  of  their 
other  customers  might  be  willing  to  provide  an  additional  degree  of 
certainty  by  entering  Into  long-term  and  committed  contracts, 
although  the  duration  of  such  contracts  would  be  unlikely  to  match 
the  expected  life  of  new  production  plants.  The  division  of  the 
market  Into  franchise  and  non-franchise  sectors  would  however  raise 
Issues  of  pricing  and  regulation  which  are  discussed  later  In 
chapters  ~ and  5 of  this report. 
EnergY  Po  I ICY 
10.  As  noted  In  paragraph  2  above,  the  greater  market  uncertainty  faced 
by  electricity producers  under  a  TPA  regime  could  change  the make-
UP  of Production caPacity. 
11.  There  were  differences  of  opinion  about  whether  this  greater  market 
uncertainty  would  reinforce  the  present  tendency  to  reduce  r lsk  by 
minimising  front-end  Investment  costs  In  the  provision  of  new 
capacity.  To  the  extent  that  this  happened,  producers  would  tend  to 
work  to  shorter  planning  horizons  and  favour  the  construction  of 
smaller  and/or  less capital  Intensive  plants designed  to use  natural 
gas,  and  possibly  oil.  It  could  also  become  more  difficult  for 
utilities  to  Invest  In  some  new  and  renewable  energy  schemes  which 
might  not  be  economically  attractive  In  a  competitive  market 
sItuatIon.  Dec Is Ions  to  Invest  In  I  arge  coa I  or  nuc 1  ear  p  1  ants 
would  depend  on  companies  taking  a  longer-term  strategic  view  and 
giving  priority  to  achieving  lower  unit  production  costs. 
Comparisons  with  other  capital  Intensive  markets  do  not  give  any 
clear guidance on  this question.  It might  well  be  that  the situation 
would  evolve  over  t lme,  whlth  companies  tending  to  r.educe  Investment 
rIsks  unt II  they  had  more  exper lence  of  the  effects  of  TPA  on  the 
electricity market. 
As  well  as  their effect on  production  costs  (see  chapter~>. changes 
In  the make---up  of production capacity  could  In  the  long  term  have  an 
Impact  on  the  diversification  of  fuels  used  by  the  Community  for 
electricity production.  Although  now  under  review,  the 1995  COmmunity - 22  -
energy  obJectives  adopted  In  1986  called  for  less  than  15X  of 
Community  electricity  to  be  produced  from  oil  and  gas.  Since  that 
time,  there  has  been  stronger  recognition  of  the  environmental 
benefits of using gas  rather  than  other  fossil  fuels. 
12.  Historically,  national  governments  have  sought,  in  the  interests  of 
energy  policy,  to  ensure  a  diversified  stock  of  electricity 
generation  capacity  or  to  favour  specific  energy  sources  either  by 
directing  or  Influencing  the  utilities  concerned  at  the  planning 
stage,  or  through  the  authorisation  or  refusal  of  construction 
consents.  There  have  a I  so  been  InterventIons  In  the  .Y.ll.  of  power 
station  capacity,  for  Instance  to  ensure  greater  rei lance  on 
domestically produced  coal. 
13.  Under  a  TPA  regime  It  would  become  more  difficult  for  national 
governments  to  Intervene  In  this way.  Producers  could  not  reasonably 
be  directed  to  maximise  the  use  of  particular  fuels  In  a  situation 
where  the  utI I I  sat ton  of  capacIty  was  dependent  on  market 
competition.  Governments  could  In  theory  stl I I  Intervene  at  the 
planning or  authorisation stage  to  Influence  the  choice of  fuels  for 
new  production  capacity,  but  their  ability  to  do  so  would  be 
constrained by: 
-the fact  that  the  power  station would  not  necessarily  be  used  for 
supplying electricity to the country  concerned; 
-the  need  for  generation  capacity  to  be  competitive  In  the  new 
market  situation; 
- the  risk  that  national  Interventions  could  distort  trade  and 
competition  In  the Community's  electricity market. 
14.  It seems  clear  therefore that a  TPA  regime  would,  In  principle,  limit 
the  ability of  national  governments  to  ensure  a  diversified  pattern 
of  fuel  use,  or  greater  use  of  Indigenous  resources,  In  the 
electricity sector.  In  parallel, market  forces would  tend  to  Increase 
reliance  on  natural  gas  (part lcular ly)  and  perhaps  oil.  To  some 
extent,  however,  the electricity  Industry  Itself will  want  to ensure 
diversification  as  a  matter  of  good  commercial  practice.  Nor  have 
energy  policy  decisions  taken  In  the  past  under  the  existing, 
centrally controlled  regime  always  been  effective.  Nevertheless both 
Member  States  and  the  Community  would  probably  want  to  retain  some 
power  to act  In  this field. 
15.  It  Ia  not  ruled  out  that  thla  Influence  could  still  be  exerted  at 
national  level  through  regulation,  Incentives,  or  taxation,  but  such 
measures  would  need  to be  authorised by  the Commission,  In  accordance 
with  the  Treaties,  If  there  were  a  risk  of  distortion  In  Intra-
COmmunity  trade.  A  more  equitable  approach  would  be  to  offset - 23  -
any  weakening  of energy  policy control  by  means  of  Community  measures 
applying  In  all  Member  States,  or  by  br lnglng  nat tonal  measures 
within a  framework  of agreed  Community  rules. 
I ndtPindtnt ProdUct I QD/AI&toproduct I 90 
16.  The  entry  of  new  companies  Into  the  electricity  production  field 
would  be  encouraged  by  a  TPA  regime  under  which  they  could  market 
their  electricity  through  the  grid  to  customers  or  electricity 
companies  outside  their  own  area.  The  same  would  be  true  of 
autoproducers  for  their electricity surpluses,  which  could  either  be 
sold  or  transmitted  for  use  In  their  own  company's  branches  or 
aff II iates  elsewhere  In  the  CommunIty.  In  both  cases  electrIcIty 
pr 1  ce  1  eve 1  s  wou 1  d  of  course  a lao  be  a  key  factor  1  n  Investment 
decisions. 
17.  A TPA  regl118  Is  not  the  only  way  In  which  Independent  electricity 
producers  or  autoproducers  could  be  promoted.  In  line  with  the  EEC 
council  Reconaendat ion  88/611/EEC,  a  number  of  Member  States  have 
sought  to promote  autoproductlon of electricity, or  certain  types  of 
autoproductlon,  by  defining  a  framework  for  co-operation  between  the 
utilities  and  the  autoproducers.  These  measures  facilitate,  by 
voluntary  or  legislative  means,  sales  of  electricity  by  such 
producers  to  the  supply  companies  operating  In  their  area.  But  some 
autoproducers  feel  that  these arrangements  are·stlll  not  effective  In 
many  cases,  particularly  In  the  prices  paid  for  surplus  production, 
conditions  for  back-up  supplies  and  llmltat_lons  on  cross-frontier 
trade.  There  would  clearly  be  a  need  to  review  these  rules  If 
autoproducers  were  granted  access  rights.  This  Is  discussed  further 
In  paragraph  11  of  the Executive  Summary. 
18.  Under  either  approach,  better  market  access  for  Independent  or 
autoprodUct ion  would  tend  to  promote  co-operat lve  ventures  between 
generators  and  consumers  and  to ·encourage  particular  types  of 
electricity  Investments,  notably  CHP  schemes  and  proJects  using 
local  resources,  Including  new  and  renewable  energy  resources 
where  the economics  are favourable.  Both  examples  would  be  beneficial 
from  an  energy  policy  point  of  view,  and  CHP  schemes  should  be 
particularly attractive  In  a  competitive market  situation.  The  other 
lmpllcat lon  of  growing  Independent  product ion,  because  of  the  same 
front-end  cost  considerations discussed  in  paragraph  11  above,  would 
probably  be  a  further  reinforcement  of  the  trend  towards  fuelling 
with  natural  gas. - 24  -
EnergY  EfficiencY 
19.  The  enhanced  degree  of  competition  brought  about  by  a  TPA  regime 
would  certainly  encourage  CHP  schemes  and  should  In  general  lead 
companies  to  search  for  greater  energy  efficiency  In  electricity 
product ton.  There  Is  a I  so  the  poss lb Ill ty  that  a  TPA  reg I  me  might 
encourage  large users  to smooth  out  their  demand  profiles  In  response 
to  advantageous  prices,  although  It  was  argued  that  this  could 
equally be  achieved  in  the present market  regime. 
If  electricity  prices  fall  generally  or  for  particular  consumers, 
there would  be  some  adverse effect  on  the  efficiency of  electricity 
use.  But  It  would  be  an  economic  fallacy  in  any  sector  to argue  that 
costs or  profits  should  be  Inflated  to  ensure  greater  efficiency  at 
the point of  consumption. 
• • • • • • • • .... 
1 • 
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Chapter  3 
EFFECTS  ON  ELECTR I  CITY  TRANSMISSION 
AND  ITS  RELATION  WITH  PRODUCTION 
It  Is  an  Inherent  characteristic  of  the  electricity  sector  that, 
under  any  market  regime,  there will  need  to be  centralised control  of 
the operation of both  transmission and  production within a  particular 
reglon<1>.  As  well  as  providing  transmission  and  related  services 
such  as frequency  and  voltage control,  the central  control  point will 
have  to ensure  that  production matches  demand  at  any  given  time,  and 
to deal  with  unexpected  emergencies.  The  grid control  must  therefore 
extend  to  'calling  up'  Individual  power  stat Ions  onto  fhe  system 
(dispatching)  and,  more  rarely,  to  curtailing  demand  by  reducing 
voltage  or  I lmltlng  offtake  by  distributors  or  Individual  large 
consumers.  This  central  control  Is  exercised  either  by  Integrated 
electricity suppliers,  carrying out  both  generation  and  transmission 
and  perhaps also  local  distribution, or, where  the  Industry structure 
Is not  Integrated,  by  the  transmission or  'grid'  company. 
2.  It  Is  also a·normal  feature of  the  Industry  that  the  control  centre 
will  operate,  within  a  regional  system,  an  economic  dispatching 
procedure  by  calling up  production  units  In  accordance  with  a  'merit 
order'  taking  account  of  production,  transmission  and  other  variable 
operating  costs  In  the  short  and  medium  term.  This  type  of 
dispatching  will  usually  take  account  also  of  government  policy 
requirements.  This  process  can  be  furthered  by  the  sort  of  Joint 
planning  and  operation of  production  and  transmission  carried out  by 
Integrated  companies.  In  any  case,  a  continuing  dialogue  between  the 
responsible  companies  will  be  necessary. 
3.  In  discussing  the effects of  TPA  on  electricity transmission  and  Its 
relationship  with  production  two  points  need  to  be  taken  Into 
account.  The  first  Is  the  Integrated  nature  of  tho  Production/ 
transmission  svstom.  Tho  concept  of  electricity  moving  from  a 
part lcular  source  of  product lon  to  a  part lcular  consumer  Is  not  a 
reality  In  European  electricity  networks.  Each  entry  of  new 
product I  on  or  new  demand  to  an  Integrated  system  reba 1  ances  the 
production/transmission  system  as  a  whole.  The  second  point  Is  that 
It  will  often  be  Important  to  dlst lngulsh  between  Intra-regional 
transmission  within a  region covered  by  one  grid control  centre)  and 
Inter-regional  transmission  (between  regions  covered  by 
(1)  In  this report,  the area served  by  a  particular grid control  centre 
(whether  national  or  regional) will  be  called a  •region•. - 26-
different  control  centres,  as  well  as  within  those  regions).  The 
first aspect  Is  discussed  In  paragraphs  4  to 15  below  and  the  latter 
In  paragraphs  16  to 26. 
OQerat IQOal  CQntrol 
4.  The  COmmittee's  discussions  have  shown  that  In  a  TPA  situation  there 
would  be  real  difficulties  In  reconciling  the  need  for  central 
control  with  the  matching  of  production  patterns  to  contractual 
c011111ltments.  The  company  operating  the  grid  would  still  have  the 
responsibility  for  controlling  transmission  and  production  to ensure 
quality of  service  and  maintain  a  balance  between  supply  and  demand. 
But  dependIng  on  the  number  and  the  nature  of  TPA  contracts,  the 
complexity  of  the  control  operation  would  need  to  Increase 
cons 1  derab I  y  to  ensure  that  specIfIc  contractua I  commItments  were 
Implemented.  The  ability  to  handle  a  large  number  of  complex 
contracts  Is  not  guaranteed  In  the  present  status  of  technology. 
Ways  of avoiding  this difficulty are discussed  In  paragraph  20  of  the 
Executive  Summary. 
TPA  would  raise a  number  of other basic questions: 
-the availability and  allocation of  transmission capacity; 
- the basis for  transmission charges; 
-the effects on  production patterns and  economic  dispatching .. 
Tran§IISIIQO capacitY 
5.  It  Is  assumed  In  this  report  that  any  TPA  regime  Introduced  In  the 
Community  would  not  allow  new  TPA  arrangements  to  override  existing 
supply obligations,  whether  legal  or contractual.  As  explained  In  the 
Introduction,  the  alternative  'common  carrier'  approach,  In  which 
any  demand  for  transmission at  any  time  would  have  to be  accommodated 
by  sharing  the  available  capacity  pro-rata  amongst  existing  and  new 
users,  could  obviously  have  an  unacceptable  Impact  on  security  of 
supply  and  Is  not  considered  further  In  this report. 
6.  Many  TPA  contracts  would  not  Involve  any  Increase  In  electricity 
demand,  but  only  replace  one  supplier  with  another.  But  such 
contracts  could  nevertheless  result  In  an  additional  load  and 
transmission  losses  If  the  new  supplier  was  geographically  more 
distant  and/or  the  direction  of  supply  was  adverse.  Contracts 
I  nvo I  vI ng  new  electrIcIty  demand,  or  In  some  cases  transIt  through 
the system,  would  be  more  likely to have  this effect. - 27  -
7.  Most  transmission  systems  will  have  some  capacity  to  handle 
additional  transmission  demands.  Some  of  this  flexibility  should 
however  be  reserved  for  dealing  with  emergency  situations  (see 
paragraph  8)  and,  it  is  argued,  could  not  be  used  for  TPA,  even 
interruptlbly,  without  Jeopardising  that  need.  The  Integrated 
Industry  also  argues  that  It  would  be  economically  disadvantageous 
for  all  concerned  to  use  transmission  capacity  for  TPA  rather  than 
for  'spot'  trade  between  different  electricity  systems,  designed  to 
maximise  the  short  term  use  of  lower  cost  production.  Some  consumers 
argued  however  that  spare  transmission  capacity  should  not  be 
reserved  for  trading  opportunities  limited  to  electricity 
companies. 
8.  It  would  be  essential  to  ensure  that  a  growth  In  TPA  contracts  did 
not  undermine  the  security of  the  overall  system.  This  could  happen 
If  there  were  an  unacceptable  reduction  In  the  abll tty  to  'bring' 
electricity  from  other  parts  of  the  system,  or  from  adjoining 
systems,  to  replace  unexpected  supply  losses.  It  would  not  therefore 
be  feasible  for  TPA  contracts  Involving  new  transmission  demands  to 
go  ahead  unless  the company  responsible  for  the grid could  handle  the 
transmission  without  Jeopardising  security  margins,  or  had  been 
granted sufficient  time  to provide additional  transmission  capacity. 
Transmission  charges  should  always  reflect  this  security  element. 
(The  security of  supply  Implications  for  consumers  of  TPA  contracts 
are discussed  later  In  chapter  5 of  this report.) 
9.  There  would  Inevitably  be  a  risk  of  disputes  arising  when  TPA 
consumers  or  producers were  refused  transmission services because  the 
company  operating the grid took  the  view  that sufficient  transmission 
capacity was  not  available, or was  unwilling  to provide  the necessary 
capacity  In  a  reasonable  timescale. 
There  are a  number  of possible ways  of alleviating this problem: 
(a)  a  system  of  regulation  could  be  Introduced  In  which  the 
regulatory  authority  or  Independent  arbiters  would  assess  the 
situation  and  decide  whether  the  capacity  limitation  was 
valid.  This  could  be  a  complex  and  time-consuming  process, 
particularly  If  the  resulting  decision  was  then  appealed  to  the 
Courts.  The  expertise  of  the  electricity  company  on  the 
technicalities of  Its own  system  would  be  difficult  to match; 
(b)  Some  type  of  obligation  to  provide  capacitY  could  be  Imposed  by 
1  aw  on  the  t r ansm Iss I  on  ccimpany.  Th Is  cou 1  d  1  nc 1  ude  an 
obligation  to  construct  new  transmission  lines,  or  to  Increase 
the  capacIty  of  new  I I  nos  a I  ready  pI anned,  where  TPA  needs 
could  not  otherwise  be  provided  for  without  Jeopardising  tho 
needs  of  the  overall  system.  Such  an  approach  would  clearly 
reQuire  a  reasonable  period  of  notice  to  be  given  for  major  new - 28  -
TPA  transmission  requirements,  as  well  as  willingness  to  enter 
Into  term  contracts.  But  It  would  not  be  easy  to  Impose 
obligations  to  Invest  on  Integrated  companies,  particularly 
perhaps  pr lvate  companies,  In  a  sltuat ion  where  TPA  contracts 
were  reducing  their own  sales.  And  there are often real  planning 
difficulties hindering  the construction of  new  lines. 
(c)  Integrated  companies  could  be  required  to  Introduce  seParate 
oPerat tonal  management  and  account lng  for  the  services  they 
provide,  Including  transmission.  While  maintaining coordination 
of  overall  planning,  this  would  help  to  Improve  transparency  in 
the  transmission  phase  of  the  business,  Including  the  capacity 
situatIon,  cost  structure  and  revenues.  But  Judgements  on  the 
availability of capacity would  still  remain  complex. 
(d)  seParate  ownershiP  of  transmission  would  create  a  situation  In 
which  the  grid  company  was  Interested  only  In  providing 
transmission  services,  Irrespective  of  which  suppliers  and 
consumers  were  Involved.  In  that  situation  the  company  could 
I  tse If  be  expected  to  take  a I I  the  steps  necessary  to  market 
transmission  services,  Including  the  construction  of  new 
capacity.  But,  representatives  of  the  Integrated  electricity 
Industry  argued  that  separate  ownership  could  have  negative 
consequences  In  terms  of  the  overal 1  economics  of  the  system, 
which  are  at  present  based,  In  most  countries,  on  central 
planning within  Integrated utilities. 
10.  A combination of some  or all  of  these options might  well  be  required. 
This  aspect  of  the  TPA  Issue  Is  discussed  further  In  the  Executive 
Suwnmary. 
11.  In  principle,  one  further  way  of  encouraging  more  competition  would 
be  to  remove  any  legislative  obstacles  to  the  construction  of  new 
transmission  lines by  companies  other  than  the owners  of  the existing 
transmission  systems.  Much  would  however  depend  on  circumstances. 
Where  electricity was  to  be  supplied  to  a  new  greenfield site  there 
would  seem  to be  no  particular  reason  to exclude  the  construction of 
an  Independently-owned  transmission  line,  linked  to  a  product ton 
source,  eIther  dIrect I  y  or,  _If  a  TPA  reg I  me  was  In  force,  through 
the  main  grid.  If  such  a  new  link  was  to  be  connected  to  the  main 
grid,  the  design  and  operation  of  the  link  would  need  to  match  the 
grid's technical  requirements,  and  the  resulting security and  quality 
of  supply  should  be  paid  for  In  an  appropriate  way.  But  where  the 
electricity  was  to  be  supplied  to  a  site  already  serviced  by  the 
grid,  planning  authorities  would  be  unlikely  to  welcome  the 
construction  of  lines  where  transmission  capacity  was  available  In 
the  existing  system.  A possible  approach,  If  changes  to  the  present 
regime  were  thought  desirable,  would  therefore  be  to  llberallse 
construction alongside  the  Introduction of  a  TPA  regime. • 
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Tran§llsslgn Charges 
12.  Under  a  TPA  regime  transmission  would  remain  very  largely  a  monopoly 
service,  and  would  therefore  Inevitably  be  subject  to  price 
regulation.  such  regulation would  need  to cover  charges  for  ancillary 
services  (reserve  capacity,  differences  In  production  patterns, 
metering,  providing  reactive  power  etc  •• )  as  well  as  transmission 
charges.  One  basis  for  setting  transmission  charges  would  be  system 
costs,  plus a  reasonable  rate of  return. 
Other  possibilities might  be  competitive  bidding  or  some  calculation 
of opportunity costs,  but  these would  not  seem  to be  appropriate  In  a 
situation where  transmission  largely remained  a monopoly  service,  and 
could  Introduce  economic  distortions.  But  even  for  a  cost-related 
system of  charges a  number  of  Questions  would  remain: 
(I)  how  should  the  costs of  a  particular  transmission  operation 
be  calculated,  given  that  any  flow  would  In  reality  react  on 
the  whole  system  rather  than  travel  along  a  fixed  path? 
Indeed  sOMe  TPA  contracts  could  actually  reduce  costs  by 
counteracting  the  general  direction  of  electricity  flow  In 
the system; 
(II) should  capital  costs be  reflected  In  transmission  charges  on 
a  historical  cost or  replacement  cost  basis? The  latter would 
clearly do most  to promote  the construction of  new  lines,  but 
would  that  be  an  equitable  basis  for  users  of  the  existing 
syst ..  ?  If  not,  would  It  be  acceptable  for  TPA  users  of  the 
syst .. to be  at a  competitive disadvantage? 
These  Questions  are  discussed  further  In  chapter  5 on  Modalities  and 
Regulation. 
13.  These  are classical  problems  of utility regulation  to which  solutions 
have  been  developed  In  other  countries,  although  often on  a  basis of 
rough  just Ice  and  never  wl thout  leav lng  room  for  cr 1  t lc Ism.  The 
separate accounting  for  services referred to  In  paragraph  9(c)  above 
would  probably  be  essential  and  would  help  to clarify the  true  level 
of  transmission  costs,  which  are  not  always  fully  understood  In  the 
present situation.  It  Is  also worth  noting  that  problems  of  this type 
would  be  alleviated by  Independent  ownership  of  transmission systems. 
In  that  situation  the  companies  concerned  would  no  doubt  seek  to 
develop  and  encourage  optimal  use  of  their  system  by  proposing  a 
competitive and  reasonably  simple  structure of  transmission charges. - 30-
Pr9ductlqn Patterns 
14.  The  Merit  Order  approach  commonly  followed  In  regional 
production/transmission  system  operations  (paragraph  2  above)  would 
appear  to be  undermined  by  a  TPA  regime.  Rather  than  call lng  up  power 
stations only  according  to  their  production  costs,  the  grid  company 
would  have  to  ensure  that  production  from  particular  suppliers,  or 
even  particular  stations,  was  In  accordance  with  contractual 
con~nltments.  The  question  Is  whether  this  would  tend  to  Increase 
average  production  costs  by  making  It  no  longer  possible  to optimise 
the  system  as a  whole,  although  It  was  pointed out  by  some  Committee 
Members  that  current  Merit  Order  optimisation  Is  limited  by  regional 
boundaries and  often distorted by  energy  policy constraints. 
15.  One  view  is that  TPA  competition  for  lower  cost  supplies would  In  any 
case ensure over  time  that  the most  efficient and  lowest  cost  sources 
of  production  were  preferentially exploited.  The  other  view  Is  that 
special  measures  should  be  adopted  to  ensure  that  a  Merit  Order  Is 
retained.  This  has  been  the  view  taken  In  the  UK  where  a  Pool  System 
has  been  adopted  whIch  operates  a  type  of  MerIt  Order  based  on 
bIddIng  prIces.  Under  thIs  system  a I I  consumers,  IrrespectIve  of 
their supplier,  pay  the Pool  price at  any  given  time,  together  with  a 
charge  to cover  local  distribution costs.  The  Pool  price  Is  composed 
of  the  system  marginal  price derived  from  the  bids and  of  a  capacity 
related  element.  It  Includes  also  an  element  to  cover  the  costs  of 
the  transmission  gr ld.  However.  consumers  as  well  as  suppliers  who 
wish  for  greater  predictability of  electricity prices may  enter  Into 
option  contracts.  The  concept  of  the  pool  Is  returned  to  In 
paragraph  20  of  the Executive  Summary. 
I  nter=Reg I  QDI I  TPA 
16.  The  first  part  of  this  chapter  discussed  the  Implications  of 
Introducing  a  TPA  regime  within  a  particular  regional  system  In 
terms  of  the  effects  of  that  regime  on  transmission,  and  on  Its 
relationship  with  production,  within  that  system.  It  did  not  deal 
with  the  effects of  a  wider  Community  TPA  regime,  which  would  apply 
to  transmission  Involving  more  than  one  regional  system,  as  well  as 
within particular regional  systems. 
17.  A Community-wide  TPA  regime  could  take  the  form  of  either  a  single 
regime  applied at Community  level  or  a  harmonlsed  set of national  TPA 
regimes  accompanied  by  rules  governing  the  treatment  of  electricity 
moving  between  Member  States  under  TPA  contracts.  In  either  case 
basic  questions  about  operational  control,  transmission  capacity  , 
charges  and  production  patterns  would  again  arise  (paragraph  4)  but 
In  a  more  complex  form. - 31  -
OQorat IQDal  Control 
18.  Under  a  TPA  regime  extending  across  more  than  one  regional  system, 
operational  control  would  become  still  more  complex.  A particular 
system  operator  would  now  have  to  take  account  not  Just  of  TPA 
contract  arrangements  within  his  own  system  (paragraph  4  above)  but 
also of  Inter-regional  transactions.  The  costs of  telecommunications 
and  control  systems  would  certainly  Increase,  as  would  the 
sensitivity  of  the  system  to  telecommunication  failures.  But  long-
term  contracts  with  local  back-up  arrangements  would  probably  be 
easier  to accommodate. 
19.  In  this context  It  Is  Important  to  recognise  that  the  decision  of  a 
part lcular  consumer  to  enter  Into  a  TPA  contract  with  a  supplier 
outside  his own  region would  not  'remove'  him  from  his  local  system. 
Physically,  he  would  remain  part  of  that  system  and  would  benefit 
from  the  flex lb Ill ty,  qua II ty  of  servIce  and  securIty  prov lded  by 
Its  central  control  system,  Interconnected  network  and  stock  of 
generating  capacity.  The  ultimate  example  of  this  would  be  a 
situation  In  which  the  'external'  supplier of  a  TPA  customer  could 
no  longer  provide  a  supply  because  of  a  breakdown  In  production  or 
transmission  facilities.  In  these  circumstances  the  local  system 
would  automatically  take  over  the  burden  of  meeting  that  customer's 
demand,  unless  specific  steps  were  taken  to  cut  him  off  from  the 
system  (which  might  not  be  acceptable  In  the  case  of  priority 
users).  It  Is  clear  that  the  possibility  of  a  TPA  customer  having 
this  recourse,  and  the  payments  to  be  made  for  that  facility,  would 
need  to be  negotiated  In  advance. 
TrtnSIIISIQD caoacltY 
20.  The  problem  of  resolving  disputes  about  the  availability  of 
transmission  capacity,  Including  the  risk  that  TPA  contracts  might 
Infringe  the  ability  to  deal  with  emergencies,  would  presumably  now 
be  accentuated  by  the scope  for  TPA  contracts with  external  suppliers 
or  consumers,  and  by  additional  transit  of  electricity  through 
systems  (Including  systems  not  directly  on  the  theoretical 
transmission  path).  The  options outlined  In  paragraphs  9(a)  to  (d), 
and  their  advantages  or  disadvantages,  would  not  change 
fundamentally,  but  there  would  be  an  additional  need  for  any  such 
measure  to  ..  be  harmonlsed  at  Community  level.  The  same  need  for 
harmonisation  would  also arise  In  the  case of  authorisations  for  the 
construction  of  new  'Independently-owned'  transmission  lines 
(paragraph  11). 
21.  There  Is  also  the  question  of  Interconnections  between  different 
systems.  These  lines  are  used  at  present  for  the  ex 1st lng  spot  or 
longer-term  trade  between  regional  systems,  as  well  as  for  mutual - 32-
help  In  emergency  situations,  and  the  level  of  capacity  available 
will  often  relate only  to  these  needs.  Inter-regional  TPA  contracts 
would  be  In  direct  competition  for  this  capacity.  The  problems  of 
determining  the availability of capacity or  the  al towable  contingency 
reserve,  and  of  ensuring  the  construction  In  good  time  of  new 
Interconnect lon  lines,  would  In  this  case  Involve  more  than  one 
country  or  region,  and  would  therefore  presumably  need  to  be  solved 
at  COmmunity  level  •  The  trend  towards  greater  Interconnection  would 
help  to  Increase  the  flexibility  and  reliability  of  the  Community 
system. 
Tran§llsslgn Charges 
22.  As  well  as  the  considerations  discussed  In paragraphs  12  to 13  above, 
the  pr lnclples  for  calculat lng  transmission  charges  would  clearly 
need  to  be  harmonlsed  at  Community  level  to  avoid  unnecessary 
distort  Ions  In  trade  patterns.  The  level  of  charges  would,  Inter 
alia,  need  to  take  account  of  additional  costs  arising  from  greater 
complexity  of  system  control  and  operation.  Conversely,  Increased 
utilisation of  the  system  could  help  to reduce  transmission costs. 
Production Patterns 
23.  Any  direct  form  of  TPA  regime,  whether  at  national  or  Community 
level,  would  appear  to  undermine  the  'merit  order'  approach  or 
economic  load  dispatch  regime  within  a  particular  regional  system 
(paragraph  14).  In  addition,  Increased  trade  through  a  particular 
system,  If  predominantly  In  one  direct lon,  could  tend  to  rebalance 
the  system  In  such  a  way  as  to  Impose  a  further  'directional' 
distortion  In  the  use  of  power  stations,  at  least  until  new 
transmission  capacity  was  provided.  On  the  other  hand,  TPA  would 
reduce  the  distortions  created  by  the  fact  that  the  •merit  order• 
approach  Is  generally  limited  to  the  boundaries  of  a  particular 
regional  system. 
24.  Again,  the  two  possible options outlined  In  paragraph  15  would  apply 
In  the  case  of  TPA,  that  Is  to  rely  on  competition  to  produce  an 
acceptable  outcome  over  time,  or  to adopt  some  type of  Pool  system  • 
For  a  COmmunity-wide  regime,  the  latter  approach  would  presumably 
have  to  be  based  on  establishing  a  series of  'Regional  Pools',  with 
Imports  or  exports  be lng  treated  In  the  same  way  as  product I  on  or 
consumption  within  each  system,  as  Is  already  the  case  for  Inter-
system  trade. - 33  -
25.  An  Important  factor  to  be  taken  Into  account  In  consider lng  the 
merits of  TPA  Is  the co-ooeratlon which  takes place under  the  present 
structure  of  the  European  electricity  Industry,  which  Includes  a 
growing  level  of  trade  between  systems.  The  in~ustry believes  that 
because  the  Integrated  nat lonal  or  regional  companies  are  not  In 
direct  competition with  each  other,  they  are readier  to co-operate  In 
matters  such  as  transit or  the  provision of  assistance  in  emergency 
sltuat Ions.  They  believe  that  this  type  of  mutual  support  would 
become  more  difficult  to  arrange  If,  because  of  the  Introduction  of 
TPA,  the  Industry  moved  from  a  co-operative  to a  competitive  regime. 
Emergency  assistance would  however  seem  likely  to  remain  a  matter  of 
some  mutual  concern. 
26.  The  Introduction  of  cross-frontier  competition  through  a  Community 
TPA  regime  would  raise  a  number  of  questions  In  the  Industry  about 
comgetltlve  distortions  arising  from  differences  In  the  conditions 
which  electricity utilities face  In  their own  countries.  Examples  of 
this would  be  differing environmental  standards,  planning  procedures, 
taxation  regimes,  subsidies  or  national  requirements  to  give 
preference  to  part lcular  power  stat ion  fuels.  The  COmmission  has 
recognised  that  this  type  of  problem  should  be  addressed  In  Its 
over a II  I  nterna I  market  programme  to  ensure  faIr  trade  and 
competition  In  all  energy  sectors,  although  not  as  a  perequlslte  for 
market  lntegrat lon.  TPA  Induced  competItIon  should  however  help  to 
Identify and  'drive out'  such  distortions.  This  Is discussed  further 
In  chapter  5. 
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Chapter  4 
EFFECTS  ON  COMPETITION,  PRICES  AND  CONSIAFT ION. 
tompet It lon 
1.  Although  there will  be  some  scope  for  the construction of extensions 
to  the grids  by  generators  and  large users  (see chapter  3  above),  It 
will  very  often remain  uneconomic,  under  any  type  of  legal  regime,  to 
duplicate  existing  transmission  lines  or  distribution  networks.  The 
stage  where  competition  has  a  practical  significance  In  electricity 
Is,  therefore,  production.  One  way  of  promoting  such  competition 
would  be  through  TPA,  wh lch  would  a I low  e llg lb le  consumers  and 
distributors  to  conclude  contracts  directly  with  producers  on  a 
commercial  basis. 
2.  If  such  a  competitive  choice  existed,  consumers  exercising  that 
choice  would  presumably  benefit  because  they  would  have  a  better 
opportunity  to  negotiate  not  only  price  but  some  non-price  terms  to 
suit  their  needs.  Terms  related  to  the  quality  of  electr Ietty  like 
frequency  and  voltage control  would,  however,  remain  an  Integral  part 
of  the  supply  contract  and  could  not  be  separately  negotiated.  The 
relat lonshtp  between  the  supplier  and  the  customer  should  be  more 
balanced  with  TPA,  particularly  If  there  were  good  market 
transparency.  There  were  however  differences  of  opinion  on.  whether 
all  consumer  classes  would  benefit  equally  and,  In  particular,  what 
the  effect  would  be  on  consumers  without  access  rights or  with  less 
market  power.  This  Is  discussed  further  In  paras 12  ~o 17  below. 
·3.  There  Is  already  a  limited  degree  of  competition  In  electricity 
production.  The  UCPTE  exchange  mechanisms  enable  utilities to  trade 
electricity  among  themselves  In  a  co---operative  framework  and  recent 
developments  point  towards  the  development  of  a  more  commercial 
Inter-utility spot-market.  One  further  point made  by  the electricity 
Industry  is  that  the  publication of  comparative  prices amounts  to an 
Indirect  form  of competition between  utilities. 
Competition  at  the  level  of production could also be  enhanced  without 
TPA  If  there were  a  regime  establishing  fair  condltl.ons  for  the grid 
to  buy  Its  electricity  from  competing  Independent  producers  (see 
chapter  2  above).  This  would  Imply  that  the  grid  Is  either  a 
separate  entity  Independent  of  the  generators  or  an  Integrated 
company  subject  to a  regulation ensuring  that  It  does  not  favour  Its 
own  generation  plants.  However  such  a  regime  would  not  give 
Individual  consumers  any  direct  say  In  their  supply  arrangements, 
although  they  should  benefit  Indirectly from  any  cost savings. - 35  -
4.  Lastly,  under  this  heading,  It  Is  Important  to  recognise  that 
competition between  producers at community  level  would  be  affected by 
differences  In  national  rules  on  matters  such  as  environment 
standards,  planning  consents,  fiscal/accounting  practices  or  fuel 
choice.  Increased  trade  and  competition  should  tend  to  reduce  or 
harmonise  such  Interventions,  although  In  some  cases  Community  level 
solutions might  need  to be  found. 
Effects on  costa. 
5.  Competition  will  always  provide  a  clear  Incentive  to  put  downward 
pressure  on  coats,  whether  variable  or  fixed  capital  costs.  The 
present  electricity  structure  does  already  Include,  In  some  cases, 
price  control  mechanisms  by  national  authorities  that  provide 
Incentives  for  coat  minimisation  and  ensure  that  price  Increases  are 
only  allowed  when  the  utilities can  demonstrate  that  cost  Increases 
reflect  rational  operation.  Also  the  UCPTE  exchange  mechanisms 
(referred  In  paragraph  3 above)  enable  utilities  to  optimise  the 
use  of  production  resources  to  a  certain  extent.  The  question  Is 
whether  TPA  and  the  form  of  competition  It  allows  will  lead  In  the 
electricity  sector  to  higher  cost  efficiency  than  other  forms  of 
organisation. 
6.  There  are different opinions about  this.  One  view  Ia  that  Integrated 
electricity companies  are  In  the  best  position  to  Identify  potential 
additional  benefits,  and  that  co-operation  will  suffice  to  bring 
overall  costs down.  It  Is  also argued  that  TPA  would  be  accompanied 
by  significant  extra  costs  deriving  from  the  need  for  new  control 
systems,  planning  difficulties  and  sub-optimal  use  of  the 
production/transmission  system.  The  contrary  view  Is  that  TPA 
Induced  competition  would  bring  additional  pressure on  costs as well 
as more  technical  and  commercial  flexibility. 
7.  In  the  analysis,  It  Is  Important  to  distinguish  the  short  term 
stat lc  effects  of  TPA  from  the  long  term  dynamic  ones.  Short  term 
effects  resu It  from  the  fact  that  TPA  allows  consumers  to  compare 
offers  from  suppliers  and  to  make  an  economical  choice.  Long  term 
effects depend  on  the  companies'  strategies to take  advantage  of  the 
opportunities and  cope  with  the risks of  the open  market. 
a.  In  the  short  term,  TPA  would  also affect  costs  through  Its  Impact  on 
the dispatching  order  and  on  transmission operations. 
COst  Increases  could  be  experienced  If  TPA  was  Implemented  In  such  a 
way  that  the  economic  dispatch  of  plants  were  disrupted,  although - 36  -
It  Is  arguable  that  customers  seeking  lower  prices would,  over  time, 
ensure  the  most  efficient  use  of  capacity  and  the  network  (chapter 
3).  Nevertheless  it  Is  uncertain whether  TPA  contracted  demand  and 
supply  would  be  compat lble  with  the  pract leal  constraints  of  the 
operation of  the grid and  would  ensure,  within  those constraints,  the 
use  of  the  most  efficient  production  capacity  over  time.  Paragraph 
20  of  the  Executive  summary  discusses possible ways  to preserve Merit 
Order  operation  by  allowing  the  grid  to  retain  the  authority  to 
operate  Independently  from  the  contracts  and  call  on  production  In 
an  economic  way.  This  approach  within  a  region  presumably  achieves 
the  same  savings  as  the  present  economic  dispatch  applied  in  many 
regions of  the Community. 
An  Interregional  TPA  regime  would  provide  an  external  Incentive  for 
more  Interregional  trade  and  should,  therefore,  allow  a  wider  use  of 
low  cost  resources  In  the  limIts  of  the  present  Interconnect ion 
system,  thus  reducing  the average  cost of production.  It  was  however 
argued  that  such  trade  would  In  any  case  now  develop  under  the 
current  regime. 
9.  TPA  would  affect  and  presumably  Increase  the  cost  of  transmission 
operations.  Transmission  losses  could  Increase  as  the  quantities  of 
transmitted  electricity  Increased,  although  such  Increases  would  be 
small  In  relation to the  total  supply  costs of electricity (chapter  3 
).  Metering  and  billing  requirements  would  Increase.  Technical  co-
ordination  between  regional  control  centres  would  become  more 
complex.  But  these  additional  costs should  be  paid  for  and  offset  by 
the difference  In  production  costs  In  the  production  and  consumption 
regions,  which  would  be  the driving  force  for  TPA  contracts. 
A  number  of  add It lona 1  costs  could  a I  so  resu It  from  too  short  a 
transition period  to TPA. 
10.  In  the  long  ter1n,  TPA  should  have  an  Impact  on  costs  through  the 
producers'  new  approach  towards  Investment  and  the  search  for  greater 
Internal  efficiency. 
The  Impact  of  TPA  on  production  costs will  in  part  depend  on  whether 
TPA  changes  the  ~nake...up of  supply  (chapter  2  above).  Considering  the 
Increased  ~narket uncertainty,  producers might  seek  to minimize  front-
end  Investments  and  avoid  large  capital  Intensive  Investments  that 
are  only  recoverable  In  the  long  term.  This  factor  could  raise 
average  production  costs,  although  other  producers  might  decide  that 
the  lower  and  more  stable production  costs offered  by  larger  plants 
were  still attractive, particularly  in  a  competitive situation. 
A number  of  electricity  Industry  representatives  argue  that  overall 
supp I  y  costs  wou I  d  I  ncr  ease  because  of  pI ann I  ng  I  neff 1  c 1  enc 1  es. - 37  -
The  counter-argument  was  that  competition  would  Improve  system 
efficiency.  In  particular,  TPA  or  another  means  of  allowing  more 
competition  at  the  level  of  production  should  also  broaden  the  scope 
for  Involvement  of  energy  consuming  Industry  In  electricity 
generat lon  and  thereby  lead  to  more  development  of  CHP  plants. 
This  would  result  In  lower  electricity  production  costs  and  higher 
production  efficiency.  TPA  would  also  reduce  the  costs  of 
environmental  protection  Insofar  as  It  modified  the  energy  mix  In 
favour  of  gas  and  Improved  overall  energy  efficiency  (see  again  In 
chapter  2). 
11.  The  argument  was  also  made  that  TPA  should  bring  cost  benefits  In 
allowing consumers  to define better  what  services  they  are  Interested 
In  and  at  what  prIces.  The  unbundling  of  services  would  help  to 
diversify  the  concept  of  electricity  supply  and  provide  a  basis  for 
IdentIfyIng  costs  and  therefore  prIcIng,  for  Instance  as  regards 
security of supply.  TPA  should  also encourage  better  load management 
as  prices  more  closely  followed  supply  costs.  But  the  contrary  view 
was  that  these  needs  were  already  met  by  the  present  market 
organization. 
Effects on  prices. 
12.  For  TPA  consumers,  some  components  of  the  final  electricity  price 
such  as  transmission  and  dlstr  I but ion  would  stIll  be  regulated  and 
cost  based.  The  prIce  of  electrIcity  at  the  level  of  product ion 
wou I d,  however,  be  de term I ned  by  the  market  for  those  consumers, 
subJect  only  to  regulatory  safeguards  designed  to  protect  non-TPA 
consumers  from  paying  for  cross-subsldlsatlon.  In  a  competitive 
pricing situation It  is not certain whether  the  market  would  perform 
smoothly,  or  whether,  as  In  other  capital  Intensive  commodity 
markets,  spot  prices  would  fluctuate widely.  But  most  consumers  and 
producers  would  probably  want  to  enter  Into more  stable  longer  term 
contracts. 
13.  TPA  would  also  shed  new  light  on  the  Issue  of  prices  for  different 
classes  of  consumers.  Electricity  prices  should  be  non-
discriminatory  In this sense  and  should  reflect  the  costs  incurred  in 
supplying  the  var lous  categor lea  of  consumers.  Domest lc  consumers 
pay  more  for  their  electricity  than  large  industrial  consumers. 
ThIs  Is  due  to  techn I ca I  factors  <de I I vered  Quant It  I es,  vo 1  tage  of 
delivery,  shape  of  the  load  curve, •• )  and  to  the  fact  that  domestic 
consumers  tend  to  expect  a  hIgh  degree  of  secur 1  ty  of  supp 1  y.  1  n 
most  Member  States,  the  relative  prices  for  different  classes  of 
consumers  are monitored by  public authorities. 
14.  At  present,  however,  the  ratios  between  the  domestic  consumer 
(regulated)  price  and  the  large  Industrial  consumer  (regulated  or - 38-
not)  price vary  widely  between  the Member  countries.  This  may  be  due 
to structural  differences  in  the electricity production,  transmission 
and  distribution  systems,  or  to  different  policy  Influences,  or  to 
regulatory  Imperfections  as  regards  the  allocation  of  costs  to 
different  consumer  classes. 
15.  With  TPA,  the prices paid  by  customers  eligible  for  TPA  would  be  set 
by  market  mechanisms  and  should,  In  the  longer  term,  reflect 
differences  In  supply  costs.  Distortions  In  pricing  Introduced  for 
Industrial  or  regional  policy  reasons  would  tend  to be  driven out  of 
the syst•. 
There  were  differences of opinion  In  the  COmmittee  about  the  risk of 
cross-subsldlsatlon  In  a  TPA  situation.  Many  electricity  Industry 
representatives  felt  that  there  could  be  an  Increased  risk  of  large 
industrial  consumers  negotiating  price  reductions  to  an  extent  that 
would  have  to  be  compensated  for  by  the  remaining  consumers 
supporting  a  larger  part  of  the  fixed  Investments.  Some  others  on 
the  Committee  felt  that  TPA  would  reduce  the  risk  of  cross-
subsldlsatlon through  allowing direct sales by  electricity producers, 
and  through  the  unbundling  of  accounting  which  TPA  woufd  In  their 
view  require. 
16.  It was  however  common  ground  that  regulators would,  as  Is  already  the 
case  In  many  Member  States,  need  to monitor  prices from  this point of 
view  and  ensure  that captive and  smaller  consumers  were  not  exploited 
to  the  benefit  of  other  larger  consumers.  But  the  Identification 
and  allocation  of  the  costs  Is  a  complex  and  uncertain  process. 
Consumers'  organisations  could,  as  at  present,  help  to  protect 
smaller  consumers  by  monitoring  developments  and  ensuring  a 
sat lsfactory  regulatory  process.  Lastly,  prIce  transparency  would 
clearly be  essential  In  this sense  • 
17.  If  adequately  regulated,  distributors  could  play  a  useful  role  In 
this  respect  by  aggregating  demand  of  domestic  and  Intermediate 
consumers,  negotiating  TPA  contracts  and  spreading  potential 
benefits to all  users.  But  distributors might  find  It more  difficult 
than  final  consumers  to  negotiate  flexible  requirements  for  the 
reliability  of  supply  as  they  would  have  less  scope  for  controlling 
electricity demand.  This might  prevent  them  from  obtaining,  by  means 
of  TPA,  rebates  similar  to  those  of  final  consumers  of  comparable 
size,  although  they  might  be  able  to compensate  for .this  by  offering 
greater sales volumes. - 39 -
Effects on  con.u.ptlon 
18.  TPA's  Impact  on  electricity  consumption  will  depend  on  the  price 
effects  and  the  price  elasticities  In  each  of  the  submarkets. 
Large  Industrial  consumers  take  the  view  that  consumption  In  a  number 
of  sectors  would  significantly  Increase  with  TPA,  through  promoting 
new  uses  of  electrIcity  and  making  more  likely  Investments  In  new 
electricity consuming  plants. 
19.  TPA  could,  through  better  price  signals,  provide  Incentives  for 
effective  load  management  and  electricity  savings.  It  should 
encourage  distributors  to seek  ways  of modifying  the  demand  patterns 
of  domestic  consumers.  But  the  Industry  argues  that  the  same 
Incentives can  also be  provided  for  with  the  present market  system. 
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Chapter  5 
MODALITIES  AND  REGULATION 
1.  Regulatory  patterns  In  the Member  States differ according  to  Industry 
structures  and  the  degree  of  public ownership.  In  general,  although 
electricity utilities  are  subJect  to  a  variety  of  rules  on  matters 
such  as  safety,  land  use  and  the  environment,  the  main  areas  of 
regulation  relevant  to  this  report  have  been  consumer  prices  and  the 
obligation to supply. 
2.  Insofar  as  particular  types  of  consumer  were  outside  a  TPA  regime, 
this type of  regulation would,  for  them,  continue.  The  governments  or 
regulatory  authorities  concerned  with  price  regulation  would  still 
need,  as  now,  to  take  account  of  the  allocat lon  of  costs  over  the 
whole  systeM.  COnsumers  not  outside TPA  would  wish  to be  assured  that 
the  market  power  exerted  by  TPA  buyers  was  not  loading  onto  them  an 
undue  share  of  system  costs,  for  Instance  through  TPA  buyers  being 
offered  prices  based  on  marginal  costs.  This  difficult  problem  of 
Identifying  true  costs  and  potential  cross-subsldlsatlon  already 
exists  In  the  present  situation and  might  even  be  alleviated  to some 
extent  by  the greater  transparency  Inherent  In  a  TPA  regime.  But  the 
r lsk  of  cross-sUbsldlsat lon,  and  the  level  of  concern  about  that 
risk, might  Increase under  a  TPA  regime. 
3.  There  should  however  be  no  need  for  regulation of  the  prices charged 
for  generation  by  electricity  producers  to  consumers  who  took 
advantage  of  a  TPA  regime.  In  that  case  competition  and  consumer 
choice  would  ensure  that  prices  were  equitable.  All  that  would  be 
needed  would  be  the  usual  national  or  EC  competition  rules,  and  the 
provisions of contract  law. 
4.  Under  a  TPA  regime,  therefore,  It  would  mainly  be  In  the  field  of 
electricitY  transgort  where  a  need  for  new  forms  of  regulation could 
arise.  At  present,  In  most  Member  States,  electricity  transport  Is 
controlled by  the grid owners  and  transmission  Is  not  usually carried 
out  for  third  parties.  But  If  a  TPA  regime  was  Introduced  some  new 
mechanl•  would  be  needed  to  ensure  that  access  was  made  available 
and  that  the  charges  for  use  of  the grId were  faIr .. 1  t  wou I  d  be  the 
duty  of  the  organisation  or  organisations  charged  with  this 
responsibility  (the  regulator>  to  protect  the  Interests  of  all  the 
users  of  the  grid,  Including  the  grid  owners,  and  to  ensure  that 
decisions,  for  Instance on  reserve capacity,  were  compatible with  the 
security of  the system. - 41  -
Qode  of Practice 
5.  It  would  be  Important  that  any  such  regulatory  system  should  be  as 
simple,  transparent,  practicable and  effective  as possible.  Case-by-
case  regulation  should  as  far  as  possible  be  avoided.  One  suggested 
means  of  achieving  this  was  lay  down  the  strategic  principles of  a 
TPA  regime  In  advance  In  the  form  of  a  Legal  Code,  drawn  up  after 
consultations  between  the  regulator  and  representatives  of  all 
parties concerned.  This  COde  would  probably  have  to  Include: 
-a definition of which  types of companies  or  Individuals should  have 
a  right  to  TPA  and  of  how  those  rights  should  be  activated;  It 
would  be  Important  to decide whether  the division should  be  made  on 
the basis of eligibility for  TPA,  or  according  to whether  consumers 
decided  to exercise that option. 
-a requirement  to  offer  to  applicants  spare  transport  capacity,- If 
necessary  on  an  Interruptible basis,  without  prejudicing  the  legal 
or  contractual  rights of existing customers: 
-transitional  arrangements  for  changing  to a  TPA  regime; 
- qua II ty  of  servIce· standards  for  a II  customers  (e.g.  frequency, 
voltage,  connection conditions); 
- any  system  of  pr lor It les  mod 1  fy lng  the  bas I  c  f 1  rat  come  f 1  rst 
served system of allocating capacity  to new  applicants  If  temporary 
shortages of capacity arise; 
-non-discrimination between  returning and  new  customers; 
-possible marketability of  transmission contracts; 
- a  requIrement  for  the  company  ownIng  the  grId  to  pub I 1  sh  regu 1  ar 
Information on  grid capacity and  capacity constraints; 
-Possibly,  an  obligation on  the  company  owning  the  grid  to maintain 
a  sufficient  level  of  transport  capacity over  time  to provide  for 
Its  own  customers  and  for  TPA  bus I  ness  ( Inc I  ud I  ng  an  a I I  owab I  e 
contingency  reserve)  subject  to any  necessary  conditions on  timing, 
feasibility and  the costs of constructing new  lines; 
-principles for  determining  non-discriminatory  transport  charges; 
- back-up  arrangements; 
-a requirement  to  publish,  and  keep  up  to  date,  a  scale of  charges 
for  transport.at I  on  and  reI a ted servIces; - 42  -
-confidentiality of  Individual  transport  commercial  arrange-ments; 
- any  procedures  for  resolving  disputes  on  any  of  the  above  matters 
before  recourse  to the  regulator. 
The  Code  could  also  Include  provisions  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  customers  outside  the  TPA  regime,  for  Instance  on  supply 
obligations and  cross-subsldlsatlon. 
There  was  disagreement  about  the  extent  to which  this approach  would 
avoid  detailed  case-by-case  regulation  and  provide  acceptable 
solutions  to  the  problems  arising  under  a  TPA  regime.  The  need  for 
regulatory  Intervention  should  decrease  over  time  as  precedents  were 
set and  disputes resolved. 
Transport  capacitY 
8.  The  ava llablll ty  and  allocatIon  of  transport  capacIty  would  be  a 
particularly  difficult  problem  to  be  dealt  with  under  such  a  Code. 
This  Issue  Is  discussed  further  In  the Executive  Summary. 
Transport Charges and  Cpsts 
7.  The  Identification  of  the  principles  for  setting  transport  charges 
would  be  another  particularly  complex  aspect  of  this  approach.  Each 
TPA  operation  would  Involve  costs  made  up  of  many  elements  arising 
from  the  transmIssIon  as  we I I  as  from  the  provIsIon  of  reI a ted 
services  and  the  rebalancing  of  the  system  concerned.  Various 
studies  are  In  progress  to  develop  more  sophisticated  charging 
principles,  but  In  the  meantime  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
operationally  practicable  alternative  to  the  publication  of  a 
'standard'  scale  of  maximum  charges,  taking  account  of  only  a  few 
bas I  c  var I  ab les  such  as  dIstance,  quant I  ty,  capacIty  and  perhaps 
lnterruptlblllty. Contract  duration might  also be  a  factor.  Provided 
that  transmission  charges  were  realistic,  they  should  encourage 
economic  siting  of  new  plants  Irrespective  of  national  or  regional 
boundaries. 
8.  Such  a  standardised  system  of  charges  would  no  doubt  produce 
situations  where  charges  were  higher  or  lower  than  the  specific 
characteristics  of  a  particular  transaction  would  justify,  but 
provided  that  the  basic  principles  were  adequate  these  differences 
should  not  undermine  the  viability  of  a  TPA  regime  or  of  the 
transmission  system.  Transport  costs  are  not  a  major  element  of 
total  supply  costs  and  Integrated  electricity  companies  do  not  at i. 
I 
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present  calculate  them  In  any  detail  when  contracting  with  new 
customers.  In  the  course  of  time  more  sophisticated  methods  of 
transmission pricing should evolve  under  the  Impetus  of a  TPA  regime. 
It  would  have  to be  a  pre-requisite  for  establishing such  a  scale of 
charges  that  the  short-term  and  long-term  costs  of  transportation 
related services should  be  'unbundled'  from  a utility's overall  costs 
In  accounting  terms.  This  'unbundling'  could  also  Include  the 
allocation  of  these  costs  to  various  customer  categories,  thus 
reducing  the risk of cross-subsldlsatlon.  Also,  basic decisions woUld 
have  to  be  taken  by  the  regulator  on  matters  such  as  the  use  of 
average or  marginal  costing,  the appropriate rate of  return or  profit 
margin,  and  the  calculation  of  capital  charges  In  historic  or 
replacement  cost  terms.  It  would  be  essent Ia I  for  the  regulatory 
system  to ensure  the continued  financial  security of  the grid company 
and  the  viability  of  Investments  In  the  transmission  system.  PrIce 
differences  arising  from  the  'vintage'  of  particular  transmission 
lines should  probably  be  avoided. 
10.  A  suggested  alternatIve  approach  to  the  set  t 1  ng  of  transmIssIon 
charges  on  the  basis of  coats  Is  to allow  them  to  be  determined  by 
negotiation between  the parties concerned.  But  this would  not  seem  to 
be  an  acceptable  approach  In  a  altuat ion  where  the  gr ld  companies 
have  monopoly  power  and  are often  Integrated upstream  and  downstream. 
Th Ia  may  not  however  ru I  e  out  the  poss I  b  i I I  ty  of  some  e I  ement  of 
market  negotiation within  ranges,  or  below  maxima,  set  In  accordance 
with  the principles established by  the Code. 
securitY of SUpplY 
11.  One  further  aspect  which  would  need  to  be  Included  In  a  Legal  Code 
governing  a  TPA  regime  would  be  the arrangements  and  cost  principles 
under  which  the  local  electricity  system  should  provide  back-up 
emergency  supplies  to a  customer  In  Its supply  area  which  had  a  TPA 
contract  with  an  external  supplier.  It  would  seem  appropriate  for 
this  service,  If  requested  by  the  TPA  customer,  to  be  provided  for, 
and  charged  for,  In  each  TPA  transmission  contract.  Such  services 
could also be  provided  by  third parties. 
12.  One  further  related  provision  In  the  Code  would  be  to ensure  that  a 
TPA  customer  wishing  to  'return'  to  his  local  supplier  was  treated 
wIthout  d I  scr I  m  I  nat I  on  In  the  same  way  as  any  other  new  customer 
eligible for  TPA,  provided appropriate notice of  leaving or  returning 
was  given.  New  customers  benefiting  from  legal  supply  obligations 
would  of course  receive priority. - 44  -
Preyentlon of •bYst  legislation 
13.  The  possibility of  legislation based  on  the  prevention of  abuse  was 
also  suggested  and  Is  mentioned  In  paragraph  28  of  the  Executive 
Sunnary. 
Ltye  I  of Bogy  I at I  an 
14.  Given  the  need  for  local  knowledge,  the  considerable  variations 
between  national  systems,  and  the principle of subsidiarity,  It would 
seem  advisable  for  the  Legal  Codes  and  regulatory  mechanisms 
discussed  above  to  be  drawn  up  and  operated  at  Member  State  level. 
But  the  Codes  and  theIr  lmplementat I  on  would  need  to  be  based  on 
community-wide  principles  to  ensure  no  distortions  In  national  or 
cross-frontier electricity trade. 
15.  In  addition,  there  would  need  to  be  a  degree  of  central  supervision 
to  ensure  the  correct  app II cat ion  of  the  COmmunIty  pr Inc I  pIes,  the 
harmon I  sat ion  of  nat lonal  regimes  and  pr lnclples  for  transmission 
charges,  and  to  deat  with  cross-frontier  trade.  In  the  latter  case, 
pr lnclples  would  need  to  be  laid  down  for  access  to  Inter-system 
transmission  capacity  (Including  the  provision  of  additional 
capacity)  and  for  the  corresponding  transport  charges.  These 
responslblllt les  could  be  undertaken  either  by  the  European 
Commission  or  by  a  new  supervisory agency  at Community  level. 
16.  Lastly,  under  the  heading  of  modalities,  the  electricity  Industry 
argues  strongly  that  greater  competition,  for  Instance  by  means  of  a 
TPA  regime,  should  not  be  Introduced  until  a  level  playing  field  has 
been  created  by  removing  competitive  distortions arising  for  example 
from  differing  national  laws,  arrangements  for  licensing electricity 
production,  energy  policy  Interventions  or  State  subsidies.  The 
contrary view  Is  that  It  would  never  be  feasible  to delay  all  action 
to  complete  the  Community's  Internal  market  until  such  differences 
had  been  e I imlnated,  and  that  open  trade  and  competItion  should 
Indeed  help  to  'drive  out'  such  distort Ions.  The  commission  Is  In 
any  case  commIt ted  to  removIng  such  dIstort Ions  by  the  use  of  Its 
Treaty  powers  or  by  seeking  new  legislation  at  Community  level.  It 
will  also  address  any  other  relevant  barr lers  to  cross-front ler 
electricity trade. 
* * * * * * '  . 
Access  right 
Autoproductlon 
Broker/Trader 
CHP-Comblned  heat  and 
power  plant 
Common  carriage 
Cross  subsldlsatlon 
Distribution 
Franchise area 
Franchise customer 
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GlossarY of terms 
R  lght  to  the  use  of  the  transmission  and 
distribution system  In  a  TPA  regime. 
The  generation  of  electricity  by  an 
enterprise  for  Its  own  final  consumption, 
some  of  which  may  be  available  for  sale  to 
other parties. 
An  Intermediary  who  buys  electricity  from 
whatever  source  for  Its subsequent  resale. 
Plant  designed  to produce  heat  for  own 
purposes  or  for  supply  to  local  customers 
(dlstr let  heat lng)  as  well  as  to  generate 
electricity. 
A regime  providing  for  a  general  obligation 
on  transmission and  dlstrl- butlon companies 
to provide electricity transport  services at 
all  time,  with  no  distinction  between 
existing  and  new  clients  and  by  allocating 
capacity prorata amongst  all  applicants. 
Process  of  charging  an  unjustifiably  low 
pr Ice  to  one  group  of  customers  and 
compensating  for  this  by  charging  higher 
prices to other customer  groups. 
The  transport  of  electricity  on  lower 
voltage  local  networks  In  view  of  Its 
delivery  to final  consumers. 
An  area  In  which  an  electricity  company  Is 
providing services to franchise and  possibly 
non-franchise customers. 
A captive customer  In  a  franchised  area. J 
l 
l 
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Grid  control 
Independent  producer 
Local  or  regional  distribution 
company  - LDC  -
Merit  order 
Non-franchise customer 
Partly  Integrated electricity 
company 
Production 
Production/Transmission 
System 
Region 
Regional  system 
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The  centralised  control  of  the  operation 
of  both  transmission  and  product lon 
within  a  region.,  Including  load 
management,  maintenance  of  reliability 
and  generation plants dispatch. 
A producer  of  electricity  not  associated 
either  with  transmission  or  distribution 
business. 
A  local  or  regional  distribution company 
which  Is  not  part  of  an  Integrated 
electricity company. 
The  ranking  of  available  electricity 
generating  plants  with  a  view  to  their 
economic  dispatching,  usually  on  the 
basis of variable generating costs. 
A customer  who  may  or  may  not  be  In  a 
franchise  area  who  has  been  granted 
access rights. 
A company  performing  two  of  the  tasks of 
generation,  transmission and  distribution 
In  a  coordinated  way  with  the  view  of 
supplying wholesale or  final  consumers. 
The  generation of electricity 
A group  of production and  transmission 
assets operated as a  whole. 
The  geographical  area  served  by  a 
particular grid controller. 
A  production/transmission  system  In  a 
region. '  . 
Supply 
Third  Party Access  - TPA 
Transmission 
Transport 
UCPTE 
Unbundling 
Wholly  Integrated electricity 
company 
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The  delivery  of  electricity  to  final 
consumers,  combining  Its  generation  or 
purchase,  transmission  and  distri-
bution. 
A  regime  providing  for  a  qualified 
obi lgatlon  on  companies  operating 
electricity  transmission  grids  and 
distribution  networks  to offer  terms  for 
the use  of  their system. 
The  transport  of  electricity on  the  high 
voltage  Interconnected  gr ld  In  v lew  of 
Its  delivery  to  wholesale  or  final 
consumers. 
Includes  both  the  transmission  and 
distribution functions, 
(Western  European)  Union  for  the 
coordination  of  production  and  transport 
of electricity. 
Disaggregation of  charging,  accounting or 
management  of  part lcular  operatIons,  or 
even  ownership  of  a  wholly  Integrated or 
a  partly  Integrated company. 
A  company  performing  the  tasks  of 
generation,  transmission  and  distri-
bution  of  electricity  In  a  coordinated 
way  with  the  view  of  supplying  final 
consumers. ;  .. 
'  "  . 
i 
:  1) 
2) 
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BRUXELLES 
ANNEX  I 
You  would  like  to  find  above  the  remarks  that  inspires  me  the  last 
issues  of the  PCCE  report. 
The  report  that  is  laying  us, well  globaly  show  from  the 
outset,  the  contradictories  opinions  that  raise  as  well  the  actuel 
~tern than  the  TPA  system  considered. 
One  know  the  problems  the  actuel  ·system  can  raise: 
-disparity  of  ~ifferentr  national  situations, 
-absence  of  choice  for  consumers. 
-climate  of  non  economic  competitiveness  that  induce  a 
certain  stability  that  one . ,  may  be  mix  up  with  a  sane  economical 
situation. One  can  wonder  if  the  actuel  electricity  outup  and 
distribution  in  Europe  don't  look  like  a  melting  point  of  a  liquid 
after  a  suddendly  fall  of  temperature...  So  take  only  one  exemple, 
the  electricity  output,  made  by  EDF  (the  state  owned  company  for 
electricity  in  France)  is  one  of  the  more  competitive  in  Europe. 
But  the  management  of  nuclear  waste  is,  in  France,  a  political 
problem.  Paul  Gardent  delivering  his  twelve  "wise  men"(refered  to 
the  subject)  advice  report,  proclamed,  the  last  21  of  February 
:  "EDF  has  to  integrate  the  management  cost  of  the  nuclear  waste  in 
the  KWh  price...  If  he  would  be  followed  by  the  french  govern1nent, 
what  would  be  the  future  of  the  EDF  price  of  electricity? 
One  should  multiply  exarnples  :  to  show  that  we  rnay  be  argue 
about  the  european  electric  situation  with  data  that  have,  may 
be,  gone. 
The  1"PA  project  certainly  presents  the  meint  to  set  the 
problem  and  to  purpose  an  alternative.  Nevertheless,  one  have 
never  totally  can  convince  us.  Ones  who  are  in  favor  of  this 
system,  can  base  their  opinion  on  a  really  pertinent  acquired 
example.  Great  Britain  wa~  often  cited.  But  don't  we  are  too  close 
for  a  proper  view  to  judge  the  experience?  Aren't  there  scale 
differences  with  Europe? 
The  TPA  system  obviously  keep  a  speculative  dimension. 
Although  it  is,  our  comity  remarks  have  put  in  evidence  the 
crucial  problem  of  the  small  consumers  necessary  protection? 
Whatever  will  be  the  electric  energy  distribution  in  Europe,  they 
can't  be  too  much  the  captive  victims  of  those · crossed 
subsidisation  so  often  showed  as  implicite  reply  to  TPA  (from 
what  the  reference  to  control  instancies). 
But,  are  we  certain  that  the  actual  organization  is  more 
efficient  to  answer  everywhere  and  always  that  care  ?  The  TP  A · 
system  at  least  presents  the  interest  to  set  a  guarantee,  relating  to 
the  subject,  to  the  home  consumer  :  a  formalized  guarantee  at  this 
level,  more  and  more  pertinent  for  consumption,  that  is  the 
Community. * - - * 
*  * 
AW~C:X  !1 
EURELECTR/C  COMITE EUROPEEN OES ENTREPRISES O'El.ECTRICITE 
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INOUSTFIY 
.. ·  .. 
*  ,., *  .  ~.· 
·~·--
21st March 1991 
Orig  :  F 
WHAT FORM OF COMPETITION FOR THE ELECTRICITY 
SUPPLY SECTOR IN EUROPE ? 
POSmON OF THE CONTINENTAL MEMBERS OF EURELECTRIC 
Galer•• Ravenste•n  •  B:e 6 BE  • 1000 SRUXELLES 
Tel  fnt:  +  32 2·5125571  ·Telex: 62409 UEBVEB 6  · Tetecoplletefax tnt:  +  32 2 5113159/St27362 - 2  -
CONTENTS 
INTRODUcriON 
1.  A COMMON  MODEL  - ITS  EMERGENCE  IN  THE  PAST  AND 
RECENT  CHANGES 
2. 
1.1  Emergence  of an "industrial model"  of· electricity 
supply system operation 
1.2  Subjects of debate and  reforms over the last 
ten years 
INDUSTRIAL  MODEL 
2 
3 
4 
4 
6 
7 
2.1  Service monopoly  and  long-term investment decisions  8 
2.2  Security of supply  8 
2.3  Integrated programming  and  optimized operation  9 
2.4  Energy policy  9 
2.5  Regulation - limits of the industrial model  10 
2.6  Diversity of national situations  10 
3.  DIFFICULTIES  RESULTING  FROM  THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS 
TO  THE  GRID 
3.1  Security ot supply and  third party access 
3.2  Protection of captive consumers  and  regulation of 
distribution 
3.3  Regulation of grid access and  pricing 
3.4  Wholesale electricity market 
3-5  Conclusions concerning third party access 
4.  OTHER  FORMS  OF  COMPETITION 
4.1  Auto-production 
4.2  Independent production 
4.2.1  American  experiment 
4.2.2  Difficulties encountered 
CONCLUSION 
11 
13 
14 
~6 
13 
.:o 
..21 
21 
..:t 
...:1 
1) 
- 3 - 3  -
INTRODUCTION 
Looking  ahead  to  the  single  European  energy  market,  the  EEC  Commission  has 
initiated  discussions  concerning  the  opportunity  of  creating  new  forms  of 
competition  between  the  participants  in  the  electricity  sector,  in 
particular by  opening  the electricity grids  to  third parties.  This  is  the 
method  favoured  by  the  EEC  Commission,  in  its  approach  to  integration  of 
'  the electricity sector in  the single European  market. 
This  document  describes  the  position adopted  by  the  Continental  members  of 
Eurelectric on  this important question. 
In all countries,  the electricity companies  - in  their various  legal  forms 
- have  all  been  given  the  mission  of  providing  a  service  of  general 
economic· interest,  comprising the supply of electricity to  the Community: 
- the  availability  of  supply  is  due  to  all,  and  must  be  provided  under 
optimum  conditions  of cost  and  security,  with  security  covering  both  the 
short  term  (continuity  of  supply)  and  the  longer  term  {development  of 
equipment  required to satisfy demand; 
electricity  prices  must  reflect  the  cost  of  each  supply,  in  order  to 
avoid cross  subsidies  between  different consumer  categories.  Prices  must 
comply  with  the  principle  of  equality  of  treatment.  In  certain 
countries,  a  system  of  geographical  tariff equalization  is  also  applied 
to certain categories of consumer; 
- given  the  importance  of electricity production  in  the  energy  budget,  the 
electricity companies  contribute  to  the  policy  of  the  public  authorities 
in the  area of security of primary energy supply. 
This  note sets out  to examine: 
- the  method  of  constituting  an  operatin·g  model  for  electricity  systems. 
common  to  all  countries  irrespective  of  their  ins ti  tu  tiona!  d  1 ._.e rs  i ty. 
and  how  this  model  can  assist  the  electricity  industry  to  carry  Jut  its 
mission of providing a  service of general economic  interest: 
- why  free  third party access  to  the grids would  impede  thi$  mission: 
- whether  the  existing  model  can  still  be  improved,  while  retainlng  its 
advantages  in terms  of·economic  and  security-related efficiency. - 4  -
1.  A  COMMON  MODEL  - ITS  EMERGENCE  IN  111E  PAST  AND  RECENT  CHANCiES 
1.1  Emergence  of  an  "industrial  model"  of  ele~tricity  supply  system 
operation 
The  first  point  which  strikes  one  when  comparing  the  organization  of 
electricity supply  systems  is their diversity.  The  German  system  comprises 
•  hundreds  of  separate  companies,  some  public,  some  semi-public  and  some 
private,  each  contributing  to  the  electricity· supply  function,  while  the 
Italian  and  French  systems  are  dominated  by  a  single,  large  public 
authority.  This  diversity  reflects  the  political  and  institutional 
traditions of each country to a  large extent. 
However,  despite  this diversity,  the systems all present  a  number  of common 
points,  sufficiently  pronounced  for  their  inclusion  in  a  single  operating 
model,  and  one  which  is  sufficiently  flexible  to  take  account  of  the 
diversity  of  institutional  forms,  although  broader  than  the  limited  area 
covered by  the expression "service monopoly  with an  obligation to supply". 
This  "industrial model"  is characterized by  the  following: 
- close  coordination  of  production  and  transmission  over  vast  areas, 
regions  or  countries,  and  the  objective  of  balanced  regional  supply, 
based  on  location  of  production  resources  close  to  the  consumption 
centres,  with,  in  particular  for  purposes  of  economic  efficiency, 
security of  supply  and  quality of service,  a  single operator  responsible 
for  running  the production-transmission system in each area; 
- close  relations  with  distributors  on  a  long-term  basis,  these  relations 
accompanying  the  service  monopoly  and  obligation  to  supply,  present  in 
all cases de  facto or de  jure; 
- a  method  of regulation characterized by  the predominating intervention of 
the  public  authorities,  which  control  utilization  of  public  property. 
choice of investments  and  tariff levels. 
The  emergence  of  this  model  forms  part  of  the  history  of  electricity 
supply,  and  is  based  on  two  major  teclmical  innovations  at  the  origin  of 
the electricity supply system: 
·- the  arrival  of  alternating  current,  the  victory  of  which  over- direct 
current  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  terminated  competition  bet~een 
two  technically  different  systems.  The  production-distribution  grid 
systems  then became  local public services; 
- the  possibility of electricity  transmission  over  long distances.  ~~d  the 
increase in the unit size of power  stations. - 5  -
Between  the  two  world  wars,  and  as  a  result  of  oligopolis  tic  competj, tion 
for  the  ·territories,  a  number  of  production-transmission-distribution 
systems  ("electricity  supply  holding  companies")  were  set  up,  and  were 
finally  controlled,  in  practically  all  cases,  by  the  State  or  by  the 
regional authorities,  on  the basis of continuous,  flexible regulation. 
Crystallization  of  a  common  industrial  operating  method  thus  appeared  as 
the  historical  result  of  selection,  introduced  progressively  due  to 
competition,  of  forms  of  organization  and  regulation  enabling  the 
electricity supply sector to carry out its mission more  efficiently. 
The  industrial  model  of  electricity  supply  effectively  took  shape  as  a 
result  of  competition,  when  the  electricity  companies,  starting  from  a 
local  dimension,  engaged  in  a  race  for  increased  size,  enabling  them  to 
benefit  from  the  increased  return  generated  by  the  creation  of  vast 
production  - transmission  systems,  while  lowering  the  cost  of  electricity 
and  increasing  security  of  supply.  This  race  for  increased  size  was 
naturally restricted  by  the  technical  and  economic  limits  of long-distance 
electricity  transmission.  It  is  cheaper  to  transmit  fuel,  such  as  gas, 
coal or oil, over long distances. 
A  certain  degree  of  competition  is  still  present  today,  due  to  the 
existence of  independent  distributors  (which  are  also  producers  in  certain 
countries),  and  the  possibility  of  certain  large  industrial  consumers  to 
develop  their own  production of electricity, or locate their new  centres in 
areas where electricity prices are most attractive. 
In  Europe,  relations  between  producers  are  based  on  simultaneous 
cooperation and  competition: 
- cooperation  generates  very  substantial  gains  in  efficiency,  resulting 
from  interconnection  of  the  national  systems.  It  should  be  remembered 
that  the electricity companies  of continental  Europe  were  thus  encouraged 
to  set  up  groups  such  as  Nordel  and  UCPTE,  which  have  experienced 
considerable  development.  These  groups  include  both  EEC  and  non-EEC 
countries,  all contributing  to  improved  security of  supply,  reduction  of 
transmission losses,  and  optimization of production; 
competition  applies  pressure  in  various  forms,  such  as 
between  primary energies,  competition in the spot market ·for 
trading  between  interconnected  companies,  and  indirect 
resulting from  compari$On  of prices and  quality of ·supply. 
competition 
electricity, 
competition 
In  this  system,  the  control  applied  by  the  State  guarantees  that  fair 
prices,  based  on  actual  costs, . are  applied  to  the  different  groups  of 
consumers,  all of which  represent  captive  customers.  Indirect  competition 
resulting  from  comparison  of  electricity prices  in  Europe,  cons ti  tu  tes  an 
incentive  for  improved  efficiency,  and  influences  the  location  of 
industries  in  certain  cases,  and  consequently  regional  and  local  economic 
development. - 6  -
1.2  Subjects of debate and  reforms over the last ten years 
The  various  reforms  introduced  appear  to  be  essentially  due  to  the 
identification  of  difficulties  associated  with  the  structure  of  the 
industry  or  regulations  applying  to  the  industry,  rather  than  the 
introduction of major  technical innovations. 
These  reforms  have differed substantially from  ~ne country  to another: 
- in  the  United  Kingdom  they  form  part of general  political options,  which 
the  State,  which  owns  the  Electricity Supply  Industry,  has  been  able  to 
undertake  in  the  uni·form  legal,  technical  and  economic  context  of  an 
insular  system.  The  Electricity  Act,  voted  in  1989  has  begun  to 
introduce  competition  in  generation  and  supply  as  part  of  privatization 
of  the  industry.  A regulator has  been  appointed,  with  a  duty  to  promote 
competition  and  regulate  those  aspects  of  the  activity  which  remain 
monopolistic.  Open  access  to  transmission  and  distribution  networks  for 
suppliers  and  consumers  has  been  introduced  by  separation of generation, 
transmission  and  distribution  functions  into  separate  companies  in 
England  and  Wales  and  into  separate  businesses  within  the  two  main 
(vertically  integrated)  Scottish  companieso  Pool  trading  arrangements 
enabling  integrated  technical  operation  of  the  system  based  on  a  bid 
priced merit order compiled  by  the grid company  have  been  put in place in 
England  and  Wales,  side  by  side  with  supply  contract  arrangements  for 
financial  operation.  Special  trading  arrangements  apply  between  the 
Scottish  companies-.  Both  have  been  allocated  a  part  of  the 
interconnection capacity between Scotland and  England over which  they  can 
trade  with  Pool  in  England  and  Wales.  France  also  trades  with  the  Pool 
through  a  Cross  Channel  Link.  Codes  of  practice  ensure  the  technical 
operation  of  the  integrated  system,  trading  operation  of  the  integrated 
system,  trading  across  interconnectors  with  other  systems  and  emergency 
cooperation; 
in  the  USA,  reforms  are  situated  in  a  special  legal,  economic  and 
industrial  tradition,  with  specific  energy  contexts.  In certain States, 
production  has  been  opened  to  other  participants  via  auctions  organized 
by  the  regulating  authorities  and  electricity  companies,  although  this 
experiment  has  so  far been  of limited scope.  It should  be  recalled here 
that  the  initially  extensive  reflection  on  opening  the  grids  to  end 
users,  has  now  been  totally abandoned  in the  USA; 
- in  Spain  and  the  ~etherlands,  State  intervention  has  changed  the 
structures,  in  order  to  achieve  stronger  concentration  and  coordination 
of  the  electricity  sector  (although  in  the  Netherlands,  a  large 
manufacturer  has  the  right  to  consult  ·a  producer  remote  from  its  own 
area,  this legalized option has not yet been  taken up); 
- the  industrial  model  has  also  evolved  in  other  countries,  where  the 
electricity supply  sectors  have  had  to  adapt  to  new  economic  situations, 
while  preserving  the  framework  of  coherence  essential  for  secut"i ty  of 
supply. ' 
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Thus,  if we  leave  aside  the  important  reforms  undertaken  in Great Britain, 
the  lessons  to.  be  drawn  from  which  all  will  not  be  apparent  for  several 
years  to  come,  recent  changes  clearly  reflect  emphasis  on  improving  the 
efficiency  of  the  electricity  supply  industry  as  far  as  possible,  by  the 
introduction,  where  appropriate,  of  additiqnal  competitive  elements  at  the 
production  level,  while  retaining  the  advantages  acquired  with  the 
"industrial  model".  Opening  of  the  market  to  competition  at  production 
level  - yes,  but  opening  the  electricity supply  grids  to  third parties  in 
general  - no. 
•  •• 
Through  the  subjects  of  debate  and  reforms  introduced  in  the  last  ten 
years,  we  discern  the  outline  of  two  major  alternatives  to  the  industrial 
model,  for  operation  of  the  electricity  supply  sector,  with  on  the  one 
hand,  the initial draft of a  deregulation model,  which  breaks  away  from  the 
current model  (English system),  and  on  the other,  the opening of production 
to  competition,  but  without  opening  the  grids  and  accompanied  by  the 
improvement  of  existing  regulations,  while  retaining  the  established 
principles of the industrial model  (USA,  Spain,  etc.) 
We  shall  therefore  analyse  the  alternatives,  following  a  recapitulation of 
the  logic,  coherent  with  its  mission,  with  which  the  existing  model 
complies. 
2.  INDUSTRIAL  MODEL 
The  main  advantages of the industrial model  are as  follows: 
- exclusive service  areas  provide  producers,  whether  they  are  also  engaged 
in  distribution  activities  or  not,  with  the  long-term  security  required 
for  commitment  of  major  investment  spread  over  a  lengthy  period  (these 
exclusive  service  areas  enable  distributors,  where  they  are  independent, 
to  conclude  long-term  supply  contracts  with  their  producers,  or  in 
certain  countries,  to  achieve  a  suitable  multi-source  production 
situation); 
- the essential  need  for  security of  supply,  which  forms  an  integral  part 
of  the  mission with  which  the electricity supply  industry is  charged,  is 
taken  into  account  for  each  geographical  area  by  a  single  operator. 
having authority over production,  the  topology  and  operation of  the  grid, 
exchanges  with  neighbouring  systems,  and  as  an  ultimate  measure.  load-
shedding; - 8  -
substantial  productivity  gains  are  obtained  by  means  of  integrated 
programming,  and  optimized  operation  of  interconnected  production-
transmission systems; 
- national governments,  in their capacity as  regulating authorities  for  the 
electricity supply  industry,  possess  the  resources  required  to  implement 
their energy policies,  and  ensure long-term security of supply. 
2.1  Service monopoly  and  long-term investment decisions 
Long-term  security,  which  is necessary  for  amortization of  investments,  is 
essential  for electricity producers  as  a  result of the capital nature,  long 
construction  period  and  lifetime  of  the  power  plants,  which  further-more 
can  only  be  used  to  produce  electricity.  Operators  only  decide  to  invest 
if the level of risk is acceptable. 
Consumers  may  think,  wrongly,  that  they  are  not  concerned  with  the 
investment  amortization  problems  of  the  electricity  supply  industry,  but 
are interested,  on  the  other hand,  in obtaining advantageous  prices,  and  in 
reliable supply and  good  quality of service. 
The  existence of  a  large service  monopoly  with  an  obligation  to  supply  for 
a  specific geographical  area,  reconciles  the need  for  long-term security on 
the  part  of  the  producers,  and  the  shorter  term  considers  tions  of  the 
consumers.  This  situation  effectively  provides  a  framework  in  which  the 
decision  to  commit  specific  investment,  representing  the  most  efficient 
basic  production  resources,  can  be  made.  The  service  monopoly  provides  a 
guarantee of  having  to  meet  demand  over  a  period of  time,  the  assurance  of 
being  able  to  pass  on  production  and  transmission  costs  to  all  consumers, 
by  means  of  tariffs  controlled  by  the  public  authorities,  ~d  the 
possibility  of  achieving  optimum  control  of  future  demand  forecasts,  and 
thus  organizing  the  increase  in  individual  demand  at  lowest  cost, 
principally  by  means  of  the  electricity  tariffs,  and  passing  on 
productivity gains on  an  equitable basis. 
2.2  Security ot supply 
Electricity  has  become  vi  tal  for  operation  of  the  national  econc:::y,  the 
daily  life  of  the  population,  and  operation  of  the  public  services.  with 
particular reference  to health and  public order. 
Thus  security  of  electricity  supply  has  become  a  major  necessity  for  all 
.businesses participating in this activity. 
This  means  that any  interruption of supply must  be  reduced  to  a  mi~:=~m.  in 
terms of both duration and  frequency. 
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The  industrial  model  clearly  demonstrates,  from  this  point  of  view,  that 
the  produ~tion,  transmission  and distribution of electricity form  a  system, 
all  the  component  elements  of which  are heavily  interdependent.  Thus,  the 
high  level  of  security  of  supply  achieved  in  Europe  is  based  on  the 
existence  of  a  single  operator,  holding  authority  for  a  vast  area,  region 
or  country,  over  production,  the  topology  and  operation  of  the  grid, 
exchanges  with  neighbouring  systems,  and  where  appropriate,  load-shedding 
as  a  last resort to avoid breakdown of the system. 
Some  customers  consider  that  the  supplies  they  demand  do  not  require  the 
degree of guarantee normally provided  by  the local supplier.  It should not 
be  forgotten  that  the  local  supplier  will  provide  this  guarantee  at  all 
events,  in  view  of  the  integrated  operating  laws  governing  the  grid,  and 
that  the  local  supplier  must  allow  for  this  in  his  production  and 
transmission  reserve  planning.  Furthermore,  if  the  customer  does  not 
require  this  guarantee,  numerous  forms  of  contract  covering  interruptible 
supply,  subject  to prior notice,  are now  available. 
2.3  Integrated programming  and optimized operation 
The  industrial  model  is  based  on  the  concept  of  an  integrated  production-
transmission  system,  in which  the  EHV  grid  interconnects  a  large  number  of 
production  centres,  and  a  multitude  of  supply  points  to  the  distribution 
networks  throughout  the  terri  tory.  Considerable  economies  of  both  scale 
and  scope  are  achieved,  to  the  benefit of  the  consumers,  by  means  of  this 
inter-connection,  combined  with  integration  of  system  planning  and 
operation: 
- economies  of scale  associated  with  the  increase  in  individual  demand  and 
supply; 
- economies  of scope associated with  the complementarity of  the  load  curves 
for  different  categories  of  consumer,  combined  with  planning  for  an 
optimum  production  structure,  global  planning  of  maintenance  for 
production  and  transmission  capabilities,  management  of  hydraulic 
reserves  and  demand  management  actions,  and  implementation  of  tariffs 
aimed  at lowest cost management  of the supply/demand  system. 
2.4  Energy policy 
The  flexibility  of  electricity  supply,  for  which  all  sources  of  primary 
energy  can  be  used  for· production,  constitutes  an  essential  advantage  for 
this  energy  vector,  :ln  the  face  or  the  uncertainties  of  the  world  energy 
market. 
The  electricity supply  industry  in  each  country,  regulated  by  the  national 
governments,  thus  plays  an  important part in the  implementation of  n~tional 
energy  policy,  and  can  also  contribute  to  implementation  of  the  ::~Jropean 
energy  policy.  The  recent  Gulf crisis  reminded  us  how  it was  poss~ble for 
a  number  of European  countries  to  achieve a  rapid and substantial  t"·:' .!uction - 10  -
of  energy  dependence  in  the  past,  as  a  result  of  conversion  of  the 
productiC?n_  facility  to  energy  sources  available  in  the  country  concerned, 
or  to  imported  energies  involving  a  lower  risk  than  that  of oil,  combined 
with an  increased penetration of the national energy budget by  electricity. 
2.5  Regulation - limits of the industrial model 
• 
Those  who  criticize  the  current  organization  of  the  electricity  supply 
industry,  point  to  difficulties  concerning  regulation  of  the  monopoly, 
whether public or private.  This  regulation must  provide  for tariff control 
and  optimization of production,  which  essentially relates  to  the  choice  and 
implementation of investments  and  primary energy sources. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  improvement  of  this  regulation  can 
provide  a  partial  answer  to  these  criticisms.  Flexible,  continuous 
regulation  applied  by  the  public  authorities,  can  indeed  be  based  on 
reasonable  "rules of the road": 
- tariff  levels  must  cover  all  electricity  costs,  including  the  cost  of 
capital,  while  the  tariff  structure  must  reflect  seasonal,  weekly  and 
daily  variations  in  supply  costs,  according  to  the  load  curve  for  each 
user,  and  differentiation of grid costs  according to  the  connection  level 
for each customer; 
- the  choice  of  production  and  transmission  investment,  determined  on  a 
centralized  basis  for  each  area,  region  or  country  by  the  companies 
concerned,  and  which  conditions  a  high  proportion  of  the  cost  per  kWh. 
can  be  justified  very  easily  in  economic  terms,  on  the  basis  of 
minimization of long-term costs. 
Nevertheless,  the  control  of  producer  efficiency  in  terms  of  construction 
and  operating  cost  control  for  production  resources,  is  one  of  the  many 
preoccupations of the electricity supply industry regulating authority. 
2.6  Diversity of national situations 
Differences  between  electricity prices  in  the  EEC  countries  stem  from  the 
diversity of situations in each country. 
The  differentiation  of  costs,  and  consequently  of  electricity  service 
prices,  is the result of various  factors,  including: 
- economies  of scale in favour of large companies; 
- geographical,  orographical,  user  density  and  mean  consumption  level 
situations which differ according to  the territories served. - 11  -
This  set  of  factors,  which  have  an  impact  in  one  direction  or  another  on 
the  determination  of  company  costs,  and  which  can  therefore  offset  each 
other,  only  provides  a  partial  explanation  of  the  price  differences 
observed. 
The  main  cause of  these differences  must  be  sought  in  the varying operating 
conditions  imposed  on  the  electricity companies  by  the  public  authorities, 
in the various  countries. 
The  following aspects should be  remembered,  in particular: 
constraints and  prohibited access  to certain primary  energy  sources  {e.g. 
obligation  to  use  high-cost  national  coal  production,  prohibition  or 
moratorium on  use of nuclear power); 
relatively  severe  constraints  imposed  in  connection  with  the  protection 
of  the  environment,  as  to  the  location,  type  and  operating  methods  for 
production  facilities.  These  various  requirements  lead  to  differing 
levels of financial  charges  for  transmission,  production or distribution; 
- differences  in  taxation  levels  for  fuels  employed  for  production,  and 
applied  to  electric  energy  sold  (in  certain  cases,  this  component  has  a 
major  impact  on  user  price  differences,  in  particular  where  taxation  is 
based on  excise duty in addition to VAT  tax); 
- different  funding possibilities and  methods,  and  remuneration of  invested 
capital,  for  the companies; 
tariff  policy  constraints  imposed  by  the  government  for  macro-economic 
reasons,  such  as  anti-inflationary  measures,  restriction  of  end-user 
consumption,  and  the  competitive  position  of  national  industries  in 
export markets. 
3.  DIFFICULTIES  RESULTING  FROM  THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS  TO  THE  GRID. 
The  idea  of  opening  grids  to  third  parties  is  based  on  economic  analyses 
made  in  a  North American  context  ~uring  the  1970s  and  early  1980s,  with 
respect  to  all  grids.  .  The  supporters  of  this  common  approach  to  grid 
economics  proposed  a  new  breakdown  of  these  sectors  (overhead  transmission, 
telecommunications,  gas,  electricity,  etc.).  Grid  infrastructures  were  to 
remain  natural,  regulated  monopolies,  whereas  the  remainder  (transmission, 
added-value services,  and  gas  and  electricity production)  were  to  be  opened 
to  competition.  These  economic  analyses  were  expressed,  in  legal  form,  in 
the "Essential Faci;tity Doctrine". - 12  -
Thus,  the  constitution of  a  deregulation  model  for  the  electricity  supply 
sector is  based  on  the  convergence  of  three  elements:  the  notion  that  no 
further  increase  in  production  efficiency  is  possible,  the  theory  of 
competitive  access  to  the  grids,  liable  to  form  a  bottleneck  for  upstream 
or  downstream  competition,  and  increased  public  awareness  of  environmental 
problems  and  "small is beautiful"  ideology. 
Following  an  initial  period  of  deregulation  based  on  this  approach 
'  (concerning  telecommunications,  overhead  transmission  and  gas) ,  numerous 
economists,  lawyers  and  professionals  from  the· industries  concerned  in  the 
USA,  are  now  experiencing  the  need  to  take  the  technical  and  economic 
characteristics  of  each  sector  more  fully  into  account. 
viewpoint  that  this  document  presents  a  specific 
electricity supply sector. 
It  is  from  this 
analysis  of  the 
The  notion  of  third  party  access  (TPA)  has  been  put  forward,  for  the 
purpose  of  developing  competition  at  production  level,  resulting  from 
market  pressure  exerted by  end-user  customers.  Opening  of  the  grids  would 
enable  distributors  and  large  industrial  consumers  to  have  their 
electricity supply carried and  delivered by  the grid operated by  a  specific 
electricity company,  thus  enabling  the consumer  to buy  electricity directly 
from  the  producers  of  its  choice.  Symmetrically,  opening  of  the  grids 
would  give  the producers  the same  grid access  rights,  enabling  them  to  sell 
electricity directly to  the distributors or large industrial consumers. 
A  TPA  situation  would  thus  terminate  the  traditional  integration  of  the 
commercial  and  transmission  functions  of  the  electricity  transmission  and 
distribution  grids  and  networks.  This  would  create  two  new  markets:  a 
captive  market  for  captive  customers,  and  a  wholesale  electricity  supply 
market,  corresponding  to  a  competitive  market  situation  with  direct  sales 
to  customers  holding grid access  rights.  In other words,  there  would  be  a 
regulated market  and  a  competitive market,  both served by  the  same  physical 
transmission  and  distribution  networks.  The  American  regulators  describe 
this as  a  "half-slave,  half-free" sector. 
Any  administrative  separation,  such  as  that  involving  separat~on  of 
production,  transmission  and  distribution  of  electricity.  conse~~ently 
failing  to  take  account  of  the  physical  characteristics  of  electricity 
{non-storability,  transmission at  the  speed of light)  is open  to  c~t~lcism. 
Analysis  of  actual  costs  would  then  be  made  practically_ imposs lb  ~e.  and 
consequently  subject  to  agreements  which  would  not  take  account  ·)f  the 
realities of operation. 
TPA  would  require coherent  development of regulations  covering  the  :~~plete 
electricity supply  sector.  as  we  shall  see  as  we  examine  in  succes~~Jn,  in 
terms of economic  efficiency,  its effects on  distribution,  transm1ss~Jn and 
production. • 
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But  firstly,  to  analyse  these  questions,  we  must  determine  what  technical 
conditions  a  TPA  system  must  meet  in  any  case,  while  preserving  the 
essential  requirement  of  security  of  consumer  supply.  Is  this  indeed 
possible? 
3.1  Security of supply and  third party access 
• 
Irrespective of  the concrete methods  adopted,  a  TPA  system  must  ensure  that 
the  security  of  consumer  supply  is  maintained.  For  this  purpose,  control 
of  the  electricity  supply  system  by  the  despatching  system  operators  must 
also  be  maintained.  This  control is based  on  operator capacity  for  action 
and  anticipation,  and  the  operators  must  therefore  retain  their  authority 
over  the  production  resources,  the  topology  and  operation  of  the  grid, 
exchanges  with  interconnected  neighbouring  systems,  and  load-shedding 
operations  where  necessary.  This  control  is  necessarily  applied  over  the 
complete  area  in  which  the  operator  is  responsible  for  supply,  and  must 
have  access  to  all  the  above  possibilities  for  proper  management  of  his 
resources. 
In  the  short  term  and  real-time,  the  despatching  unit  operator  must  be  -
able,  in particular,  to  interrupt  any  electricity  transmission  transaction 
on  behalf  of  a  third  party,  where  the  transaction  poses  a  threat  to 
security of supply in  the area under his responsibility.  This  is naturally 
true  in  a  real-time  situation,  where  the  operator  must  return  the 
electricity supply  system  to  its normal  operating configuration  as  quickly 
as  possible,  following multiple  incidents affecting the grid or production, 
at  the  same  time  minimizing  the  consequences  of  the  incidents  for 
consumers.  However,  this is also  true in a  predictive  management  context, 
as  the  operator  must  retain  the  responsibility  for  taking  any  necessary 
preventive measures,  to ensure  that any  unscheduled failure of a  production 
or grid element has no  real-time consequence on  continuity of supply. 
We  already  know  that it will  be  essential,  for  transit contracts  concluded 
between  grid operators,  to  link  the quantity  and  quality of  the  transiting 
energy  to  a  set of programmed  advance  warnings  and  values.  This  h~s  major 
technical  consequences  associated  with  physical  laws,  invol·;1ng  the 
implementation  of  a  set  of  exchange  services,  usually  of  a  rec  1 procal 
nature  (adjustment  of  frequency  and  voltage,  exchanges  of  infor::ation. 
coordination of procedures,  etc.) . 
However,  procedures of this  type would  not be sufficient for TPA  contracts. 
A  number  of  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  examination  of  the  technical 
aspect alone: 
- direct  sale  contracts  between  a  producer  and  distributor  c~  large 
industrial  consumer,  could  not  include  any  guarantee  of  suppl:.-.  Only 
correct  operation  of  the  complete  grid  system,  combined  wlt~  local 
intervention on  production  under  the authority of  the  despatchir.c;  ·  .. ~its  -
taking due  account  of  technical ·possibilities  - could  ensure  t~~t  3  non-
captive  customer  (TPA  customer)  obtains  uninterrupted  supply  1:1d  the - 14  -
requisite quality of service.  Services necessary for security of supply, 
including reserve management,  would  be provided by  the local producer; 
- regulation of grid access  (see  paragraph  3.3)  should  take  account  of  the 
above  elements.  Furthermore,  as  the  assessment  made  by  the  system 
operators  concerning  the conditions  required  for security of supply  could 
be  contested  by  third  parties,  it  would  be  necessary  to  set  up  an 
authority  (regulating authority)  to settle disputes  of  this nature,  which 
would  take  the interests of all participants• (owner  of the grid,  free  TPA 
customer  and  captive  customer)  into  account  on  an  equitable  basis.  The 
question  of  the  return  of  a  free  TPA  customer  to  the  regulated  system, 
would  have  to be considered in this context. 
It must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  continental  EEC  countries  possess  a  very 
extensive  grid  system  with  a  dense  mesh  structure,  destined  to  be  extended 
to  include  operation  in  parallel  with  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries,  as desired by  the  EEC  authorities. 
The  important  task involving  the uprating of standards  covering security of 
operation  on  the  grids  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  can 
only  be  undertaken if the  European  electricity companies  can  cooperate  for 
this  purpose.  In contrast,  a  TPA  situation would  be  liable  to  smother  the 
grids  under  the  constraints  resulting from  commercial  agreements,  differing 
from  those  which  the  electricity  companies  make  for  the  benefit  of  all 
users. 
It should  be  pointed  out  that  the direct  competition  introduced  by  opening 
the  grids  would.  cast  doubt  on  the  current  practice  of  mutual,  voluntary 
back-up  practiced by  the  partners  of  the  interconnected grid  system,  which 
will have  negative effects on  security of supply. 
At  all events,  we  must  observe  that definition of  the  free  capacities of  a 
grid,  namely  those  which  the  operator  can  release  after  allowing  for  the 
transmission  reserves  required  for  emergency  services  in  the  event  of  an 
incident,  is  a  delicate  matter.  Corresponding  estimation  varies  in  the 
course  of  time,  according  to  the  r~gional  production-consumption  budgets, 
withdrawal  of facilities  from  service for maintenance  purposes,  etc.  Rules 
of  priority  between  the  various  grid  users,  would  therefore  have  to  be 
established as  a  safeguard for eventual diffi.cult operating situations. 
We  shall take another look at the majority of these problems,  which  reflect 
the  integrated nature  of  the  production-transmission  system,  examined  from 
the angle of economic  efficiency. 
3.2  Protection of captive consumers  and  regulation of distribution 
As  long  as  captive  consumers  continue  to  exist,  there  must  be  a  public 
authority responsible  for  their protection,  and  in particular for  ensuring, 
as  far as  possible,  that cross subsidies do  not act against  them. 
• • 
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This  means  firstly  that  consumers  having  access  to  a  "free"  market  should 
be  prohibited  from  returning  to  the  regulated  market,  and  be  deprived  of 
the  option  of  demanding  from  their  natural  supplier,  not  only  actual 
electricity  supply  but  also  application  of  regulated  tariffs.  In  the 
absence  of  any  such  prohibition,  the  switch-over effect would  enable  these 
consumers  to  avoid  a  part of the fixed cost charge,  to  the detriment of  the 
captive consumers. 
•  However,  any  such  prohibition  of  return  to  the  regulated  monopoly  system 
would  obviously  be  inadequate  to  guarantee  ·the  total  absence  of  cross 
subsidies.  With  the  current  system  of  exclusive  service  areas,  producers 
have  little  reason  to  apply  cross  subsidies  as  their  market  share  is  not 
dependent  thereon.  The  task  of  the  regulating  authority  is  facilitated. 
On  the  other  hand,  under  TPA  conditions,  each  producer  will  be  encouraged 
to  revert  to  cross  subsidies,  to  the  detriment  of  captive  consumers,  in 
order  to  win  or  retain  his  'share  of  the  competitive  market,  and  thus  at 
least ensure global coverage of his costs. 
Regulation  aimed  at controlling cross  subsidies  is difficult  to  apply.  It 
supposes  first  and  foremost,  that  rules  are  established  for  the  assignment 
of costs  to  the various  consumer  categories,  whereas  the electricity supply 
system  is  a  single  entity,  where  "physical"  assignment  of  specific 
production  to  specific  consumption  is  never  made,  and  the  grid  delivers 
energy  to a  large number  of individual consumers. 
This  regulation  also  requires  permanent  monitoring,  as  the  cost  structure 
is  not  stable.  Production  and  transmission  costs  vary  according  to 
equipment  structures,  actual  location  of  production  and  consumption,  grid 
saturation,  environmental  standards,  and  the  fluctuation  of  primary  energy 
costs,  etc.  to  which  we  must  add,  in  the  case of a  TPA  situation,  that  the 
procurement  costs  for his  captive markets  for  a  given operator,  will depend 
on  the actual volume  of his competitive market share. 
This  means  that  the  regulating  authority  must  monitor  each  consumer 
category  according  to  its  individual  grid  connection  level,  load  curve, 
etc.,  and  supplier.  For  this  purpose,  the  regulating  authority  will  need 
to  have  detailed  knowledge  of  costs,  far  beyond  what  can  be  provided  by 
separating  production,  transmission  and  distribution  accounting  functions, 
and  close  to  the  level of  knowledge  possessed  by  the  operator himself,  who 
would  have  no  incentive  in  the  direction of  transparency ..  A TPA  situation 
would  provi~e an  incentive  to  distort  prices  with  respect  to  costs,  as  we 
have  already  seen.  Furthermore,  it should  be  noted  that  cost  transparency 
is incompatible with-the  form  of competition introduced by  a  TPA  situation, 
and  does  not  exist  ~n  any  other  sector  of  industry.  Furthermore,  as 
indicated at  the  beginning of  this  chapter,  it will  be  necessary  to  employ 
keys,  frequently  open  to  debate,  and  not  justifiable,  for  the  purpose  of 
distributing costs. - 16  -
Thus,  it is  not  established  that  regulation  of  this  type.  and  which  is 
capable  of  ensuring  appropriate  protection  for  captive  consumers,  is 
workable:  - Were  this  the  case,  the  problem  would  still remain  of  ensuring 
that  regulation  provided  an  incentive  in  the  direction  of  grid  management 
efficiency,  the  grids  remaining natural  monopolies  at all events.  In  this 
respect,  the  fact  that  a  distributor  can  enter  the  free  market,  does  not 
relieve him  of  the  need  to regulate his  own  activity or protect his captive 
customers.  or  remove  the  incentive  for  him  to  seek  the  most  favourable 
procurement  conditions. 
Thus,  a  TPA  system  does  not  avoid  the  need  for  regulation  of  tariffs  and 
grid  access.  This  is partly  true  today,  but  regulations  will  become  much 
more  complex  and  difficult  to  manage.,  in  contrast  to  the  popular  notion 
that competition will simplify the  task of the regulating authority. 
The  complexity  of  regulating  a  "half-slave,  half-free"  sec  tor  is 
illustrated in  the  case  of  telecommunications  in  the  USA.  In  contrast  to 
the  initial  ideas  of  a  light-weight  form  of  regulation  developed  in 
Great Britain,  with  a  global  "price  cap"  type  formula,  the  US  regulating 
authorities  are  very  much  aware  of  the  ever  increasing  complexity  of  a 
regulation  system  capable  of  avoiding  cross  subsidies  in  a  sector of  this 
type. 
3.3  Regulation of grid access and  pricing 
The  transmission  grid  will  always  remain  a  monopoly.  Grid  access  and 
remuneration  of  the  transmission  services  provided  by  the  grid  will 
therefore  have  to  be  regulated  under  conditions  applying  to  a  TPA 
situation. 
The  main  difficulty  with  this  double  regulation  stems  from  the  integr-ated 
nature  of  the  production-transmission  system,  which  clearly  reflects  the 
interaction of production  and  transmission  economics.  Even  in  a  situation 
where  the  transmission  management  and  accounting  functions  are  separ-ate. 
this basic  question  raises  the  following  problems  (leaving  aside  technical 
problems  proper,  such  as  the  consequences  of  rapid  transit  changes,  looped 
transit,  or perturbation at the points of injection): 
a)  Regulation of grid access,  as  discussed in para.  3.1  above,  will  have  to 
determine  the  grid  capacity  available  for  transmission  services.  taking 
due  account  of  the  fact  that  part of  the  available capacity  must  ~emain 
available for  economi-c  and  security reasons,  and  that  the  remain1ng  part 
is  not  necessarily• available  for  long-term  transmission  services.  The 
capacity  available  for  TPA  will  therefore  be  even  more  difficult  to 
assess  for  the  medium  or  long  term.  The  regulating authority  wiLl  have 
the  complex  task  of  determining  and  allocating  this  available  c~pacity 
between  a  number  of competing projects. 
• • 
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b)  Regulation  of  the  remuneration  of  transmission  services  will  have  to 
determine  transmission  tariffs,  taking  full  account  of  the  fact  that 
these services,  apart  from  the  actual  transmission  function,  necessarily 
include  load  monitoring,  voltage  and  frequency  adjustment,  and  finally 
security  of  supply  and  reaction  to  incidents  occurring  on  the  grid. 
These  additional  services  are  supplied  by  local  producers,  in 
coordination with  the grid and  under  the supervision of  the grid control 
centres.  Regulation will therefore have  to  thke in the producers also. 
At  the  present  time  and  in  the  near  future,  these  problems  also  exist  and 
will  exist  in  the  context  of  application  of  the  transit  directive,  with 
respect  to  exchanges  which  are  frequently  bidirectional.  However,  these 
problems  are  solved  by  cooperation  between  interconnected  companies  having 
the same  responsibilities.  In  the  case of free access,  services  would  have 
to  be  estimated  for  generally  unidirectional  flow,  and  for  participants 
having  different  responsibilities  (producers,  transmission  companies  and 
consumers) . 
Insofar  as  these  two  aspects  of  transmission  regulation  are  concerned  in 
the  case  of  opening  the  grids  to  third  parties,  electricity  spot  market 
theory,  together with  the  recent report on  electricity transmissi·on,  issued 
by  the  Task  Force  of  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission,  clearly 
demonstrate  that  no  satisfactory  reply  has  so  far  been  found.  The 
difficulty  here  lies  in  the  extreme  volatility  of  transmission  costs  and 
constraints,  linked  to  the  integrated nature of the production-transmission 
system,  where  transit,  injection and  consumption  levels vary permanently. 
Consequently,  the  regulation  of  electricity  transmission  will  inevitably 
take  the  form  of  a  compromise,  in  all  cases  conflictual,  between  the 
simplicity  required  for  drafting  practicable  rules  for  obligatory 
transmission,  and  the more  sophisticated case-by-case  approach  required  for 
economic  efficiency. 
The  result  will  probably  be  a  form  of  regulation  subject  to  permanent 
evolution,  under  pressure  from  observed  inefficiencies,  and  legal  actions 
instituted  by  parties  which  consider  they  have  suffered  prejudice,  with  a 
consequent,  inevitable planning restriction of grid development. 
c)  Development  of  the  grid  itself  will  also  be  difffcult  under  TPA 
conditions,  which  will  introduce  uncertainties  as  to  the  transmission 
capacities to be  developed  to handle direct sale contracts. 
Furthermore,  we  know  that grid development  is  justified by  the  prospect  of 
substantial  production  savings.  Integrated  programming  and  optimized 
operation  of  the  production-transmission  system  make  it possible,  in  the 
industrial model,  to  achieve  these  savings.  On  the  other  hand,  separation 
of production  from  transmission,  with  the producers  placed in a  competitive 
situation  by  their  customers,  would  make  these  productivity  gains  open  to 
doubt.  Third  party  access  could  thus  have  an  adverse  effect  on  efficient 
development  of  the  transmission  network,  and  introduce  supplementary  costs - 18  -
resulting from  the need  to invest in new  interconnection lines,  which  would 
not be  necessary in the absence of this TPA  activity. 
In  view  of  the  foregoing,  it  appears  highly  likely  that  the  regulating 
authority  will  be  obliged  to  cross  the  frontier  between  the  regulation  of 
transmission,  and  the  combined  regulation  of  production  and  transmission. 
The  idea  of  competition  at  the  production  level,  instigated  by  normal 
market  pressures,  and  with  no  need  for  regulation  other  than  that  required 
•  to ensure  the  transparency of the  transmission grid,  thus  appears  illusory. 
3.4  Wholesale electricity market 
A TPA  system  with  direct  consumer  access  to  the  production  sources,  would 
lead  to  the  development  of a  wholesale electricity market,  which  would  have 
the effect of commonizing  electricity,  making  it just another  raw  material. 
In effect,  the view  held by  the supporters of this approach is that no  form 
of  regulation,  other  than  the  natural  play  of  market  pressures,  would  be 
necessary  at  the  production  level.  Competition  would  lead  to  a  reduction 
of electricity prices,  which  explains  the  support  for  this  idea manifested 
by certain large industrial consumers. 
These  arguments  are  generally  based  on  a  short-term  view,  and  presuppose  a 
situation in  which  supply  exceeds  demand.  However,  the  consequences  of  a 
TPA  situation  must  be  examined  for  both  the  short  and  long  term,  and  for 
both surplus  and  short-fall  market  situations.  Indeed,  we  must  not  forget 
that  while  some  have  experienced  over-equipment  situations  for  economic 
reasons,  any  such  over-equipment  is  now  in  the  process  of  substantial 
reduction,  and will have disappeared entirely very soon. 
It is  clear  that  the  market  pressures  induced  by  opening  the  distribution 
networks  would  provide  an  incentive  for  increased  production  efficiency. 
However,  this  incentive  could  be  achieved  by  less  complicated  means.  as  we 
shall  see  below.  In  contrast,  a  TPA  situation  would  bring  '.~With  it 
inefficiencies relating to both production and  cost allocation: 
a)  In  the  short  term,  the  "cost-based merit  order"  approach  for  pr-oduction 
resource,  characteristic  of  integrated  production-transmission  systems. 
ensures  lowest  cost  operation  of  the  electricity  supply  system.  It  is 
obvious  that  this  approach  overstates  the  efficiency  of  a  TP.l.  system. 
.  . 
In effect,  under such  conditions of free  third party access  to  the  grid. 
the  operating  control  centres  would  have  to  check  that  production  by 
certain  units  or ·sets  of  units  complies  with  contractual  coc:::11 tments. 
This  would  tend  to•increase  the global cost of supplies,  and  pr-event  any 
general  optimization  of  the  electricity  supply  system.  We  would  then 
see  a  reduction of  the  possibilities  for  optimization  exchanges  between 
the  electricity  companies,  due  to  the  greater  level  of  utiliz:!tion  of 
the  interconnection  lines,  and  increased  losses  resulting  f:--c:n  the 
greater distances which  the energy supplied would  have  to  travel. • 
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b)  In  the  long  term,  the  crucial  question  concerning  development  of  the 
electricity  supply  system  ("long  term"  is  measured  in  decades  in  this 
context)  concerns  the  performance  of  the  producers  with  respect  to 
investment.  This  performance  would  be  modified  by  comparison  with  the 
integrated programming  as practiced in the current model,  as: 
- the  competitive  framework  of  the  wholesale  electricity  market  would 
create  greater uncertainty  for  each  producer  regarding  his  individual 
market  share; 
- industrial  and  market  risks,  currently  borne  by  all  consumers,  would 
be  intrinsically concentrated on  the producers . 
c)  Faced  with  such  risks,  the  producers  would  be  obliged  to  shorten  their 
planning  horizon  sharply,  privileging  the  choice  of  investments  less 
demanding  in  terms  of  capital,  with  shorter  construction  periods  and 
smaller  unit  sizes,  and  not  necessarily  representing  the  most  economic 
options in the longer term. 
It would  become  extremely  difficult  to  implement  long-term  policies,  with 
the  probable  result  of  price  cycles  linked.  to  an  alternating  pattern  of 
periods  of  over-investment  and  under-investment,  which  could  have  an 
adverse effect on  reserve power  margins,  or even  the guarantee of continued 
supply.  These  price  cycles  would  cause  losses  of efficiency  for  users,  as 
a  result of the  costs associated with excessively  frequent  switching  to  and 
from  processes employing competing energy sources. 
In  this  context,  the  most  competitive  and  largest  producers  would  probably 
attempt  to  sign  long-term  contracts  with  the  distributors.  who  can  make 
long-term commitments  more  easily  than  the  manufacturers,  offering  the  most 
advantageous  and  stable  prices.  This  would  ultimately  lead  to  the 
manufacturer  customers  having  to  bear  the  risks  associated  with  the 
volatile nature of the market. 
It  will  also  be  noted,  assuming  that  the  question  of  cross ·subsidies, 
considered  in  paragraph  3.2,  is  controlled  by  the  regulator.  that  the 
existence  of  a  protected  captive  sector,  for  which  all  price  changes  are 
very  strictly  controlled,  will  increase  the  volatile  nature  of  pr-ices  in 
the  free  market,  this  phenomenon  being  common  to  all product  markets  where 
there  is  a  high  capital  content.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  captive 
customer  consumption  is  nevertheless  subject,  in  its  e·volution.  to  the 
random  factors  of economic  conditions.  A situation of this  type  is  likely, 
in  the  long  run,  ·to· be  considerably  less  attractive  for  industrial 
customers,  previously'  accustomed  to  guarantees  of  supply,  and  r-emarkably 
stable price levels. 
d)  Finally,  the  tendency  to  privilege the short-term  lowes~ cost  production 
technique,  which  would  result  from  instituting  a  wholesale  electr-icity 
market,  would  lead  to  a  highly  diversified  production  structur-e.  based 
on  fuels  imported  by  the  EEC.  Under  present  circumstances.  these 
monovalent  fuel  investments  (natural  gas)  would  make  prcduction - 20  -
increasingly sensitive  to  the volatile nature of fossil  fuel prices.  In 
this  production  market  economy  context,  the  national  governments  or  EEC 
authorities would  have  less  scope  than at the present  time,  for  imposing 
a  diversified  production  structure,  or  one  which  took  account  of  their 
energy  policies.  In  due  course,  this  could  contribute  to  the  creation 
of a  threat to European security or primary energy supply. 
e)  Opening  of  the  grids,  with  the  introductic;>n  of  a  TPA  situation,  is 
intended  to  allow  free  play  of  market  pressures  between  producers  and 
consumers.  The  competition  between  producers  which  it would  involve, 
would  not only endanger  the efficiency gains obtained_via cooperation  in 
connection with  interconnected operation,  but would  also  have  an  adverse 
effect on  international cooperation in general. 
3.5  Conclusions concerning third party access 
Intended  to  allow  the  development  or  competition  at  production  level, 
subject  to  market  forces,  third party  access  would  in  fact  require  complex 
regulation,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  captive  consumers,  controlling 
the  transmission  grids  and  distribution  networks,  which  would  in  any  case 
retain  a  monopolistic  status,  and  involve  risks  of  economic  inefficiency, 
with  a  consequent  global  increase in  the  cost of supplies,  associated  with 
the development of a  wholesale electricity market. 
Are  the benefits of competition  introduced by  TPA  likely to offset,  or more 
than offset,  this  need  for  cumbersome  regulation  and  the  associated  losses 
of efficiency? 
Indeed,  there  are  sectors  where  the  potential  for  technological  innovation 
is  such  that  it  can  challenge  the  very  organization  of  the  network 
activity.  This  is  the  case  with  telecommunications,  where  a  number  of 
technical  systems  are  competing  {microwave  links,  optical  fibers.  cables 
and  satellites).  For  sectors  of  this  type,  the  cumbersome  regulations 
required  for  a  "half-captive,  half-free"  market,  can  be  justified  by  the 
fact  that  deregulation  makes  it  possible  to  place  different  technical 
systems  in  competition  with  each  other,  with  subsequent  selection  of  the 
best  system.  This  was  the  situation with  the  electricity  supply  industry 
at the beginning of the century.  Alterating current and  the uniformization 
of  frequency  and  voltage  values  were  the vectors  of progress  at  this  time, 
which  led to development of the present cooperation-competition model. 
However  at  the  presen~  time,  in  the  absence  of  any  strong  technical 
innovation,  the benefits of competition for  the electricity supply  industry 
are limited  to  the effect of cost control for new  production resources,  and 
improved  utilization  of  the  comparative  advantages  as  between  different 
national systems. 
If  we  assume  that  a  TPA  situation  would  generate  these  limited  benefits, 
these  benefits  would  have  no  common  measure  with  the  loss  of  advantages 
resulting from  integrated planning and  operation. 
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4.  OTHER  FORMS  OF  COMPETITION 
We  have  looked at the dangers  associated with  the  type of competition which 
a  TPA  situation would  involve. 
Within  the  permanent  reflection  process,  aimed  at  improving  the  current 
industrial model,  we  can raise the question as  to whether it is possible  to 
find  other  forms  of  competition  which,  in  contrast  to  TPA,  could  increase 
production  efficiency  without  danger  to  the  benefits  associated  with  the 
industrial model  of the electricity supply industry. 
4.1  Auto-production 
We  observe  that certain forms  of competition in the  area of production,  the 
only  element  of  the electricity supply  industry activity which  is  not  in  a 
naturally monopolistic situation,  already exist in the industrial model. 
In  Europe,  there  are  a  number  of  producers  of  electricity  for  their  own 
use,  as  also  co  generators  in  each  country.  Regulation  includes . various 
methods  of  handling  this  situation,  according  to  which  the  electricity 
supply  system  is  required  to  purchase  any  excess  production  from  producers 
for  their  own  consumption,  on  the  basis  of  regulated  purchase  tariffs.  or 
by  contract. 
4.2  Independent production 
4.2.1  American  experiment 
A number  of  new  participants  have  appeared  in  the  USA,  who  are  interested 
in  the  construction  and  operation  of  electric  power  stations.  These 
include  energy  industry  contractors,  oil  companies,  gas  transmission 
companies,  coal  producers  and  engineering  or  construction  companies.  such 
as Bechtel,  General Electric,  Westinghouse,  ABB,  Siemens  and  Alsthom. 
These  newcomers  generally  operate  through  joint  ventures,  formed  with 
electricity companies  and  financial  institutions. 
This.  type  of  competition  has  developed  in  the  industrial.  energy-related 
and  regulationary context particular to  the  USA.  The  solutions  put  forward 
vary according to  the specific situation in the different States. 
We  cannot  therefore  examine  the  structural  and  regulationary  aspects  of 
these  new  participants,  without  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  individual 
motivations  involved State by  State. - 22  -
4.2.2  Difficulties encountered 
A call  for  tenders  mechanism  for  independent  producers  has  been  tried  out 
in a  number  of American States. 
This  American  experiment  has  led,  through  a  pragmatic  approach,  to 
procedures  designed  to  attempt  to  maintain  the  advantages,  in  terms  of 
economy  and  security of  supply,  associated  wit~ the  integrated  programming 
and  optimized  operation  of  electricity supply·systems.  A  new  independent 
producer  is  thus  subject  to  the  planning  and  operating process  implemented 
by  the  company  responsible for its area. 
For  this  purpose,  tender  assessment  procedures  tend  to  take  into  account, 
apart  from  price,  the  multiple  attributes  which  characterize  a  production 
plant  in  the  choice  of  investment  made  by  traditional  electricity 
producers,  as  for  example  construction  time,  payment  schedule,  operating 
and  maintenance  expenses,  availability,  operational  flexibility,  the  type 
or  types  of  fuel  which  can  be  used,  lifetime,  risks  associated  with  the 
project  from  construction  to  actual  operation,  and  the  sharing  of  these 
risks between  purchaser and  seller,  the guarantee of production  permanency, 
and  the  financial penalties in the event of a  production failure. 
Difficulties  encountered  in  the  USA  principally  concern  definition  of 
tender  assessment  procedures,  definition  of  contracts  to  be  made  between 
the  existing  system  and  the  successful  tenderer,  guarantees  attaching  to 
these  contracts,  and  their  insertion  in  the  tariff  system  as  a  whole. 
Assessment  procedures  and  contract structure must  be  such  that  the  company 
responsible  for  providing  the  electricity  supply  service  of  general 
economic  interest  for  a  given  area,  can  hold  on  to  the  resources  which 
enable it to execute its mission correctly. 
We  can  see  that  this is a  form  of competition which  has  not  got  beyond  the 
stage of a  limited experimental level,  and  which  must  be studied further in 
order  to  obtain  a  reasoned  assessment  of  its  potential  advantages  and 
drawbacks.  These  experiments  were  introduced  in  the  USA,  in  order  to 
overcome  the  specific  difficulties  with  which  certain  American  companies 
are  faced  (major  drift  in  investment  costs).  We  cannot  ignore  the  fact 
that  the  European  electricity  companies  are  operating  in  an  entirely 
different context. 
The  experiment  mentioned  above  at  least  demonstrates  that  other  channels 
could  be  envisaged,  without  opening  the  grids  to  third parties,  to  develop 
competition  in  the  electricity  supply  sector.  Perhaps  there  are  also 
lessons  to  be  learnt  from  the  British  reorganization  of  the  electr-icity 
supply  sector.  In  the  short  term,  the  British  approach  effectively 
represents  a  major  change  with  respect  to  the  previous  organization  of  the 
electricity  supply  system.  But  we  are  concerned  here  with  an  insular 
system  - this  particular!  ty  must  not  be  forgotten  - operating  within  the 
framework  of  a  single  legislation,  and  consequently  under- the  same 
operational  conditions.  This  experiment  should  be  monitored  and  verified 
over  a  period  of  time,  before  we  consider  transposing  all  or- part  of  the • 
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new  model  which  it represents  to  continental  Europe,  namely  to  a  heavily 
meshed,  very extensive grid system. 
Thus  TPA  is  in  no  way  the  only  means  of  developing  competition  in  the 
electricity supply sector,  and  other alternatives could be  studied. 
CONCLUSION 
This  analysis  may  appear  arduous,  but in fact does  no  more  than reflect the 
complexity  of  the  problem.  In  our  opinion  however,  two  clear  conclusions 
emerge: 
a)  Opening  of  the  grids  to  distributors  and/or  large  end-user  consumers 
must  be  excluded,  as it would  be  in opposition to  the mission of general 
economic  interest which  is that of the electricity supply industry. 
We  have  seen that such a  move  would  raise the following problems: 
- economic  losses  linked  to  less  closely controlled equipment  programming, 
and  with  a  shorter  horizon;  loss  of  control  by  the  public  authorities 
over  the  structure  of  production  resources,  and  consequently  over  the 
security of primary energy supply; 
- difficulties with management  of multiple contracts,  and  reconciliation of 
this  management  function  with  real-time  and  medium-term  control  of  the 
electricity  supply  system,  if we  are  to  preserve  the  economic  gains  of 
optimized  management,  and  the  security  of  supply  which  demands 
centralized control of the system; 
- quasi-impossibility  of  finding  a  method  of  remunerating  transmission 
services,  which  is  at  the  same  time  sufficiently  simple,  non-dissuasive 
with  respect  to  economically  justified  exchanges,  and  embodies  an 
incentive for grid development; 
- extreme difficulty,  or even  impossibility for  the  regulating  autho~ities, 
of  guaranteeing  the  absence  of  reciprocal  subsidies  between  captive  and 
non-captive customers. 
We  believe  that no  genuinely  sat~sfactory answer  to  these questions  exists, 
and  that  the present model  should consequently continue  to be  the  ~eference 
for organization and  op~ration of the electricity supply industry. 
b) ·Progress  with  operating  methods  currently  in  use  in  the  electric_ity 
supply  industry  is possible,  and  the electricity companies  are  ~eady  to 
play  their  part.  We  consider  that  two  channels  should  be  examined,  or 
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1.  Development  of  cooperation-competition  between  the  European  electricity 
companies. 
These  companies  have  been  engaged 
interconnection came  into being.  More 
the  organization  of  an  electricity 
improved  concertation  with  respect 
investments,  and  application  of  the 
operations. 
in  this  direction  since  European 
recently,  Eurelectric has  undertaken 
trading  exchange,  the  search  for 
to  production  and  transmission 
EEC  directive  concerning  transit 
Together,  these various  actions  should already make  it possible  to  increase 
the  efficiency  of  the  electricity  supply  industry  still  further,  and 
doubtless constitute the only means  of achieving this objective,  without  in  • 
any  way  losing  the  economic  advantages  obtained  from  the  current 
organization. 
2.  Other directions for extending competition 
The  experiments  described  in  Chapter 4  demonstrates  that  solutions  exist, 
other  than  a  TPA  situation,  for  improving  competition  in  the  electricity 
supply sector.  None  of the  known  channels is free  from  difficulty,  but all 
deserve  examination  or  investigation  in  greater  depth.  Eurelectric  is 
ready  to  undertake  this  work  with  the  EEC  Commission,  taking due  account  of 
the  fact  that  the  importance  of  the  electricity  supply  sector  in  both 
economic  and  social life,  necessarily demands  a  pragmatic  approach  to  these 
problems. 
The  European electricity companies  are ready,  should  the  EEC  Commission,  in 
agreement  with  their respective governments,  wish  to explore  such  channels, 
to  participate  in  experiments  concerning  independent  production.  This 
subject  could  then  be  examined  in  greater  depth  by  all  the  European 
electricity companies. 
The  purpose  of  this  investigation  should  be  to  check  the  feasibility  of 
these initiatives,  with respect  to the European electricity supply  system. • 
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IFIEC  EUROPE 
Siege: 
111-113 Chaussee de Charleroi 
Bruxelles (Belgique) 
Brussels,  April 4,  1991 
Re:  PCCE  Final Report 
GENIRAL  STATEMENt 
***  ORIGINAL  *** 
1  - Professional Consultative Committee  on Electricity 
***  IFIEC  EUROPE  ASSESSMENT 
The  initial terms  of reference proposed 
the  delegates  invited  to  participate 
Committee  on Electricity stated: 
by  the  Commission  and adopted by all 
in  the  Professional  Consultative 
"To  identity and present  the main  technical,  economic  and 
administrative considerations which  should be  taken  into 
account  in Community  policy on  whether and  by what  means 
TPA  to electricity transmission  systems  should  be  provided." 
The  Committee  was  asked,  as  a  &roup  of experts,  to  assist the  Commission  in 
identifying  these  factors.  An  objective  picture  taking  into account  the 
various views  of the  participants was  to be  drawn  up  in a  committee  report, 
with  the understanding that any  points  on which  disagreement  remained should 
be  clearly recorded therein .. 
IFIEC  EUROPE  delegates were  invited to 
behalf  of energy  consumer  industries 
assessment of the  PCCE  procedures  is  : 
participate in the  PCCE  meetings  on 
and  industrial  autoproducers.  Their 
(a)  The  PCCE  meetings  provided an open  forum  for all delegates  to  freely 
express  ideas  and opinions,  both verbally and  in writing.  Although  IFIEC 
Europe  does  not share  all the  views presented,  it supports  the principle 
whereby divergent views  should be  given equal expression. 
(b)  IFIEC  Europe  approves  the  Final  Report  as  a  balanced  committee 
report in which  a  wide  range  of views  on the subject is presented adequately. 
In this respect,  the  Report fulfills  the committee's  aims  as  set out in the 
initial procedural  terms  of reference.  , 
However,  the  opportunity has  been  offered to  IFIEC  Europe  to make  a  clear 
statement of  its particular views  ;  IFIEC  Europe  welcomes  this opportunity· 
and provides  the  statement attached herewith. 
IFIEC Europe 
c/o A.  MONGON 
25 Quai Paul Doumer 
F-92408 Courbevoie C4klex 
Tel. 33 1 47 68 18 98 
Tx Rh6ne X 810 500 F 
Fax. 33 1 47 68 23 n I 
I. 
IFIEC  Europe  General  Statement 
April,  1991 
2  - Third Party Access  (TPA) 
***  IFIEC  EUROPE  OBJEGTIVES 
2 ... 
For  IFIEC  Europe.  Tbird Party Access  is not an  end  in itself  ... 
2.1.  TPA  is  a  means  of  opening up  new  opportunities 
generators,  distributors  and  end-users.  This  POVER  OF 
expected,  as  in other competitive markets,  to  : 
of  CHOICE  for 
CHOICE  can  be 
(i)  provide  strong incentives  for  increased efficiency and reducing 
costs of supply, 
(ii)  enable  a  better balance  to  be  achieved in the  relationship between 
suppliers  and consumers  and a  greater responsiveness  to each others' 
needs, 
(iii) facilitate  a  greater diversity in  contracting practices,offering 
more  options,  and allowing consumers  a  greater role  in decisions  affec-
ting their supply arrangements. 
Consumers  today are  effectively captive users  of power  provided by monopoly 
suppliers  and are  obliged in most  cases  to adapt  to  tariff structures which 
are  imposed.  Furthermore,  consumers  have  few  effective  routes  for 
challenging these  structures,  and  no  transparent procedure  for  independent 
resolution of disputes. 
IFIEC  Europe  believes that the  traditional  structures  in place  today need  to 
be progressively adapted  to  respond  to  the need for  greater consumer  choice 
and influence in electricity supply. 
Traditional  power  suppliers,  themselves,  recognize  today  that choice  is 
fundamental  for optimising economic activity in declaring that open access  to 
primary sources  of energy is one  of their major concerns.  .  Choice  has  also 
been  fundamental  in  the  development  of  electricity  exchanges  between 
• 
suppliers  and will  remain a  key factor  in cross-border  electricity trade  > 
under  the  guidance of ehe _recent Electricity Transit Directive. 
Similar  and other  new  opportunities  for choice  in the  electricity market 
should be  extended,  on a  non-discriminatory basis,  to  independent producers, 
including industrial autoproducers,  as well as  industrial end-users  and  local 
distribution companies  acting on behalf of small and domestic  consumers. '  '4  • 
:• 
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IFIEC  Europe  General  Statement 
April,  1991 
• 
3 ... 
2.2.  IFIEC  Europe  has  a  high regard for  the  technical expertise  and grid 
control  experience  on  which security  of supply'  depends.  It  unreservedly 
accepts  the  key  role  of  the  grid  controllers.  However,  from  the  PCCE 
discussions,  it  appears  today  that there  are  no  insuperable  technical 
obstacles  to  TPA.  Nor  should optimisation procedures,  where  they exist,  be 
hampered by new  contractual  frameworks  governing customer relations. 
TPA  would enable  consumers  to  reach their  own  decisions  concerning  the 
trade-off between continuity of supply at all times  and  the  cost of providing 
it.  Customers  would  be  willing,  indeed would  seek  to  sign,  long  term 
contracts,  and this  would aid  investment planning  and hence,  security of 
supply. 
TPA  would also enable  new  entrants and new  technologies  to participate in·the 
markets,  creating  a  broader  generating base,  increasing  diversification in 
type  of  fuel  and  plant,  enhancing  differentiation in  order  to  respond to 
developing market  needs  and  attracting new  sources  of  capital  ;  such new 
opportunities  would  undoubtedly  increase,  not  diminish,  the  long-term 
security of supply within the whole  Community. 
2.3.  TPA  merits  careful consideration within the  scope  of future  Community 
Energy  Policy as  it is being elaborated today  : 
- in terms  of completing the  Internal  Energy Market,  the  EC  documents: 
* Commission working  document  COM  (88)238  Final 
* Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the Counsel  and  the  European 
Parliament COM(89)336  Final 
clearly raise  the  issue  of TPA  in terms  of the  implementation of  a  more 
integrated European market 
- more  recently,  the draft European  Energy Charter  proposes,  among  its 
operational· goals,  "the  development of trade,  particularly  through  the  free 
functioning of  the  market,  free  access  to  resources  and  the  development of 
infrastructures". 
IFIEC  Europe  believes  that  the  ultimate  s~ccess of such  emerging community 
intiatives as 
.  the  development of independent power, 
.  the  development of industrial self-generation,  CHP, 
.  the  development of renewables,  alternative fuels,  etc ... , 
.  the need  to  increase energy efficiency, 
the  need  to better protect the  environment, 
the  development of community  interconnection networks, 
will depend,  in large part,  on the extent to which  cons·umers  are given a  more 
active  role  in  the  decision-making  processes  associated  with  these 
initiatives. IFIEC  Europe  General  Statement 
April,  1991 
4 ... 
Industry(*),  in the past,  has  played a  major  role  in power  production across 
Europe.  As  a  key initiator of the existing European power  industry,  and as  a 
motor  of  economic  development  on which  economic  growth  and  social welfare 
depend,  Industry also has  the expertise and experience  to  play a  greater part 
in  reaching the  Internal  Energy  Market  and  the  European  Energy  Charter 
objectives. 
2.4.  Freedom  to obtain  the  power  supplies  best adapted  to  Industry's 
specific needs  is fundamental  to its  overall viability,  which  is,  in turn, 
essential to  the  Community's  long  term well-being.  Industrial  investment  is 
capital-intensive  and  long-term in  scope.  Where  Industrial activity  is 
energy-intensive,  supply conditions  are often a  key  factor  in  the  choice of 
plant site.  For other power  consuming  industries,  which have  to be  situated 
close  to their  down-stream markets,  energy costs may  be  one  of the critical 
factors  that  determine  their  commercial  margin  and  ability  to  remain 
competitive.  In many  cases,  project  financing  for  industrial development  in. 
the  future will  depend,  in part,  on industry's ability  to procure  long-term 
energy supplies under competitive conditions. 
* * * * * * * 
Industry today is world-wide  in  seo~e  and obliged to 'operate in competitive 
markets  that do  not-offer automatic pass-through of costs.  Choice  of supply, 
flexibility,  supply  security and balanced contractual  relationships are  the 
"stuff"  of TPA. 
IFIEC  Europe  asks  that careful,  objective  consideration be  given to  the 
overall  long  term benefits of  introducing competition and consumer  choice  to 
the  European  power  markets  as  they  evolve,  progressively,  into  a  more 
integrated Community  configuration.  TPA  should be  at  the heart  of energy 
policy discussions  in the  coming months,  not as  an  instrument  of chaotic 
change,  but as  a  means  to  flexible  problem solving  that will allow  Industry 
to  pursue  a  course of dynamic  economic  development within the  Community  in 
the  future. 
(*)  "Industry"  designates  hereafter:  energy  consuming 
industrial autoproducers 
industries  a.nd 
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THE  DESIRABILITY  OF  THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS  CTPAl 
Position statement of the association of the  Dutch electri-
city distribution companies. 
Europe without  internal borders 
The  structure of the public electricity supply  industry in 
the various Member  States is determined  on  the basis of 
national considerations and has  sharp national delimitati-
ons.  This has  led to the situation that on  both sides of 
the current internal borders completely different structu-
res are  found.  On  the basis of this mere  fact it may  be 
concluded that it will be  impossible to maintain the cur-
rent national structures when  the single internal market 
has been established.  So it is not  a  matter of whether 
there will be  any change,  but of which direction the change 
will have to take.  In fact,  the choice is between  incorpo-
ration of the current nationally defined structures into a 
centrally developed  EEC  structure and  an essentially diffe-
rent approach:  a  more  open energy market.  The  latter option 
is to be preferred for many  reasons.  A more  open energy 
market offers possibilities for better bringing out of 
diversity within Europe;  by competition it leads to higher 
efficiency and it offers the best perspectives for further 
development of the European electricity market. 
A more  open energy market is not feasible without  a  soluti-
on  for the apparent discrepancy between  an  open market  and 
the natural monopoly  of electricity transmission and elec-
tricity distribution.  TPA  is that solution.  TPA  provides 
the conditions  for  a  more  competitive electricity market 
while retaining the efficient use of the existing and 
future electricity supply infrastructure. 
Position of Local pistribution Companies  CLPC'sl  under  a 
TPA  regime 
The  introduction of TPA  leads to a  competetive situation 
for  LDC's vis a vis their customers,  which  in itself is 
already an  argument that LDC's  should be eligible for  TPA 
vis a vis their suppliers.  Furthermore  LDC's  buy large 
volumes  of electricity for their large and small consumers 
and are subsequently in a  position to enter into long term 
contracts for large volumes.  They are therefore an  impor-
tant player in a•more competitive market.  Of  course  LDC's 
need  a  high level of supply security. 
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This  should not  lead to the conclusion that LDC's,  for 
reserve capacity reasons,  should be obliged to buy all 
their electricity from  one supplier.  As  (industrial)  consu-
mers  LDC's  can enter into reserve  cap~city contracts as  a 
supplement to supply contracts.  Of  course - like  (industri-
..  , 
al)  consumers  - they have to pay for such reserve con- ~ 
tracts. 
It is sometimes  argued that a  TPA-regime will only benefit  • 
the large consumers at the cost of the small  consumers,  who 
are not eligible to reach out for  TPA  contracts. 
However,  (local)  distribution companies must  also - jointly 
if relevant - be able to negotiate TPA  benefits to reach 
out for  a  balance between the different categories of 
buyers  in the electricity market  including and  in particu-
lar in favour of the small  consumers. 
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ZENTRALE  VERBANO  DER  DEUTSCHEN  ELEKTROHANDWERKE 
German  translation of  Mr.  Fassbender's  letter 
to Mr.  C.L.Jones of  19.4.1991 
Dear  Mr.  Jones 
Concerns:  PCCE 
As  arranged  with  Mr.  Brakels,  I  send  you  my  position,  explained  in  the 
following: 
After  all  the  consultations  that  I  have  attended  to  and  after  having 
heard  all  the  arguments,  I  cannot  see  In  which  a  change  of  the  system 
should  lead  to advantages. 
Before  1  can  approve  of  any  of  the  reconunendat ions  made,  an  exact 
listing  should  be  drawn  up  that  would  clearly  show  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of  the existing national  systems. 
It  is  only  in  that  way  that  merely  approximately  a  responsbi le 
recommendation  can  be  given. 
With  best  regards, 
F.  Fassbender 